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Topics in Market Microstructure 
 
Abstract 
The increase in trading volume raised concerns about the impact of algorithmic trading, which 
includes high frequency trading (HFT), on price discovery process and volatility. First chapter 
considers the regulatory debate concerning HFT which led the European Commission to 
suggest implementing a financial transaction tax (FTT) of 0.1% on all stock transactions. A 
simulation of pure electronic limit order book (E-LOB) finds support to implement FTT. 
Particularly, traders are found to trade more aggressively by increasing the volume traded to 
remain in a profitable position after tax. The market, nevertheless, ended up with higher trading 
volume, lower bid-ask spread and almost same price volatility. The second and third chapters 
rebuild the London Stock Exchange Electronic Order Book (SETS) in real-time for 5 different 
stocks for two consecutive months, July and August 2007 and utilise the Directional Changes 
(DC) methodology to track price trends. Notional Volume Weighted Average Price (NVWAP) 
concept is used to analyse the intraday dynamics of liquidity in the London Stock Exchange E-
LOB; namely, the slopes of NVWAP curves and the volumes on both sides of the market (bid 
and ask) are studied. Second chapter observes that the shape of both sides of the order book 
changes during DC in predictable ways where changes in volumes and NVWAP curves’ slopes 
revealed to be robust proxy to identify the prevailing market trends without prior knowledge 
of price. Third chapter assesses order book events’ (OBE), i.e. submissions and cancellations, 
influence on the shape of the order book which generates price trends that may cause flash and 
mini-crashes. It revealed that OBE’ effects are highly significant determinants of the change in 
cumulative return under normal price conditions while only buy side events are significant 
under extreme price conditions. These findings match the expected direction of change in 
cumulative return. 
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Trading in the stock markets has undergone a dramatic perfection over the 20th century 
onward due to the pressure of the rapid growth of financial markets (Foucault, 1999). The 
promotion of automatic and electronic trading in financial markets has replaced the old trading 
system which is based on floor trading and dealership markets. Electronic limit order books, 
indeed, were the successful reliable candidate to replace floor and dealership markets. What is 
even more, it becomes possible with the wide spread of the internet to access and benefit from 
different information anytime and anywhere, the thing that motivated a necessary reconsidering 
of market structures. Changing market structures would raise many questions that should be 
answered in order to guarantee a smooth trading. The way markets will change, who will 
benefit from these changes and what and how the relationship between sellers and buyers will 
be controlled are examples of questions raised under the name of transparency (Grover et al., 
1999).  
In the recent years, the wide evolution on electronic commerce in both Europe in the U.S. 
has led to introduce new trading platforms (e.g. Chi-X and EdgeX) in stock exchanges (Colliard 
and Foucault, 2012). These platforms allow traders to utilize technology to swiftly buy and sell 
their shares in the market. Briefly, in line with the notion of fast automated execution and high 
technology, it has become ordinary for market participants to fully electronically complete their 
transactions with identified counterparties who want to transact/trade in a matter of seconds. 
This ultimately sets the tone for emerging a new style of trading known as high frequency 
trading (HFT), where automated systems electronically buy and sell given that they will not 
hold a particular position for a long instance (a few seconds or less). High frequency traders 
(HFTs) are becoming key players in equity markets due to large trading volumes. However, 
the variation of trading volumes, high volatility of intraday prices (possible trigger of Flash 
Crashes) and the massive growth in limit order submissions and cancellations caused by HFTs 
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have necessitated strict regulations to control the market (Cliff et al., 2011; Hagströmer and 
Nordén, 2012).  
For many years, HFT firms have undertaken their transactions smoothly and gained billions 
without being investigated (in shadows). They were criticised and accused of damaging 
markets and hurting regular investors. Interestingly, a massive public attention is recently 
placed on HFT since the U.S. May 6, 2010 Flash Crash along with the large trading volumes 
increase of HFT strategies. In other words, the ‘Flash Crash’ of 2010 pushed HFT into the 
spotlight (Gomber et al., 2011; Guo, 2012; Easley et al., 2012a). Interestingly, as there is an 
impact of HFT on market quality, there has been a considerable effort on questioning market 
quality and HFT. Most of the research which has investigated HFT has concentrated on the 
market impact of HFT on market quality measures. Besides, another bulk of studies has 
inspected the suitability of the current market regulations in the light of HFT. Most of the 
literature argues in favour of HFT but still more to learn from it. 
The present thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter studies the impact of the 
ongoing debate on re-regulating the market structure and its effect on HFTs. In particular, the 
European Commission is considering applying a financial transaction tax (FTT) of 0.1% on all 
stock transactions. The European Commission believes that the financial sector should 
contribute more fairly to cover the crisis costs. This contribution comes in a form of cancelling 
the VAT exemption of most financial services and starting participating in these costs. 
Although HFT is believed to be good for market quality, HFTs would be negatively hit by such 
a tax as low-margin HFT strategies would remain unprofitable. More specifically, any 
regulatory policy would mainly affect market makers if it is directed at HFTs. The hypothesis 
to be tested is HFTs would be negatively hit by such a tax and therefore the volatility will 
increase. This study is an attempt to simulate a stock market with large number of interacting 
agents. This simulation seeks to investigate the aforementioned impact on the market in general 
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and on HFTs in particular. This simulation is based on a pure order-driven market where asks 
and bids are directly matched in the limit order book.  
The second and third chapters rebuild the London Stock Exchange Electronic Order Book 
(SETS) in real-time for 5 different stock holdings for two consecutive months, July and August 
2007. The choice of these stocks considers including stocks from different sectors and different 
market capitalisations. The economic mechanism behind second and third studies is to 
continuously search for profitable algorithmic trading strategies and exploit trading 
opportunities. This, of course, has to be in line with the market regulations and fairness of trade. 
However, some trading strategies could be used to affect the price and set pressure on it to 
change in a certain direction to increase profitability of the trader (perpetrator). Predicting 
future price change to exploit profitable trading opportunities is considered to be lawful act. 
Yet, setting temporary pressure on the price (using order cancellations for example as a tool) 
to temporarily change in certain direction and then that pressure is deemed to be unlawful. 
Second and third studies will investigate these trading opportunities. 
Therefore, the second chapter aims at modelling the shape of bid and ask side of the order 
book using the notional volume weighted average price (NVWAP) concept to analyse the 
intraday dynamics of liquidity in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) limit order book. 
Specifically, it checks whether the shape of bid and ask side of the order book could be used 
as a proxy to identify the prevailing market trend without prior knowledge of the price. Within 
an algorithmic trading system, as market state changes, these four statistics can be used to 
switch between different trading strategies. 
By rebuilding the E-Order Book for London SETS for July and August in 2007, the third 
chapter reconstructs the demand and supply curves to analyse the market impact and the 
volatility with special focus on orders’ cancellations. More specifically, this paper investigates 
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how cancellations on both sides of the order book contribute to the market impact (price 
dynamics) explanation. It, also, aims at investigating the cancellations behaviour on both sides 
of the order book and their effect on market volatility (denoted by the bid-ask spread). To this 
end, different model specifications are defined and tested. All analysis is based on ultra-high-
frequency data from the order book which covers the periods where the market was 
experiencing a downtrend price change (from peak to trough). Robust regressions1, which 
control for efficiency under more realistic conditions, are run to check the validity of the 
regression results obtained. 
The remaining of this thesis is organised as follows. Next section presents the first chapter, 
which studies “European Commission Transaction Tax and HFT“. While the third section 
highlights the second chapter which discusses “Price Trends and Intraday Liquidity Dynamics 
in Limit Order Book”, the fourth section emphasises the third chapter of this thesis which is 
“The Effect of Cancellations in Electronic Order Book”. Section five concludes the thesis. 
  
                                                          
 
1 See Andrews (1974).  
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European Commission Transaction Tax and HFT 
 
Abstract 
The regulatory debate concerning high frequency trading has led the European Commission 
(EC) to suggest implementing a financial transaction tax (FTT) on all stock transactions. This 
proposed tax is set to be 0.1% on all stock transactions and will be implemented at the 
beginning of 2014 according to the EC. Building on the model created by Daniel and Cappellini 
(2006), we simulate a pure limit order market in order to find out how the proposed FTT would 
influence the market in general and high frequency traders (HFTs) in particular. We 
concentrate in this study on the main trading session during the trading day, namely the 
continuous double auction. Comparing the behaviour of the market before and after 
implementing this tax, I found support to the regulatory policy of the EC regarding introducing 
FTT. In particular, I found that traders tend to submit orders and start to trade more aggressively 
by increasing the volume traded in order to remain in a profitable position after considering the 
tax. The market, nevertheless, ended up with higher trading volume, lower bid-ask spread and 
almost same price volatility.  
 
Keywords: Order Book Simulation; High Frequency Trading; Volatility; Financial 
Transaction Tax.  
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1. Introduction 
For several decades, there has been an increased attention among economists with regard 
to financial economics in general and the market quality in terms of high frequency trading 
(HFT) in particular. This interest can be evidenced by the bulk of suggestions found in the 
literature that investigate and explain the role played by HFT in the financial markets, mainly 
in terms of the changes in market quality (Cvitanic and Kirilenko, 2010). Most academic 
studies on HFT pay extra attention to examining the effects on market quality. The majority of 
these papers have empirically investigated this impact and suggested that there is no evidence 
of negative effects of HFT on market quality. On the contrary, positive effects of HFT were 
noticed by a myriad of studies concerning different market parameters, liquidity and volatility 
(Gomber et al., 2011; Carroll, 2012). 
High frequency traders (HFTs) are becoming key players in equity markets due to large 
trading volumes carried out by them. However, the variation of trading volumes, high volatility 
of intraday prices (possible trigger of Flash Crashes) and the massive growth in limit order 
submissions and cancellations caused by HFTs have necessitated strict regulations to control 
the market (Hagströmer and Nordén, 2012). For many years, HFT firms have undertaken their 
transactions rapidly and gained billions without being investigated. They were criticised and 
accused of damaging markets and hurting regular investors (Guo, 2012).  
Nerudová and Dvořáková (2014) point out that as a result of the Financial Crisis, 
discussions about the possible taxation of the financial sector have started in the European 
Union following the United States in 2008. The EU Member States individually committed for 
a total of EUR 4.6 trillion2 in 2009 to support the financial sector. Those public interventions 
                                                          
 
2 This forms 39% of EU-27 GDP. 
 
13 
 
have significant budgetary consequences. That has imposed heavy burden on the present and 
future generations especially in Greece, Spain or Italy. Therefore there is a strong consensus in 
the European Union and internationally that financial sector should contribute more fairly to 
the public finance. In fact, recently there has been an ongoing debate on re-regulating the 
market structure. Moreover, it has been argued that taxes could be used as regulatory tools to 
mitigate the causes of the crisis, i.e. complex interaction of market failures, global monetary 
and financial imbalances and weak supervision.  
Carroll (2012) argues that the problems aligned with HFT are due to the existing market 
structure not because of HFT itself, the thing that needs to be seriously considered by 
regulators. As regulators have begun to deal with the proposed problem, the European 
Commission is considering applying a financial transaction tax (FTT) of 0.1% on all stock 
transactions. The European Commission believes that the financial sector should contribute 
more fairly to cover the crisis costs. This contribution comes in a form of cancelling the VAT 
exemption of most financial services and starting participating in these costs. Although HFT is 
believed to be good for market quality, HFTs would be negatively hit by such a tax as low-
margin HFT strategies would remain unprofitable. More specifically, any regulatory policy 
would mainly affect market makers if it is directed at HFTs.  
The International Regulatory Strategic Group (IRSG) report, in August 2017, indicates that 
the tax does not differentiate between HFT and other forms of trading. Although Mortgage 
Backed Securities, Collateralised Debt Obligations, Credit Default Swaps and leverage of the 
banks were the assets which led to the crisis, none of them are covered under the FTT3, which 
is instead aimed at HFT. Accordingly, it is very important for investors and interested 
                                                          
 
33 See the Centre for Policy Studies website. Available online at: 
https://www.cps.org.uk/blog/q/date/2017/08/07/the-drawbacks-of-the-financial-transactions-tax/.  
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researchers to test the impact of this tax on stock markets and specifically on HFTs. This can 
be done using simulation platforms as there is no data yet. The hypothesis to be tested is HFTs 
would be negatively hit by such a tax as their trading costs will increase, and therefore the 
volatility will increase.  
This study is an attempt to simulate a stock market with large number of interacting agents. 
This simulation seeks to investigate the aforementioned impact on the market in general and 
on HFTs in particular. In order to implement the empirical investigation, the present study 
implements a continuous double-auction mechanism, where agents can submit, 
asynchronously and at any time, limit or market orders to a single public book. Orders are 
sorted by price and then by time, as on the London Stock Exchange for instance. The simulation 
is conducted in the Matlab environment and builds on the model created by Daniel and 
Cappellini (2006) to implement the simulation. This simulation is based on a pure order-driven 
market where asks and bids are directly matched in the limit order book. Given the details of 
the market microstructure, the model used in this study is entirely defined by the characteristics 
of the agents responsible for generating the order flow, which makes it generic to be applied to 
any market.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief survey of the 
literature that investigated HFT: its regulations and its impact on the market along with 
analysing the FTT. Section 3 provides a brief description of the main procedures of market 
design and data simulation that are used in this study. Results of data analysis and discussions 
obtained by checking the impact of FTT implementation on the stock market are given in 
section 4 while the last section, section 5, concludes and gives some suggestions for future 
research. 
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2. Litrauture Review 
This section provides a brief survey of the literature that investigated HFT, its regulations and 
its impact on the market. It also presents the importance of the market regulations for 
participants and markets. This comes in line with emphasising the concept and the goal at which 
the authorities are aimed to be achieved. Two different case studies, however, are presented in 
which the two possible outcomes of implementing such a tax are represented, success and 
failure. These cases are (1) the Swedish case with a securities transaction tax (failure) and (2) 
the British case of applying a stamp duty (success). Finally, a comment on these experiences 
is provided.  
2.1 Brief Survey 
Interestingly, massive public attention is recently placed on HFT since the U.S. 2010 Flash 
Crash and the large trading volumes’ increase associated with HFT strategies. In the academic 
literature and due to the data availability matters, little attention is paid to HFT (Brogaard, 
2010; Gomber et al., 2011). Recently, there has been considerable effort on questioning market 
quality and HFT. Most of the research which has been carried out on HFT has highlighted the 
market impact of HFT on market quality measures. Besides, another bulk of studies has 
inspected the suitability of the current market regulations in light of HFT. However, there is 
still a gap between the results of academic literature and the beliefs predominant or sustained 
in media, public and even regulatory discussions on HFT impact on markets.  
Additionally, Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) have investigated the 2010 Flash Crash. They 
include low frequency traders (LFT) (i.e. humans) in line with HFTs (i.e. machine to count for 
the speed of submitting or cancelling orders, modelled as an uninformed trader) to model an 
electronic market. They suggest that the HFTs may have an impact on the average transaction 
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price and, hence, may change the whole transaction price distribution. Moreover, they glean 
some evidence on lower transaction price volatility hand in hand with improving the transaction 
price prediction. They, essentially, state that speed may explain the increase in market liquidity 
measures according to trading volume and inter-trade duration. These suggestions have been 
confirmed by many studies, such as Brogaard (2010), Hasbrouck and Saar (2010), Hendershott 
and Riordan (2011) and Groth (2011).  
Carroll (2012), in turn, investigates the open issues on HFT in line with the available 
empirical literature, i.e. the widely debated issue of the benefits of HFT and its regulations. 
Briefly, he provides an evaluation of the regulations set to organize HFT after studying 
different market quality issues in the context of HFT and Flash Crash such as manipulation, 
liquidity, volatility and market efficiency. He concludes that the problems aligned with HFT 
are due to the existing market structure not because of HFT itself. Moreover, he states that HFT 
plays a positive role in the financial markets. He also suggests that regulators have begun to set 
policies that push towards clarifying and providing better understanding of HFT and 
transparency. He adds that the current, and proposed, regulations are a step in the right direction 
in that they are aimed towards mitigating risks related to HFT manipulation that comes from 
structural defects. Lastly, he suggests that regulators must not consider only those traders who 
are engaged in HFT but rather they must consider all traders who use automated strategies. 
Guo (2012), besides, points out that HFTs are trying to give a good impression to regulators, 
public and other investors by stepping into the light. Full electronic trading in many stock 
markets has encouraged the researchers to pay more attention to automated trading strategies 
design and its impact on market quality. Considering the bad reputation of HFT in the media 
even with research evidences that suggest the good impact of HFT (see Carroll, 2012), 
authorities were urged to take an action regarding HFT and review the current regulations. 
These actions are supposed to ensure liquidity and prevent any manipulation. The European 
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Commission has introduced a FTT which in turn has raised many concerns about the impact of 
this tax on traders (HFTs in particular as they initially supposed to benefit the market) and 
financial markets. This tax has been announced by the European Commission (in 2012 to be 
applied by 2014) where it considers charging a FTT of 0.1% on all the exchanges of bonds or 
shares and 0.01% on derivatives contracts. 
In the context of regulations, Chlistalla et al. (2011) make the point that there were a 
comprehensive number of legislations passed in both the US and Europe in the years preceding 
the crisis in an attempt to re-regulate the securities markets4. They acknowledge that Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) is the representative of the regulation authority of 
securities markets in Europe where the Regulation National Market System (RegNMS) is its 
counterpart in the U.S. Both MiFID and RegNMS seek to strengthen the regulatory structure 
of the equity markets in Europe and the U.S. by pushing towards more competition between 
market participants. They are both supervising the markets and legislating updated regulations 
to achieve efficient, more integrated and liquid financial markets across all securities markets 
in Europe and the U.S. In this notion, it is worthy to cite Hanson (2011) who simulates a 
continuous double auction stock market and finds a justification of the regulators’ concern 
regarding HFT and its impact on market quality. He finds that adding more participants who 
are HFTs to the market leads to higher volatility in the market especially in times of high 
volatility or unstable markets. In other words, HFTs would exaggerate the problem, but not 
cause it, the thing that needs to be seriously considered by regulators.  
Hagströmer and Nordén (2012) point out that HFTs are becoming key players in equity 
markets due to large trading volumes. They go further by stating that the regulatory debate 
                                                          
 
4 Kirelenko et al. (2011) who investigated the 2010 Flash Crash suggest that the problem is not in HFT but in 
the market structure. 
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concerning HFT should take into consideration the importance of distinguishing different HFT 
strategies in order to be able to investigate their influence on market quality. They make the 
point that HFTs is a heterogeneous group of traders where different strategies are being used. 
Specifically, they (Hagströmer and Nordén ) use a unique data from NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm to empirically provide that distinction for equity markets. They find that in the 
group of HFTs, the liquidity supply of market makers5 is more often than opportunistic HFTs. 
Furthermore, market makers have higher order‐to‐trade ratios, lower latency, and lower 
inventory than opportunistic HFTs but they are both (in terms of strategies) mitigate intraday 
price volatility. However, the variation of trading volumes, high volatility of intraday prices 
(possible introduction to Flash Crashes) and the massive growth in limit order submissions and 
cancellations caused by HFTs have demanded strict regulations to control the market. On the 
other hand, they suggest that any introduced regulations, i.e. the FTT proposed by the European 
Commission, should take into consideration hitting market makers and therefore increasing 
market volatility.  
2.2 The Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) 
The debate of the securities transaction tax has been undergoing for a long time (Baltagi et 
al., 2006). In the context of the economic and financial crisis, the European Commission make 
the point that the financial sector should contribute more fairly to cover the crisis costs. This 
contribution comes in a form of cancelling the VAT exemption of most financial services and 
starting participating in the costs of the crisis (European Commission Website). As a 
consequence, a transaction tax on financial instruments has been proposed to be implemented 
by the beginning of 2014. The European Commission states that its proposal is mainly aimed 
                                                          
 
5 Market making is one of the strategies used by HFTs (see Jones (2013) for more details). 
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at ensuring a fair contribution of financial institutions in the crisis costs as well as avoiding 
internal market fragmentation for financial transactions (equal for all participants). The 
European Commission documents that “[t]he rates of FTT to be applied by Member States may 
not be lower than (minimum rates): 0.1 % for all financial transactions other than those 
concerning derivatives agreements; 0.01 % for all financial transactions concerning derivatives 
agreements.”  
Besides, Jones (2013) addresses that this proposal is aimed at raising revenue for the 
government but at the same time limiting HFT and other “excessive” trading. He also points 
out that this proposal is introduced by some policymakers who are still in doubt of the HFT 
value. He makes the point that transaction tax would increase the trading costs for investors 
and would also cause a fall in stock prices. This fall is due to the tax evaluation each time on 
the same share of stock when traded. Market participants would push stock prices to fall to 
preserve the same returns after-tax by the same amount they lost from their returns to the tax. 
He goes further and claims that transaction tax would negatively hit the stock market liquidity 
by increasing the bid-ask spread. This result is because market-makers would need to gain the 
tax by increase their bid-ask spreads. However, Schulmeister (2009) argues in favour of 
implementing such a financial tax. He suggests that implementing a small financial tax, which 
would be between 0.01% and 0.1%, would lead to mitigate price volatility over the short and 
the long run. This tax would also provide a considerable amount of revenues to governments.  
Interestingly, Jones (2013) provides an example of a 1% transaction tax which has been 
introduced by Sweden in 1984 and then repealed after a short time. The effect of this 
introduction on the returns’ behaviour of Swedish equity during the period between 1980 and 
1987 was investigated by Umlauf (1993). Consequently, after implementing the tax, the 
volatility was supposed to decline in response to the tax but not decreased. Stock price levels 
and turnover, however, dropped. Two years later, Sweden decided to increase the tax to 2%. 
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This rise results in a fall in the stock market by 5.3% at the time in which the tax was initially 
announced associated with about 60% movement of trading volume from Stockholm to 
London. Then, this transaction tax was removed in 1991 with a loss of the trading share equals 
to that which moved to London. Generally, regulators should be careful when implementing 
such a tax and try to learn from previous examples. 
2.3 Case Studies on Financial Transaction Tax 
In fact, any case study on financial transaction tax may be seen as misleading if, and only 
if, it is used to draw inferences and applications for a different environment. Studying 
international examples of tax implementations, however, would help us anticipate the possible 
changes in capital markets as a result of any tax activation. The Swedish experience with a 
securities transaction tax will be studied here, as a failure example, in line with the successful 
British application of a stamp duty. 
2.3.1 The 1984 Swedish securities transaction tax  
As legislation, Securities Transaction Tax (STT) in Sweden was effective from 1984 to 
1991. The Swedish experience in the STT is widely treated in the financial literature as a failure 
(Schulmeister et al., 2008). In this section, we provide a brief picture for the Swedish STT 
experience and attempt to illustrate and identify what was behind its disappointing 
performance. 
The Swedish financial sector has performed a dramatic growth in the early 80s the thing 
that accelerated the jealousy of the labour sector in the country. At the time, the labour sector 
was concerned about the “unjustifiable” earns of the young finance professionals compared to 
others where there should hypothetically be equal incomes in the society. This concern initially 
was based on the seemingly unproductive tasks, in terms of economic and social contributions, 
that these professionals performed according to the labour sector’s point of view. Hence, they 
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claimed a direct tax on domestic brokerage service providers without arguing in the 
inefficiency of the outcomes which result from trading in financial markets (Habermeier and 
Kirilenko, 2003 and Umlauf, 1993).  
The story of this tax began in January 1984 when Swedish labour sector in 1983 claimed 
it. Sweden authorities decided after this proposal by the labours to introduce a 0.5% tax (50 
basis points) on equities transactions on both purchases and sales which means 1% for the 
round trip. The Parliament approved this decision considering labour’s pressure more than the 
objections and resistance of the Swedish Finance Ministry and business sectors. As a result, 
registered Swedish brokerage services were subject to this tax as they are holding the 
significant size of exchanges in the market. Moreover, when using Swedish brokerage, the tax 
is not only payable by domestic customers but also foreign customers had to pay. No tax was 
levied in case of transacting without dealer. In other words, small traders who trade 
infrequently or in small volumes are not subject to this tax (tax free) as well as gifts. Exchanges 
between brokers at the time of tax adoption were not included in the taxation category until 
1987 as market makers were initially not considered as final consumers of domestic brokerage 
services. Rather, they were considered as intermediaries (Umlauf, 1993; Campbell and Froot, 
1994; Schulmeister et al., 2008). 
Additionally, Habermeier and Kirilenko (2003) and Schulmeister et al. (2008) acknowledge 
that the tax rate on stock options was 2% (200 basis points) for the “round-trip”, i.e. 2% is a 
result of  1% taxed at the option premium in addition to another 1% for the exercise of the 
option. This additional 1% was justified in a way that exercising the stock option makes it a 
transaction in the underlying stock and therefore becomes subject to tax charge. The popular 
awareness about how much transactions are useful in different financial instruments has been 
reflected in tax coverage and rates, i.e. those transactions which involve equity options being 
the least useful. Generally, introducing or increasing any tax will lead assets to be devaluated 
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by the investors accordingly in order to put the present value of the future tax payments into 
consideration. On the same day, an index fall of 2.2% was a result of the introduction of the 
tax. 
The labour sector has placed more pressure, in early 1986, on the Parliament to drive it 
towards reconsidering the transaction taxes issue. Both the Finance Ministry and the financial 
sector held their positions in further opposing of any tax increase. Again, the labour sector 
achieved another victory over its opponents despite their opposition. This resulted in a tax 
increase of another 1% to be 2% on equity transactions on July 1, 1986 (Umlauf, 1993). This 
increase initiated a 0.8% index fall only compared to 2.2% at the time in which the tax was 
firstly introduced (Schulmeister et al., 2008). 
On the other hand, tax revenues during the period 1984-1989 were not considered as bad in 
terms of growth but disappointing in levels though (see Table 1). Tax revenues were 
respectively SEK 820 million, SEK 1.17 billion, and SEK 2.63 billion, SEK 3.74 billion and 
SEK 4.01 billion for the years from 1984 to 1988. This corresponds to the following ratios of 
the total tax revenue in Sweden: 0.37, 0.45, 0.96, 1.17, and 1.21 percent respectively for the 
corresponding period (Bijlsma et al., 2012).  
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Equity tax revenues 0.82 1.17 2.63 3.74 4.01 
Equity trading volume 71 83 142 125 115 
Transaction tax rate 1% 1% 1%, 2% 2% 2% 
Table 1: This table presents the Swedish transaction tax revenues and trading volume, 1984-1988 (SEK billions)  
Source: Umlauf (1993), p. 4 (230 from the journal) 
Introducing a new transaction tax increases each transaction’s cost (Campbell and Froot, 
1994). This, therefore, may affect the investors’ behaviour in a way or another trying to avoid 
as much tax as possible. The possibility of not trading at all is always there though. 
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Schulmeister et al. (2008) make the point that the budgetary failure of the tax is mainly due to 
tax avoidance which also has effects on other taxes such as capital gain tax. Umlauf (1993) 
demonstrates that the huge drop in the capital gains tax revenues was a result of lower trading 
levels. He went further by indicating (p.229) that “[t]rading in Swedish government debt 
(which was also taxed) suffered so severely that taxes on bond trading were eventually 
removed. The interest rate options market evaporated with the imposition of taxes.” Thus tax 
avoidance negatively hit public revenues. Lower revenues were deepened after the migration 
of the most actively traded shares of large companies abroad under the pressure of higher costs.  
On April 1, 1990, the turnover tax on fixed-income securities was abolished following its 
introduction on January 1, 1989. A percentage of 60% of the spot market trading volume (bonds 
and bills) has been recovered following the tax removal. Futures market recovered slowly for 
bonds but not for the bills. Tax rates were reviewed in Sweden on all remaining transaction 
taxes and cut by one half before their removal on December 1, 1991. The bad design was the 
major reason behind the failure in Swedish turnover tax which led to migration of trading 
volume. Moreover, tax avoidance were made relatively easy by making the tax liability subject 
to using Swedish brokers only whereas it is worldwide when trading in UK companies 
(Campbell and Froot, 1994; Schulmeister et al., 2008). 
2.3.2 The British securities transaction tax (stamp duty) 
Recalling the Swedish experience in STT which is widely considered in the literature as a 
failure, there still another STT case which is considered as a success. The British STT or stamp 
duty is fairly different from its Swedish counterpart. It is a worldwide tax in terms of coverage 
not only subject to the usage of domestic trading/brokers services. Besides, stamp duty is 
payable upon the ownership transfer of the financial asset. In other words, tax applies when 
registering the ownership of a financial instrument. Campbell and Froot (1994, p.280) argue 
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that “an STT along British lines would be far more workable than a Swedish-style STT.” 
However, they also suggest that British-style STT is still likely to have critical behavioural 
affects additionally to the very optimistic revenue figure of $10 billion for a tax of 0.5%.  
Stamp duty has been set to different rates few times over time. It was 2% before lowering 
it to 1% in August 1963. Then, in May 1974, it was set to 2% again the thing that did not last 
for so long. In April 1984, it has been set to 1% before setting it at a level of 0.5% in October 
1986. Since 1986, when the “stamp duty reserve tax" (SDRT) was introduced as a replacement 
for the stamp duty, the tax rate has been set and kept at 0.5%. Both transfer documents and 
transacting agreements became subject to this tax under the rate of 0.5%, while it is 1.5% as an 
"exit charge". The introduction of SDRT restricted the tax avoidance and made the tax 
unavoidable even when trading overseas. Only shares which are transferred to clearance 
services to effectively avoid stamp duty and/or converted to financial products are subject to 
this "exit charge". Transactions in ordinary shares6 are subject to the stamp duty as well as 
assets convertible to shares (i.e. unsecured loan stock). Futures and options transactions, 
nevertheless, are excluded. Exercising an option at the exercise price is taxable as it is 
considered as a purchase of ordinary shares. Few exemptions from stamp duty are made such 
as registered charities and market makers registered by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
when making a market. Member firms of the London International Futures and Options 
Exchange (LIFFE) were also exempted when hedging equity options positions or satisfying 
delivery obligations following the equity options exercise. This exemption is also available for 
intermediaries, who are defined as natural liquidity providers, trading on any UK recognized 
                                                          
 
6 Any formal document produced is subject to the stamp duty tax. 
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investment exchange (Campbell and Froot, 1994; Saporta and Kan, 1997; Schulmeister et al., 
2008).  
In the era between 1997 and 2001, stamp duty has scored a much higher revenue growth 
than other taxes in the stock market before its fall in 2002 to 2004. Additionally, Schulmeister 
et al. (2008) addressed the extremely low tax collection costs for stamp duty where the average 
collecting cost is only 0.02 pence for each pound for SDRT compared to 1.11 pence per pound 
for all taxes collected by Inland Revenue. This is because of the electronic transactions system 
of the LSE which automatically applies tax on transactions. They also suggest few steps for the 
UK tax authorities to efficiently collect stamp duty when UK companies are listed on foreign 
stock markets. For example, charging interest on the stamp duty payable when returning the 
relevant legal documents to the UK on the share transactions that take place overseas.  
2.3.3 Remarks on the tax introduction 
Comparing the British with the Swedish experience clarifies the crucial role of the tax 
design. It is important not to face the large substitution effects which can be done by levying 
stamp duty paying no attention to the trade location or the investor. However, the British stamp 
duty is not perfect as there are potential adverse effects that need to be accounted for. 
Nevertheless, legislators, when setting any tax regime, should always assure that tax avoidance 
measures are kept at the minimum in order to pave the way for the tax to work well. This is 
because tax avoidance is a threat in terms of revenue bearing in mind that investors would adapt 
their behaviour accordingly. They should also keep in mind the academic evidence which 
indicates that (Jones, 2013) higher transaction taxes will lead to higher volatility, lower price 
efficiency, and worse liquidity. Put differently, STT is positively related with trading costs 
which may cause trading to move offshore as well as hitting stock prices. 
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3. Motivation 
Nerudová and Dvořáková (2014) point out that as a result of the Financial Crisis, 
discussions about the possible taxation of the financial sector have started in the European 
Union following the United States in 2008. The EU Member States individually committed for 
a total of EUR 4.6 trillion7 in 2009 to support the financial sector. That has imposed heavy 
burden on the present and future generations of some member states especially in Greece, Spain 
and Italy. Therefore there is a strong consensus in the European Union and internationally that 
financial sector should contribute more fairly to the public finance. In fact, recently there has 
been an ongoing debate on re-regulating the market structure. Moreover, it has been argued 
that taxes could be used as regulatory tools to mitigate the causes of the crisis, i.e. complex 
interaction of market failures, global monetary and financial imbalances and weak supervision.  
“Naturally estimated revenues may vary considerably depending on the tax rate but also on 
the assumed effect of the tax on trading volumes. An official study by the European 
Commission suggests a flat 0.01% tax would raise between €16.4bn and €43.4bn per year, or 
0.13% to 0.35% of GDP. If the tax rate is increased to 0.1%, total estimated revenues were 
between €73.3bn and €433.9bn, or 0.60% to 3.54% of GDP”, European Commission (2011).  
As regulators have begun to deal with the proposed problem, the European Commission is 
considering applying a financial transaction tax (FTT) of 0.1% on all stock transactions. The 
European Commission believes that the financial sector should contribute more fairly to cover 
the crisis costs. This contribution comes in a form of cancelling the VAT exemption of most 
financial services and starting participating in these costs. The International Regulatory 
Strategic Group (IRSG) report, in August 2017, indicates that the tax does not differentiate 
                                                          
 
7 This forms 39% of EU-27 GDP. 
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between HFT and other forms of trading. Although Mortgage Backed Securities, Collateralised 
Debt Obligations, Credit Default Swaps and leverage of the banks were the assets which led to 
the crisis, none of them are covered under the FTT8, which is instead aimed at HFT.  
Carroll (2012) argues that the problems aligned with HFT are due to the existing market 
structure not because of HFT itself. Although HFT is believed to be good for market quality, 
HFTs would be negatively hit by such a tax as low-margin HFT strategies would remain 
unprofitable. More specifically, any regulatory policy would mainly affect market makers if it 
is directed at HFTs. Accordingly, it is very important for investors and interested researchers 
to test the impact of this tax on stock markets and specifically on HFTs. This can be done using 
simulation platforms as there is no data yet. The hypothesis to be tested is HFTs would be 
negatively hit by such a tax as their trading costs will increase, and therefore the volatility will 
increase.  
Due to lack of real data on the effect of the proposed FTT, this study uses an asynchronous 
market simulator named NatLab, which stands for Natural Asynchronous-Time Event-Lead 
Agent-Based Platform. NatLab is a continuous asynchronous model in which thousands of 
individual traders interact through a central orders matching mechanism, just as it happens in 
real stock markets. Each trader has a unique decision function, which allows him/ her to trade 
at any time, to react to external news, to respond to price changes (or volume, volatility, etc.), 
and to consider the "fundamental price". This study is an attempt to simulate a stock market 
with large number of interacting agents. This simulation seeks to investigate the impact of FTT 
on the market in general and on HFTs in particular. In order to implement the empirical 
investigation, the present study simulates a limit order book of a market.  
                                                          
 
8 See the Centre for Policy Studies website. Available online at: 
https://www.cps.org.uk/blog/q/date/2017/08/07/the-drawbacks-of-the-financial-transactions-tax/. 
 
28 
 
The simulation is based on a pure order-driven market where asks and bids are directly 
matched in the limit order book. Our market implements a continuous double-auction 
mechanism, where agents can submit, asynchronously and at any time, limit or market orders 
to a single public book. Orders are sorted by price and then by time, as on the London Stock 
Exchange for instance. Every agent acts as a simple trader. The model used in this study9 is 
entirely defined by the characteristics of the agents responsible for generating the order flow, 
which make it suitable for different European markets.  
4. Data Sources, Definitions and Market Design 
This section introduces the initial steps and the way followed to generate and prepare the 
data for analysis purposes. It also outlines the definitions upon which I rely in order to design 
and build the market. Briefly, it states how the artificial market is built. 
4.1 Data Source 
In order to implement an empirical investigation, the present study has relied upon 
simulated data which is represented by detailed market data. In fact, this study simulates a limit 
order book of a market in order to extract useful information from it. The simulation is 
conducted in the Matlab environment and builds on the platform (Figure 1) created by Daniel 
and Cappellini (2006) to implement the simulation. This simulation is based on a pure order-
driven market where asks and bids are directly matched in the limit order book. It aims to 
provide a better comprehension to traders’ behaviour, intraday market events and price changes 
at the level of limit order book. Also, it aims to identify and forecast the impact of implementing 
a financial transaction tax on the market as well as on the traders, HFTs in particular.  
                                                          
 
9 See Daniel and Cappellini (2006) for more information on the agents’ order placement and cancellation 
strategies, as well as their patterns of activation. 
 
29 
 
 
Figure 1: Daniel and Cappellini (2006) simulation platform, "Natlab" where the five best bids and asks, last trade, total 
market activity and Bid-Ask spread can be observed. 
 
4.2 Definitions and Market Design 
For simplicity, I assume that the built market trades only one stock. For one stock in a 
specific time t, the limit order book can be described as follows: 
βn ≤ ⋯ β3 ≤ β2 ≤ β1 < α1 ≤ α2 ≤ α3 ≤ ⋯ αm (1) 
where βi and αj represent buy limit orders (bids) and sell limit orders (asks) respectively 
(Hasbrouck, 1993). Each limit order from the above has a limit price, a size and a time stamp 
for arrival time in the book. All limit orders, additionally, are queued and are waiting in the 
book to their turn to be executed where the book depth and the tick size are assumed and set to 
1024 orders and 0.01 Pound respectively. These queued orders are usually arranged or sorted 
according to their price, arrival time and then their size. This process would vary from market 
to market, but this study applies the LSE’s principle which is the price, arriving time and then 
order size respectively (or first come first served basis). The difference between the highest bid 
β1 and the lowest offer α1 is called the spread. 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖 (2) 
 
30 
 
Accordingly, β1 will be executed if it arrives market or limit sell order to the book which offers 
a lower price than β1. If this is the case, the transaction will be completed and β1 becomes the 
new market price.  
This study’s dataset, therefore, covers all the transactions, bids, offers, volume and all 
market details which are incorporated with this stock. The feature of this artificial stock market 
is that agents or traders are engaged in continuous trading session through a centralised limit 
order book. The number of agents, besides, is constant and will be set to N =2050 traders who 
are all risk-averse agents (this will be described in the next section). The main difference 
between market simulated data and the real market data is the identification of agents. In other 
words, any agent who completes a transaction can be identified in the simulated market. In real 
market data, however, identity is not available subject to regulations and anonymity reasons. 
Due to the interaction between agents’ demand and supply in the market, the price of the 
stock will fluctuate. This fluctuation is purely due to the non-linear interactions between 
traders’ demand and supply and is highlighted in the limit order book. For the sake of simplicity 
again, I assume that the market is a closed market, i.e., there is no money or information inflow 
or outflow along with constant number of traders. With this in mind, this assumption will let 
the price tend to change randomly around the steady state equilibrium price P*. Initially, this 
price is set by the total available amount of cash and shares and is defined as: 
𝑃∗ =
𝑁∗𝐶0
𝑁∗𝑆0
=
𝐶0
𝑆0
 (3) 
where for each agent/trader of the N traders, 𝐶0 and 𝑆0, respectively, denote the initial 
endowments of cash and shares. 
Alternatively, the trading day can be calibrated to the way real markets are organised, for 
example, the LSE trading day (this day excludes the opening and closing auctions) which lasts 
for 7.5 hours from 9:00 am to 4:30 pm.  Thus, the duration of trading day, in seconds, can be 
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directly estimated to T = 27000 seconds, which corresponds to 7.5 hours of continuous trading 
× 60 minutes × 60 seconds. The total trading days simulated forms two weeks of official trading 
plus one day. Put differently, we run the simulation for 300,000 seconds (Figure 2) assuming 
that each trading day equals to T = 27000 seconds as mentioned above to end up with roughly 
11 days of continuous trading, i.e., approximately two weeks of real trading. 
 
Figure 2: Setting the simulation run time 
To control for external events or incoming information in general, I run each simulation 
twice with and without tax assuming: (a) a fully closed market with no news effect or no 
external events are allowed once, and (b) allowing for incoming information to the market the 
other time. The probability of receiving good news is assumed to be Pr = 0.5; whereas Q = 1 – 
Pr represents bad news. Looking back at the 2010 Flash Crash, the idea of controlling for the 
news (see Figure 3 below) becomes justifiable in that on the day of the Flash Crash, the U.S. 
stock markets opened down and trended down most of the day. Leis (2012) acknowledges that 
on that specific day, financial markets have experienced a pressure at market open caused by 
the upsetting political and economic news concerning the European debt crisis in general and 
doubts over the Greek economic (debt) problem in particular. Furthermore, Zhang (2012) after 
analysing a high frequency data from NASDAQ suggests that HFT profits are affected by news 
shocks.  
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Figure 3: This figure shows the traders population and how to control for news flow, tick size, book depth and 
transaction tax. 
 
4.3 Market Participants 
The number of agents previously mentioned, i.e., N =2050 agents, has been considered in 
the market analysis so as to take into account the diversity of the traders which is likely to be 
determined by the number of contracts transacted by each trader. Therefore, these types of 
traders will be included in the market which this study simulates. This artificial market has 
been totally set with agents who are mainly liquidity providers. Random traders are risk-averse 
agents and trade with the utility function of: 
𝑈𝑖(𝜋𝑖) = −𝑒
−𝜌𝑖𝜋𝑖  (4) 
where 𝜌𝑖 is the CARA coefficient (see Vives (2008) for detailed CARA-Gaussian model). The 
return 𝜋𝑖 for each trader i is computed according to the CARA-Gaussian model as:  
𝜋𝑖 = (𝜃 − 𝑝)𝑥𝑖 (5) 
from buying 𝑥𝑖 units at price of 𝑝 and share random fundamental value of 𝜃. I classify market 
participants into three categories according to the manner by which each group trades. The 
market, hence, mainly includes: HFTs group, intermediaries and opportunistic group and small 
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traders group. The identification of HFTs is of importance. HFTs identification, in the 
literature, has been done following either exchanges id or data‐driven definitions 
classifications. Thus, the current study will follow Kirilenko et al. (2011) who use a data‐driven 
classification to identify HFTs as the top 7% of intermediaries with highest trading volume. In 
general, HFTs are the most skilled group (see Vacha et al., 2012) where I assume that this 
group represents traders who traded the top 10% to 20% of the highest volume (auctions) in 
the market. This assumption combines between Kirilenko et al. (2011) and the law of vital few 
for Pareto. 
Market type 
stats 
No tax, no news With tax, no news No tax, with news With tax and news 
Volume mean 41.19 40.19 22.25 22.41 
Volume stdev 76.12 84.60 62.89 55.41 
Volume mode 5 5 5 5 
Volume 80th percentile 97 93 9 12 
Volume 90th percentile 127 125 91 94 
TABLE 2: This table shows the frequency statistics for the mean, standard deviation, mode and percentiles used to 
determine the truncation value 
Technically, dataset will be truncated according to transacted volume at level of the value 
of the 80th percentile (TABLE 2) which corresponds to each market type in order to allow for 
HFTs group’s investigations. The reason behind why we care for the top 20% traders is Pareto 
Efficiency Law or Law of the Vital Few (80-20 rule) in that studying 20% of the participants 
could make inferences about 80% of market changes. This is because the top 20% are the 
richest (see United Nations Development Program, 1992). On the other hand, small traders are 
those who traded 5 shares or less each time, whereas intermediaries and opportunistic traders 
are those who fall in neither of the abovementioned groups. Agents can only view or access 
the current state of the market, namely current market price, best bid and best offer available. 
Agents, accordingly, can place market or limit orders randomly around viewed prices. 
Furthermore, based on the fact that stock markets’ activity is affected by external events or 
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news (see Leis, 2012; Kirilenko et al., 2011), I introduce in the simulations, additionally to random 
agents, an informer trader to allow for informed trading. Random agents are market liquidity 
providers while informed traders are subject to place orders aggressively to the book.  
5. Simulation Results 
The major aim of this section is to introduce, highlight and analyse the results conducted 
from the simulated data. These findings will be analysed vis-à-vis the target objective of this 
study, namely investigating the impact of the FTT proposed by the European Commission. 
This can be implemented by analysing the simulated data as a whole to address the impact of 
this proposed tax on the market trading activity, or specifically, by analysing the transacted 
volume during the trading period.  
Beyond the prevision of the dataset acquired, data truncation will be employed in order to 
address the tax impact upon large traders. For so doing, the following procedures have been 
followed. I have run the simulation four times. The simulation has been run for the first time 
before implementing the transaction tax along without allowing for external events flow 
(closed market assumed). The second time, on the other hand, I have run the simulation after 
implementing the transaction tax but without allowing for the flow of external events, too. As 
a result, the market remains closed. Consequently, it is possible to investigate the impact of the 
transaction tax on the market in general and on the traders in particular. It is not always the 
case, however, that the market is isolated from the external environment. This ultimately leads 
to re-run the simulation two more times. Since there is an impact for the external events or 
incoming news on the market, I have run the simulation for the third time allowing this time 
for external events to flow but not allowing for the tax to be implemented. The simulation has 
been run for the last time, not surprisingly, after allowing for the transaction tax and flow of 
external events together. 
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5.1 Closed Market (no news flow) 
In general, the cases in which the simulated market have been run without allowing for 
news flow are studied. More specifically, these cases include two datasets for simulated market: 
one is before implementing the transaction tax, whereas the other is after implementing the 
transaction tax. 
4.1.1 before transaction tax implementation 
Bid Ask 
Rank Volume Price Price Volume Rank 
1 5 80.86 80.87 5 1 
2 146 80.66 80.90 5 2 
3 1 80.55 80.92 63 3 
4 5 80.54 81.00 152 4 
5 5 80.50 81.04 5 5 
Total Number of Trades 117 384 Total Number of Volume Traded 4 834 749 
Number of Trades carried out by top 
20% (including HFTs Group) 
25 526 
Number of Volume Transacted by top 
20% (including HFTs Group) 
3 882 322 
Number of Unexecuted Buy Orders 
which is transferred to the Next Day 
312 
Number of Unexecuted Sell Orders 
which is transferred to the Next Day 
285 
Volume of Unexecuted Buy Orders 45 647 Volume of Unexecuted Sell Orders 40 561 
Table 3: This table depicts the limit order book snapshot when market is closed and tax is not imposed. It shows the five 
best bids and asks on both sides of the market at the end of the last trading day simulated with further information from 
the book during the two weeks of trading. The volumes carried out from each side of market are reported at the end of 
the last trading day simulated. 
As Table 3 above best illustrates, it can be noticed that the difference between the highest 
bid β1 and the lowest offer is α1 is: α1−β1 = 80.87 – 80.86 = 0.01. Since this number, which 
is Bid-Ask Spread, is relatively small, it means that the stock is highly liquid.  Furthermore, 
according to Mills and Markellos (2008), the volatility of the return of the stock could be 
conducted by applying the following formula given that 𝑝𝑡 is the price at time t: 
σ̂2 =
1
n−1
(∑ r𝑡
2n
t=1 −
log(pn/p0)
2
n
)  (6) 
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where σ2 is the true return variance and p0 and pn are respectively the first and last prices 
observed while 𝑟𝑡 is the return which is calculated as: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1 (7) 
This reveals that the mean-adjusted estimator corresponds to ?̂?2 = 0.0255. That is to say 
the price volatility of this stock is equal to 15.98%. Figure 4 below indicates the stock price 
movement during the simulated period. It shows a slight decrease in the stock price in the first 
week, while it mirrors nearly a linear movement with a low volatility. 
 
Figure 4: The stock price movement during the simulated perioud before allowing for tax 
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4.1.2 after transaction tax implementation 
Bid Ask 
Rank Volume Price Price Volume Rank 
1 4 91.90 91.93 9 1 
2 5 91.88 92.48 4 2 
3 5 91.83 92.49 5 3 
4 5 91.83 92.50 12 4 
5 114 91.83 92.66 120 5 
Total Number of Trades 132 739 Total Number of Volume Traded 5 334 513 
Number of Trades carried out by top 
20% (including HFTs Group) 
27 365 
Number of Volume Transacted by 
top 20% (including HFTs Group) 
4 304 650 
Number of Unexecuted Buy Orders 
which is transferred to the Next Day 
291 
Number of Unexecuted Sell Orders 
which is transferred to the Next Day 
273 
Volume of Unexecuted Buy Orders 42 867 Volume of Unexecuted Sell Orders 39 206 
Table 4: This table shows the limit order book snapshot when market is closed and tax is imposed. It presents the five best 
bids and asks on both sides of the market at the end of the last trading day simulated with further information from the 
book during the two weeks of trading. The volumes carried out from each side of market are reported at the end of the 
last trading day simulated. 
A deep examination of Table 4 discloses that the difference between the highest bid (β1) and 
the lowest offer (α1) in this case is: α1−β1 = 91.93 – 91.90 = 0.03 compared to 0.01 before 
implementing the transaction tax. Bid-Ask Spread, interestingly, is relatively small which 
means that the stock is highly liquid. The volatility of the stock return, besides, (i.e. the mean-
adjusted estimator) is equal to ?̂?2 = 0.0342. This ultimately means that the price volatility of 
this stock is equal to 18.46% compared to 15.98% before implementing the tax (a small 
difference though). Additionally, comparing the total number of volume traded in the market 
during the period of study before and after implementing the transaction tax suggests that this 
number has increased by nearly ≈ 11% (from 3,882,322 to 4,304,650) after implementing that 
tax. One possible explanation for this increase is that HFTs and part of the intermediaries start 
to trade aggressively in order to remain in a profitable situation. Furthermore, the result goes 
in line with Colliard and Foucault (2012) who studied a limit order market in which traders 
have to pay a trading fee to the market owner before they start trading. It also matches the 
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findings of Malinova and Park (2011) who based their analysis on trading fee changes on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) on two distinct dates in 2005. The stock price movement 
during the simulated period is displayed in the Figure 5 below. The price reflects higher 
volatility compared to the previous market which was running before implementing the tax. 
However, this volatility is still small with a price downtrend during the simulated period. 
 
Figure 5: The stock price movement during the simulated perioud after allowing for tax 
 
5.2 Open Market (with news flow) 
In a related manner, I consider the case in which the simulated market has been run 
allowing, this time, for news flow. On a deepened level, this case, also, includes two datasets 
for simulated market: one is before implementing the transaction tax while the other is after 
implementing the transaction tax. 
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4.2.1 before transaction tax implementation 
Bid Ask 
Rank Volume Price Price Volume Rank 
1 5 85.22 85.76 110 1 
2 57 85.21 85.80 159 2 
3 5 85.15 85.88 163 3 
4 5 85.15 85.95 143 4 
5 5 85.14 85.98 134 5 
Total Number of Trades 192 271 Total Number of Volume Traded 4 278 590 
Number of Trades carried out by top 
20% (including HFTs Group) 
28 883 
Number of Volume Transacted by 
top 20% (including HFTs Group) 
3 520 603 
Number of Unexecuted Buy Orders 
which is transferred to the Next Day 
415 
Number of Unexecuted Sell Orders 
which is transferred to the Next 
Day 
329 
Volume of Unexecuted Buy Orders 58 641 Volume of Unexecuted Sell Orders 49 509 
Table 5: This table depicts the limit order book snapshot when market is open and tax is not imposed. It shows the five 
best bids and asks on both sides of the market at the end of the last trading day simulated with further information from 
the book during the two weeks of trading. The volumes carried out from each side of market are reported at the end of 
the last trading day simulated. 
Looking at Table 5, it reveals that the difference between the highest bid (β1) and the lowest 
offer (α1). This difference is calculated to be equal to: α1−β1 = 85.76 – 85.22 = 0.54. It is of 
interest to state that the Bid-Ask Spread has increased after allowing for the external events 
compared to the market where news flow is not allowed. However, the spread is still relatively 
small, the thing that means that the stock is still considered as highly liquid. The volatility 
measure of the stock return, besides, (i.e. the mean-adjusted estimator) has been calculated to 
be equal to σ̂2 = 0.0045. This eventually means that 6.73% represents the price volatility of 
this stock. Compared to the measurement value of volatility in the closed market which equals 
to 15.98%, the stock price volatility becomes clearly lower after allowing for informed trading 
or external events flow. Thus, we can argue in favour of the good impact for HFTs on the 
market. This goes in line with many researches who have gleaned some evidence upon the 
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good impact of HFT on the market quality (e.g. Chaboud et al., 2009; Brogaard, 2010; 
Hendershott et al., 2011; Hendershott and Riordan, 2011). Figure 6 below shows the stock price 
changes during the simulated period where it demonstrates a downtrend price movement for 
the whole simulated period. 
 
Figure 6: The stock price movement during the simulated period after allowing for news and before allowing for tax 
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4.2.2 after transaction tax implementation 
Bid Ask 
Rank Volume Price Price Volume Rank 
1 134 90.07 90.28 22 1 
2 170 90.00 90.31 246 2 
3 46 89.77 90.34 135 3 
4 123 98.72 90.38 101 4 
5 155 98.72 90.38 104 5 
Total Number of Trades 196 589 Total Number of Volume Traded 4 406 250 
Number of Trades carried out by top 
20% (including HFTs Group) 
29 585 
Number of Volume Transacted by 
top 20% (including HFTs Group) 
3 635 196 
Number of Unexecuted Buy Orders 
which is transferred to the Next Day 
329 
Number of Unexecuted Sell Orders 
which is transferred to the Next 
Day 
311 
Volume of Unexecuted Buy Orders 49 755 Volume of Unexecuted Sell Orders 43 448 
Table 6: This table depicts the limit order book snapshot when market is open and tax is imposed. It shows the five best 
bids and asks on both sides of the market at the end of the last trading day simulated with further information from the 
book during the two weeks of trading. The volumes carried out from each side of market are reported at the end of the 
last trading day simulated. 
Table 6 above displays that the difference between the highest bid (β1) and the lowest offer 
(α1) is α1−β1 = 90.28 – 90.07 = 0.21. The Bid-Ask Spread in this case, interestingly, is 
relatively small which, also, means that the stock is highly liquid. After allowing tax 
implementation, the spread becomes smaller, lowering from 0.54 to 0.21 compared to 0.03 for 
the closed market where news flow is not allowed. The mean-adjusted estimator for the 
volatility of the stock return equals to σ̂2 = 0.0052 which means that the price volatility of the 
stock is equal to 7.23% compared to 6.73% before applying the transaction tax where they 
seem to be indifferent. The volatility numbers suggest that volatility measures have not been 
strongly affected by the tax implementation. Moreover, the total number of volume traded in 
the market during the period of study before and after implementing the transaction tax 
suggests that this number has increased by nearly 3% (from 4,278,590 to 4,406,196 ≈ 3%) after 
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implementing that tax. Observing lower spread, roughly same volatility and higher trading 
volume, I would suggest pushing forward into transaction tax implementation. This suggestion 
stands partially against the claim made by Hagströmer and Nordén (2012). They argue that the 
FTT proposed by the European Commission would increase market volatility by hitting market 
makers in a way that makes most HFT strategies remain unprofitable. Figure 7 below 
demonstrates the stock price movement during the simulated period. The stock price had a 
smooth downtrend in the first week of trading, the thing that started to change, also smoothly, 
into an uptrend afterwards with a low volatility. 
 
Figure 7: The stock price movement during the simulated period after allowing for news and tax 
To sum up, for the purpose of analysis, and since this study has exclusively focused on the 
impact of the FTT proposed by the European Commission on the market and its participants, 
the market has been limited to 205010 traders who traded twice: once without paying any tax,  
and the other with tax paying. Accordingly, market was assumed to be closed market once, 
where an external event or information is not allowed to flow, whereas news flow is allowed 
another time. This specific choice of traders could be attributed to assure the variety of traders 
                                                          
 
10 This number is 2052 when accounting for the two informers added to the market to allow open market 
assumption test. 
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in the market. Consequently, the analysis of the different market conditions reveals that the 
proposed FTT may not negatively hit the market. Rather, it increased traded volume without 
negatively affecting the bid-ask spread or volatility in the market. 
6. Conclusions 
This study is an attempt to empirically examine the impact of transaction tax 
implementation on the stock market by modelling a pure limit order market with a 
heterogeneous set of players. This set of players includes traders who are liquidity takers and 
providers where they buy and sell a single asset in the market. Inspired by previous studies 
which simulate the order book and those investigating real markets, an order-driven market is 
simulated using a double auction in order to let supply and demand match. The artificial market 
n this study is populated exclusively with zero-intelligence agents who randomly place orders. 
Yet, the specifications of the limit order book in this artificial market has led to generate a non-
random price. The novelty of the current research lies in the use of simulated order flow data 
to assess the impact of the proposed FTT on the market quality as well as on the market 
participants. This study finds support to the regulatory policy of the European Commission 
regarding introducing a FTT of 0.1% on all stock transactions. In particular, traders are found 
to tend to submit orders and start to trade more aggressively by increasing the volume traded 
in order to remain in a profitable position after considering the tax. The market, nevertheless, 
ended up with higher trading volume, lower bid-ask spread and almost same price volatility. 
This may suggest that the proposed tax does not affect HFTs in a negative way. On the contrary, 
it induced them to perform more trading volume. This may mitigate the EU concerns regarding 
tax implementation which would reduce the profit margin of HFT strategies and, therefore, 
they remain unprofitable. However, more research on this topic needs to be undertaken, 
preferably using real data, in order to clearly understand the association between tax and HFT.  
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Price Trends and Intraday Liquidity Dynamics in Limit Order 
Book 
Further evidence from the London Stock Exchange Electronic Order Book (SETS)  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this study, we rebuild the London Stock Exchange Electronic 
Order Book (SETS) in real-time for 5 different stocks. This paper’s 
aim is to model the shape of bid and ask sides of the order book using 
Notional Volume Weighted Average Price (NVWAP) concept.  
Using data for five different stocks from London SETS over a 
period of two consecutive months, July and August 2007, this paper 
analyses the intraday dynamics of liquidity in the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) limit order book and constructs the demand and 
supply curves to predict future price trend. The results suggest that 
the shape of bid and ask side of the order book is revealed to be 
robust proxy to identify the prevailing market trend without prior 
knowledge of the price. 
 
Keywords: Order Book Rebuild; High Frequency Trading; Volatility; Liquidity Dynamics; 
Price Trend; Predict Future Price Trend 
  
 
46 
 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, the wide evolution in electronic trading has led to introduce new trading 
platforms in stock exchanges (Colliard and Foucault, 2012). These platforms allow traders to 
utilize technology to swiftly buy and sell their shares in the market. Thus, utilizing the fast 
automated execution and high technology, market participants complete their transactions fully 
electronically with identified counterparties who want to transact/trade in a matter of seconds. 
This ultimately sets the tone for emerging a new style of trading known as high frequency 
trading (HFT), where automated systems electronically buy and sell. HFT strategies update 
their orders very quickly (a few seconds or less) and have no over-night positions (Gomber et 
al., 2011).  
Market microstructure is closely related to the investments field, which studies the process 
under which investors’ latent demand and supply are ultimately translated into prices and 
volumes. Noticeably, the rapid technological, structural and regulatory changes in the securities 
industry world-wide have placed more interest in market microstructure. These structural shifts 
are caused by complex processes such as new technological innovations, the substantial 
increase in trading volume, changes in the regulatory environment and the creation of new 
financial instruments.  
An important function of financial markets is to produce information. One important issue 
in recent market microstructure research has been whether knowledge of the structure of the 
electronic limit order book is informative regarding future price movements. Informational 
research in microstructure contains investigating the price formation and price discovery. 
Essentially, this topic is concerned with looking inside the “black box” where latent demands 
are translated into realized prices and volumes. There has been an extensive empirical research 
on the informational content of the electronic limit order book (E-LOB). This research is 
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relevant to predicting price movements in the stock markets (see Madhavan, 2000; Kane, 2011; 
and Kozhan and Salmon, 2012). 
As a trading mechanism of financial markets, electronic limit order markets are gaining 
more importance. All limit orders are collected in the order book at any given point of time. 
Orders come into the book throughout the day at the time they are submitted to the market. 
These orders are removed from the book as they are executed, cancelled, or expired. To match 
supply and demand on a daily basis, stock exchanges all over the world use trading rules and 
mechanisms. Following progress in technology, those rules and mechanisms not only differ 
between exchanges but can also change in time. Generally, traders use computer based 
algorithms to buy (sell) a position while endeavouring to stick to a client’s selected benchmark. 
Trading algorithms are continuously looking for profitable opportunities to trade. Therefore, 
analysing each market event and its impact on liquidity at a micro-level is of great interest to 
market participants (see Degryse et. al., 2005; Gilles, 2006; and Frei and Westray, 2015). 
One of the oldest and most popular benchmarks used in computer based algorithms is 
Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP). For several reasons, the VWAP benchmark is very 
popular amongst both brokers and clients. It is very simple to calculate, so it facilitates the post-
trade reporting. It helps breaking large orders into smaller ones which reduces market 
impact/volatility as it mitigates the demand for large liquidity. Besides, it is considered as a 
“fair benchmark price” at any given time interval. Malik and Markose (2012) have introduced 
the concept of Notional Volume Weighted Average Price (NVWAP). It refers to the average 
expected transaction price for a given order of volumes priced at different prices. They argue 
that the information conveyed by the NVWAP curves and more specifically the price trend 
indicator (the statistics about the state of the limit order book) defined in their work is quite 
useful as an indicator of prevailing market trends. They emphasise that the change in the slope 
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of the NVWAP curves as well as the change in the total volume on each side of the limit order 
book can be used in an algorithmic trading strategy to exploit different trading opportunities.  
The objective of this study is to analyse the intraday dynamics of liquidity in the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) limit order book for five different stocks over a period of two 
consecutive months, July and August 2007. These two months fairly represent the period before 
the Financial Crisis in 2007 whereby unlike August (when the financial crisis triggered), the 
month of July is a fairly stable month. This study will model the shape of bid and ask sides of 
the order book using NVWAP concept using different stock holdings from the London SETS. 
To this end, I replicate Malik and Markose (2012) methodologies to construct the demand and 
supply curves for different stocks from LSE to predict future price trend. After that, I perform 
out-of-sample tests using different time intervals to see how accurately this indicator would 
predict future price trend. Then, I compare the obtained results against their findings. 
This study proceeds as follows. The following section presents a brief survey of the 
literature that investigated electronic order books and computational market microstructure. 
Section three describes London SETS Data. Data and methodology are discussed in the fourth 
section. Section 5 focuses on the analysis and results. Lastly, section 6 concludes. 
 
  
 
49 
 
2 Literature Review 
This section surveys the technological and technical improvements that proceed alongside 
with financial markets. It, also, covers the HFT and its impact on financial markets. Then, it 
briefly discusses the E- LOB and its informational content. Finally, it describes VWAP as a 
trading benchmark.  
2.1 Technology, Algorithmic Trading and High Frequency Trading 
Briefly, over the years, automated order execution systems have continued to be developed 
allowing instant information processing and setting the human intervention or action taking to 
the minimum. These systems, as a result, become known in financial industry as “algo” or 
algorithms (Brownlees et al., 2011). With respect to Algorithmic Trading, it is noteworthy to 
highlight that Chabound et al. (2009) defined it as trading platforms which are directly run on 
computers at high frequency basis. Hendershott and Riordan (2009) consider the process of 
making trading decisions, submitting orders and adjusting submitted orders using computer 
algorithms as algorithmic trading. Put differently, the term algorithmic trading was generally 
defined by Domowitz and Yegerman (2005) as equity orders executed automatically by 
computers using direct market-access channels with the goal of achieving a specific standard. 
They, also, imply that programme trading and rules-based trading could be used as alternative 
terms to demonstrate algorithmic trading. Moreover, Chordia et al. (2008) make the point that 
over the recent years, algorithmic trading was behind the increase in trading volume as well as 
the drop in the average trade size. The increase in trading volume may explain the concerns 
about the impact of algorithmic trading on price discovery process and volatility.  
Cliff et al. (2011) place particular attention on market impact when executing large orders. 
They suggest that reducing this market impact is one of the most important motivations which 
inspire developing automated execution systems. Arguably, execution of very large orders by 
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a trader affects the market price as it encloses a sudden sharp increase in supply (demand) 
which may cause a negative (positive) impact on price and an interaction from the 
counterparties. In other words, they define the case when the price moves against the trader 
before his deal is done as market impact. This negative price movement is due to the size of 
his order along with quick execution. Briefly, it has become ordinary for market participants 
to fully electronically complete their transactions in a matter of seconds. This ultimately sets 
the tone for emerging a new style of trading known as high frequency trading (HFT), where 
automated systems electronically buy and sell given that they will not hold a particular position 
for a long instance (a few seconds or less). 
In sophisticated technology driven markets, HFT is an important aspect when it comes to 
price formation process. In the recent years, a significant amount of scientific and technical 
research has placed more attention on optimizing more reliable systems to deal with HFT based 
on high frequency data (HFD) (Easley et al., 2012). Briefly, Leinweber (2009) points out that 
always there are some traders or investors who are much faster than others due to technological 
breakthroughs used by these traders. Within a similar vein, Easley et al. (2012) and Fabozzi et 
al. (2011) agree with Leinweber (2009) that speed is a very important factor to the success of 
HFT.  
2.2 High Frequency Trading and Market Impact 
Interestingly, public attention is recently immensely placed on HFT since the U.S. May 6th, 
2010 Flash Crash along with the large trading volumes increase of HFT strategies (Gomber et 
al., 2011). Easley et al. (2012) state that the ‘Flash Crash’ of 2010 pushed HFT into the 
spotlight. Accordingly, in sophisticated technology driven markets, HFT is an important aspect 
when it comes to price formation process. A significant amount of scientific and technical 
research has placed more attention on optimizing more reliable systems to deal with HFT based 
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on high frequency data (HFD). Briefly, Leinweber (2009) points out that there are always some 
traders or investors who are much faster than others due to technological breakthroughs used 
by these traders. Within a similar vein, Easley et al. (2012) and Fabozzi et al. (2011) agree with 
Leinweber (2009) that speed is a very important factor to the success of HFT.  
Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) have investigated the impact of HFT on market quality. They 
include low frequency traders (i.e. humans) in line with high frequency trader (i.e. machine to 
count for the speed of submitting or cancelling orders, modelled as an uninformed trader11) to 
model an electronic market. They suggest that the high frequency trader may have an impact 
on the average transaction price and, hence, may change the whole transaction prices 
distribution. Moreover, they glean some evidence12 that lower transaction prices volatility is 
linked to improving the transaction prices prediction. They, essentially, state that speed may 
explain the increase in market liquidity measures according to trading volume and intertrade 
duration. Gomber et al. (2011) point out that most academic studies on HFT are concentrated 
on examining the effects on market quality. They add that the majority of these papers have 
empirically investigated this impact and suggested that there is no evidence for negative effects 
of HFT on market quality. In contrast, positive effects of HFT were noticed by most studies 
concerning the most important market parameters, liquidity and volatility. 
Easley et al. (2012) go further and make the point that speed was not the only reason that 
stands behind the wide attention paid to HFT. For so doing, they argue that “what lies at the 
centre of HFT is a change in paradigm” starting from the point that reality is more complex in 
that “today’s high frequency markets are not the old low frequency markets on steroids” (p.1). 
They suggest that because the authorities have legislated a new set of rules allowing for highly 
                                                          
 
11 This follows the classical notion of symmetric information. 
12 These suggestions have been confirmed by many studies, such as Jarnecic and Snape (2010), Brogaard 
(2010), Hasbrouck and Saar (2010) and Groth (2011). 
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technological competitors to enter the market, these changes have paved the way for an “arms 
race” between competitors. This race is about developing technological and quantitative 
strategies (HFT strategies) that allow them to meet the demands of market participants and, at 
the same time, could excavate for the last penny of profitability from trading. Precisely, HFTs 
during their process of fulfilling the demands of market participants, they, most importantly, 
care about the volume (market share). However, measuring or accounting for time is something 
intuitive. In terms of HFT, the trader is utilizing information revealed and playing a game of 
making the best possible move (before competitors), not to move as fast as possible (computers 
will do that). 
Nevertheless, Fabozzi et al. (2011) maintain that the speed of HFT has come out with new 
risks associated with it. These risks have been extensively discussed by Sornette and Von der 
Becke (2011). They emphasise that according to Tabb Group13, HFT, the ultra-high-speed 
version of algorithmic trading, is estimated to account for over 77% of transactions in the UK 
market, but lower estimates of about 25% are there for futures in 2010. They find that following 
the May 6th Flash Crash in 2010, HFTs were subsequently mostly cleared from having caused 
the crash. This conclusion is confirmed by Foucault (2016). With the notion of The Flash Crash 
of May 6th, 2010, The Treasury Flash Crash of October 15th, 2014 and The Exchange Traded 
Funds (ETFs) Flash Crash of August 24th, 2015, Foucault (2016) attributes the occurrence of 
these events to the automation of trading and structural changes in market organisation but not 
to HFT per se. He also suggests that regulation of HFT should be aimed at specific trading 
strategies rather than fast trading in general. 
 
                                                          
 
13 See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-24/high-frequency-trading-is-77-of-u-k-market-tabb-group-
says.html. 
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2.3 The information content of the electronic limit order book (LOB) 
One important issue in recent market microstructure research has been whether knowledge 
of the structure of the limit order book is informative regarding future price movements. The 
topic of informational research in microstructure contains a very wide range of topics such as 
price formation and price discovery, including both static issues (e.g. the determinants of 
trading costs) and dynamic issues (where prices come to impound information over time). 
Essentially, this topic is concerned with looking inside the “black box” where latent demands 
are translated into realized prices and volumes. There has been an extensive empirical research 
on the informational content of the limit order book. This research is relevant to predicting 
price movements in the stock markets. 
An important function of financial markets is to produce information. In his own words, 
Foucault (2016) explained how information is produced by stating “(t)hat is, asset prices 
aggregate informed investors’ signals and thereby convey information for real decisions, 
e.g.  investment (see Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein, 2012).” He suggests that making prices 
more informative is a potential benefit of informed trading which makes real decisions 
more efficient. He also acknowledges that the progress in information and trading technologies 
have contributed to the development of HFTs; those traders whose trading strategies rely on 
extremely fast reaction to market events. 
There is a growing body of literature on market microstructure with emphasis on the 
information content of the electronic limit order book (LOB). LOB is a record of all unexecuted 
orders to buy (or sell) a given quantity of a stock at or below (above) a specified price (see 
Madhavan, 2000; Kane, 2011; and Kozhan and Salmon, 2012). Moreover, Cao et al (2009) 
analysed data from the Australian Stock Exchange using error correction model. They suggest 
that order book is reasonably informative. They found that the contribution to price discovery 
from the best bid and ask prices and the last transaction price is estimated at only 22%. 
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Moreover, they illustrated the relevance between predicting future short-term returns 
movements and order imbalances between demand and supply along the book. These results 
are confirmed by Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) who analysed data from the New York 
Stock Exchange and investigated whether the limit order book is informative about future price 
dynamics.  
2.4 VWAP as a trading benchmark and the proposed improvement 
Seeking to emphasise financial market success factors, Malik and Markose (2012) suggest 
that14 the success depends on the market ability to determine the accurate price for traded assets. 
They claim that matching the demand and supply efficiently and effectively can determine a 
proper trading price. In order to optimally construct trading strategies, they acknowledge that 
a comprehensive knowledge of market microstructure is required so that quantitative modelling 
of price and liquidity dynamics can be done after accounting to ultimate transaction costs. 
Berkowitz et al (1988) have proposed the Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) with the 
aim of providing adequate methodologies to analyse and extract limit order book information 
content and adequately use this information for optimal trading strategies design. The VWAP 
is a measure of market impact and is calculated over each trading day. The VWAP is used as a 
benchmark to assess the trade-off between cost/benefit from market impact and the desire for 
immediacy of execution. 
The concept of VWAP as a trading benchmark is well understood by investors and 
extensively used in the literature. Generally, VWAP15 is a measure of the average price at 
                                                          
 
14 According to: Berkowitz et al. (1988); Almgren and Chriss (2000); Kissell and Glantz (2003); 
Madhavan (2002a); Hasbrouck (2004) which are cited by Malik and Markose (2012). 
15 VWAP’s definition given a series of prices and volumes is 𝑉𝑊𝐴𝑃 =  
∑ 𝑃𝑗×𝑄𝑗𝑗
∑ 𝑄𝑗𝑗
 where VWAP is the 
volume weighted average price, 𝑃𝑗 is the price of trade j, 𝑄𝑗 is the quantity of trade j and j is 
each individual trade that takes place over the defined period of time. 
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which a stock is traded over a trading horizon. It is particularly useful when to break a bulk 
order into several smaller orders according to the historical data and is computed to be 
optimum. It uses historic transaction prices and volumes (see Berkowitz et al, 1988; Bansal et 
al, 2010; and Kato, 2015).  
Malik and Markose (2012) adjust the VWAP logic and apply their approach to the extant 
limit orders using data from the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Building on the VWAP and 
the development of quantitative framework, they proposed an enhanced measure, namely, the 
Notional Volume Weighted Price (NVWAP). NVWAP is a statistic that applies to the 
information to the electronic order books in terms of the limit orders posted on the bid and ask 
sides. It measures the change in the shape of empirical liquidity from both supply and demand 
curves and refers to the average expected transaction price. The difference between the best 
price and the NVWAP is the premium a trader has to pay for executing an order with a volume 
larger than the total available at best price. In other words, it is the cost of immediacy. 
3 London Stock Exchange (LSE) Data 
As a matter of fact, LSE is considered as one of the largest market exchanges in the world 
(Zovko, 2008). Many British and international stocks are traded in this market. Accordingly, 
studying the LSE is quite beneficial as it entails the common characteristics of large equity 
markets. LSE operates different types of systems that deal with high and low liquid securities. 
Two trading systems for high liquid securities are being used in the LSE, namely electronic 
limit order book (E-LOB) and retail service provider (RSP). Put differently, E-LOB is known 
as on-book market whereas RSP or quotation market is known as o-book market.  
At the LSE, Stock Exchange Electronic Trading System (SETS) session is a trading service 
offered by the LSE for the on-book trading. Besides, SETS is based upon the electronic open 
limit order book and considered from the most liquid electronic order books in Europe. Stock 
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Exchange Automated Quotation System (SEAQ) session, on the other hand, is a trading service 
offered by the LSE for the o-book trading. Nevertheless, LSE offers a service for less liquid 
securities compared to those traded on SETS. This service is Stock Exchange Electronic 
Trading Service – quotes and crosses (SETSqx) (Kim, 2008; Zovko, 2008; London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) website). The following screenshot best illustrates how the trading platform screen 
looks like. 
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Figure 8: Trading screen example for the SETS (the electronic open limit order book of the London Stock 
Exchange) with some displayed traders and some general stock information. (Source: Zovko, 2008) 
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3.1 SETS Developments 
Several order types are being traded and supported in one of the most liquid electronic 
order books in Europe, the London SETS. The Millennium Exchange trading system of SETS 
has significantly improved in terms of dealing with latency and different types of orders. These 
order types include: 
Passive Only Orders ensure that if any part of the order can be executed, the order 
would be cancelled immediately when entered. This type of orders can also be used by 
participants to limit the accepted incoming orders to those priced within an indicated 
number of visible price points of the BBO. The order, besides, will also be cancelled 
if it becomes active due to a price change. This order type addresses participant’s 
demand and offers additional alternatives to traders and investors. 
Stop Orders, also called a stop-loss order, allow participants to set a specific price at 
which they will buy or sell a stock when this price is met; this specific price is usually 
referred to as stop price. At the point that stop price been hit, stop order will become 
a Market Order and execute at best. Market orders exceeding the volume at the best 
price are allowed to ‘walk up the book’. These orders are matched by standing limit 
orders beyond the best bid and ask prices. Buy/sell stop orders are generally used by 
investors to protect a profit or limit a loss. 
Stop Limit Orders combine the features of both stop orders and those of limit orders. 
As soon as a stop price is reached, a stop-limit order will become a limit order and then 
executed (buy or sell) at no worse than this limit price. This order type provides 
investors with ultimate control over picking the best time to fill or kill the order. As 
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with all limit orders, however, trade execution is not guaranteed as long as the 
stock/commodity does not meet the stop price. 
Hidden Limit Orders [also called “iceberg” or “undisclosed” order (Moinas, 2006)] 
are the type that provides traders with possibility of submitting anonymous limit orders 
on to the order book. Traders are allowed to submit iceberg orders when in need to 
buy and sell large amounts of securities. Traders can divide their large orders into 
smaller chunks so that other traders only see a small portion of the full order at a time. 
The iceberg order reduces liquidity which is the impact on price movements resulted 
from significant changes in a stock’s supply and demand. Liquidity suppliers, 
accordingly, will have the ability to choose whether to display the volume, price of the 
order or both of them to other participants. Hidden orders are able to interact with other 
orders regardless whether they are displayed or hidden on the order book. Limit Orders 
can only be hidden when entered once they meet the Large Order Threshold (LOT) 
stated in Millennium Exchange Business Parameters of LSE. LOT, hence, means that 
orders to be hidden should be equal to or above the LOT at the point of entry. In the 
notion of Iceberg Order, large order is divided into smaller parts whether by traders’ 
choice or automatically (automated program). This action aims to reduce any 
unwanted price movement when traders want to buy or sell large amounts of securities. 
Hidden limit orders will be completely hidden tough. 
Mid Price Pegged Orders allow participants to anonymously submit and price their 
non-displayed orders into the book at a limit price which is the true mid-price or the 
average of the BBO (best bid and offer). At the time of opening auction and during 
intra-day auctions, Pegged orders entered will automatically be injected in the next 
period of continuous trading. Only Mid Price Pegged Orders which meet the LOT of 
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the LSE could be entered. Using Mid Price Pegged Orders would enable participants 
to be more flexible and have higher ability to match submitted orders with incoming 
ones (higher execution) along with limiting information leak and increasing the 
probability of reducing the total trading cost. If the BBO, for instance, is £12.01 to 
$12.02, the mid-point peg order will be priced at true mid-point at £12.015. At the end 
of the trading day, all pegged orders will be deleted including those which entered 
during the closing auction. 
Executable Quotes are orders where market makers have to register in individual 
SETS securities in order for them to be able to enter this type of orders into order book 
securities. Executable Quotes entered by market makers, also, have to be named, fully 
visible, specifically priced and sized as required, electronically executable and dual 
sided quotes on entry. 
In response to customers demand, LSE on its market has introduced a new functionality 
which is Closing Price Crossing session in April 2012 and set SETS to support this session. 
This functionality will provide participants with a five-minute opportunity to execute or cancel 
stock order at the closing price determined during the exchanges’ day after the closing auction 
conclusion. This five-minute opportunity will take place directly after the exchange’s closing 
auction between 16.35 and 16.40. Matched orders are executed at the closing price whereas 
after the closing auction, the remaining orders on either book will remain to the new closing 
price crossing auction to be available for execution. Orders, however, which are entered with 
a time-in-force value or good for auction tag will not be available for execution in the next 
auction. During the session, newly entered orders would be priced at the closing price or market 
order. 
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3.2 Trading Day and Order Matching Mechanism in the SETS  
 
Figure 9: Sections of the Trading Day in SETS 
In the LSE, the trading day of the SETS (on-book) trading session starts at 8:50 with an 
opening auction which lasts for 10 minutes. During the opening auction, market participants 
place buy and sell orders while still no execution occurs. Orders submitted by market 
participants (traders) are mainly differentiated by their execution priority in the SETS into two 
types, namely limit and market orders. An order is a limit order if the price and size of the order 
is predetermined. Besides, limit orders are executed if there is a match between the order price 
and the market price whereas non matched orders will remain in the limit order book waiting 
for the incoming orders arrival. Limit orders are executed at a specified price or better. On the 
other hand, an order is a market order if the order size is predetermined but rather it would be 
executed at the best currently available market price rather than a predetermined one. The 
priority in execution in the first place is to the market orders as they arrive to the central limit 
order book while the execution priority for the limit orders depends upon how far they are from 
the clearing price and then on the arrival order. However, not surprisingly, if the supplied 
volume was insufficient for the clearance of all the market orders, priority will be based upon 
the order submission time. The clearing price (or the market opening price) is the price 
calculated at the end of the auction that maximizes the trade volume. Each order will have a 
new timestamp each time it has a modification in its price or (and) size before execution and 
therefore will be assigned a new priority. Yet, the timestamp and execution priority of the order 
will remain the same if it is partially executed (Zovko, 2008; Kim, 2008).  
Based on their trading preferences, market participants will choose between placing limit 
or market orders. Market order, interestingly, is more preferable to the market participants if 
Opening Auction
Continuous Double 
Auction
Closing Auction
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they seek for immediate execution. This choice would be risky in terms of orders executed at 
undesirable price(s) though. However, if they have concerns about execution price, choosing a 
limit order will be better. Choosing limit order also entails a risk of long time waiting till 
execution, or even no execution at all.  
The market enters the main trading phase which is “the continuous double auction” period 
after the end of the opening auction. All orders submitted during the auction and not cleared 
will be shifted to the order book. Zovko (2008), also, make the point that market participants 
can continuously submit buy or sell orders and matched transactions will be cleared directly. 
At the same time, cancelation of any untransacted limit orders is guaranteed for traders at any 
time. In the case of large market order and insufficient volume at the best price, it can be broken 
into multiple limit orders with multiple prices in order to be transacted.  
On deepened level, SETS is being set to suspend the trading system in case of an unusual 
large price move (“more than 10%-20% difference from the last transaction price”). When this 
trading suspension occurs, SETS will enter an auction period identical to the opening auction 
in order to provide traders with time to process potentially new information. At the end of the 
trading day, trading session will start to end at 16:30 with another auction period described at 
the end of previous sub section.  
4  Methodology and Data  
In this study, I reconstruct the historic limit order books of London Stock Exchange’s 
(SETS) platform over a period of two consecutive months July and August 2007. I base the 
analysis on these two months because the month of July was a quiet month where the market 
was not volatile. The market in the month of August was volatile due to the Financial Crisis 
which started August 2007-9. In their words, Eigner and Umlauft (2015) suggest that “The 
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Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 was the most severe economic crisis since the Second 
World War. Only the Great Depression was similar in severity and length.” 
The information conveyed by the NVWAP curves is greatly useful as an indicator of 
prevailing market trends. This information suggests that the market activity on each side of the 
limit order book directly affects the shape of liquidity supply and demand curves. These curves, 
in turn, depict the expectations of market participants regarding current and future price 
movements. Hence, the cumulative impact of market events is expected to have observable 
changes in these curves. In this study, I will investigate the state of the limit order book using 
data from 5 different stocks. More specifically, I will check whether the change in the slope of 
the NVWAP curves, and the change in the total volume on each side of the limit order book 
can be used within an algorithmic trading strategy to exploit trading opportunities. Then I’ll 
compare the results against Malik and Markose (2012) results as well as out-of-sample tests.  
To this end, this study presents results for five stocks from the London SETS. The stocks 
are chosen to represent different market capitalisation levels and market sectors in the sample 
studied. The following table (Table 7) provides a basic description of these stocks. All data is 
based on 5 minutes intervals where ∆𝑡 = 5 𝑚𝑖𝑛. So, each interval is of the shape (t, t + ∆𝑡) 
following the literature as in Weber and Rosenow (2005), Hendershott et al (2011) and Malik 
and Markose (2012). With this intervals approach, the impact of daily opening and closing 
auctions is excluded as I only evaluate price return between 8:01 AM and 4:29 PM. This 
approach filters out both auctions and overnight trading effect on one hand, and removes the 
impact of corporate actions (e.g. dividends, stock splits, etc) on the other hand.  
Stock Ticker Industry Sector 
HSBC Holdings HSBA Banks 
British Petroleum Plc BP Petroleum  
Tesco Plc TSCO Retail 
Astra Zeneca Plc AZN Pharmaceutical Products 
Vodafone Group Plc VOD Telecommunications 
Table 7: List of stocks used in this study from different market sectors 
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To construct the liquidity demand and supply curves, I follow Malik and Markose (2012) 
methodologies where I find the turning/reversal points (identified as peaks and troughs) in the 
cumulative price return within each trading month of the two selected months. Peaks and 
troughs in cumulative price are located by setting a minimum price return change threshold of 
25bp to identify local peaks and troughs. Peaks and troughs utilise the Directional Changes 
(DC) approach and are shown in Figure 10 below. The stock price return, r, is calculated 
following the formula: 
𝑟 = log(𝑃𝑚,𝑡+1) − log (𝑃𝑚,𝑡)  (1) 
where 𝑃𝑚 is the mid price, and given as 𝑃𝑚 =
𝑃𝑏𝑖𝑑+𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑘
2
. 
Figure 10: Peaks and Troughs calculated with a 25 basis points threshold in July 2007 for Vodafone stock in two different 
days. The 4th (right panel) and the 27th (left panel), where market volatility varies from quite (left) to volatile (right) 
market  
At the selected cumulative price return peaks or troughs, I take a snapshot of the order book 
at time t and then calculate the NVWAP which is the average expected transaction price for a 
trade size equal to the cumulative volume at the i-th level as follows:  
 
65 
 
𝑁𝑉𝑊𝐴𝑃𝑖 =
∑ 𝑃𝑗×𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
  (2) 
where 𝑃𝑗 is the price and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑗 is the volume at order j in the book.  
 
 
Figure 11: The NVWAP curves in the top panel show the start (8:35 AM) and end (10:00 AM) of downtrend on 27th of July 
2007 for Vodafone stock. The ask side NVWAP curve gradually expands and becomes flatter; the bid side NVWAP curve 
contracts and steepens. Besides, the NVWAP curves in the bottom panel show the start (13:50 PM) and end (14:20 PM) 
of downtrend on the 10th of August for the AZN stock. NVWAP curves follow the same patterns as mentioned above. 
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Figure 12: The NVWAP curves in the top panel show the start (8:30 AM) and end (08:35 AM) of uptrend on 27th of July 
2007 for Vodafone stock. The bid side NVWAP curve gradually expands and becomes flatter. However, the ask side NVWAP 
curve contracts and steepens. Further, the NVWAP curves in the bottom panel show the start (14:20 PM) and end (15:15 
PM) of uptrend on the 10th of August for the AZN stock. The bid side NVWAP curve and the ask side NVWAP follow the 
same pattern as expected. 
It is expected that when the market price falls (downtrend), the bid side gradually decreases. 
The bid side NVWAP curve slowly contracts and becomes steeper. The NVWAP curve on ask 
(liquidity supply) side curve then slowly expands and becomes flatter. This effect can be seen 
in Figure 11 in the shape of the NVWAP curves on the bid side where the curves slowly contract 
and become steeper. The snapshots in Figure 12 show the opposite case, when the market price 
increases.  
The market impact or the premium a trader pays for executing a volume larger than the 
amount available at best price is defined as:  
𝑌𝑖 = (
𝑁𝑉𝑊𝐴𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑚
𝑃𝑏
) × 10000   (3) 
where 𝑃𝑚 and 𝑃𝑏 are mid- and best-price respectively. 
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The steepening/flattening effect is captured by estimating the slope of the NVWAP curves. 
The slope of the NVWAP curve is estimated by the regression: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑖) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖  (4) 
where 𝑌𝑖 is the market impact and 𝑋𝑖 =
∑ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
𝐴𝐷𝑉
× 100 which is the cumulative volume 
normalized to the i-th order at which the market side that a trader wants to trade. The 
exponential transformation 𝑌 = 𝛽0𝑒
𝛽1𝑋 is performed to ensure that the supply curve is strictly 
increasing for 𝛽0, 𝛽1 > 0, as assumed by definition. 
The hypothesis this study tests is that in an uptrend, change in slope of the ask curve is 
greater than the change in the slope of the bid curve ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘) > ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑). 
While in a downtrend, change in slope of the bid curve is greater than the change in the slope 
of the ask curve, i.e.  ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) > ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘). The change in the slope of the curve 
captures both the volume available and any additional cost (benefit) results from buying 
(selling) in the rising (falling) market. These changes in the slopes of NVWAP curves cause 
contraction/expansion and steepening/flattening effects. Capturing these effects allows to test 
the previous hypothesis. 
Over a predefined interval, the contraction and expansion of the curves is measured by 
calculating the change in the total volume available on both sides of the limit order book. In an 
uptrend, the change in the total volume on the bid side is greater than the change in the total 
volume on the ask side, i.e. ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) > ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘). However, in a downtrend, the change 
in the total volume on the ask side of the order book is greater than the change in the total 
volume on the bid side, i.e. ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) > ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑). As the price starts rising, investors 
will compete to consume liquidity quickly to take advantage of the potential higher returns. 
This competition will attract higher volume to the demand side. At the same time, volume on 
the supply side will decrease as less traders become willing to sell. 
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To capture these effects, e.g. the steepening and flattening as well as the contraction and 
expansion of the curves, I will build on the DC methodology and use different snapshots for 
two stocks over two months, July and August in 2007. I estimate the slope coefficient (𝛽1) at 
each peak and trough covering both uptrends (from trough to peak) and downtrends (from peak 
to trough) intervals. Each of these uptrend and downtrend intervals has a price return of at least 
±25bp. Then, I calculate the following four statistics ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑), ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘), 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑)and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) at the start and the end of each uptrend and downtrend interval. 
Lastly, I will compare the different slopes and quantities at each side of the order book against 
each other to check whether this study’s results support Malik and Markose’s (2012) results. 
5 Analysis and Results 
This section proceeds in two divisions. Firstly, a test is implemented to the price trend 
indicator. Then, in the other division, an out-of-sample analysis is performed to test for the 
efficiency and robustness for this indicator. 
5.1 preliminary analysis of the market trend indicator 
As previously mentioned, this analysis is based on the order book data for five different 
stocks which are traded at the LSE in 2007. Over a period of two months, i.e. July and August, 
I identify two days at each month. These days/dates are selected depending on how volatile 
each day was. The aim is to test the hypothesis at different market settings. As discussed above, 
the month of July was fairly a stable month compared to the month August which was a volatile 
month due to the emersion of the Financial Crisis at the time. Following the peaks and troughs 
approach, I will take different snapshots as discussed in Section 4 above. I estimate the slope 
coefficient (𝛽1) at each peak or trough for the two different market states, the uptrend (from 
trough to peak) and downtrend (from peak to trough) intervals. Each of these intervals, uptrend 
and downtrend, has a price return of at least ±25 basis points to be identified. I, then, calculate 
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the ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑), ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘), ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) statistics at the start and 
the end of each uptrend and downtrend intervals. Table 9, Table 16 and Table 17 show how these 
calculations are done.  
Figure 13, Figure 14, Figure 15 and Figure 16 below illustrate the variation in NVWAP curves 
at start and end of each uptrend and downtrend intervals as discussed above. Two snapshots 
from each month are presented. These snapshots are selected at the points of highest change in 
returns for both uptrends and downtrends. From Figure 13 and Figure 14 below, we note that 
strongly similar patterns of steepening and contraction in NVWAP-Ask accompanied by 
flattening and expansion in NVWAP-Bid are observed at all eight downtrend intervals. From 
Figure 13, The 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘 values at start and end of the third downtrend interval 08:05 to 08:20 
are 0.74 and 1.00 respectively. The 𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘 at these two points are 6,170,708 and 5,688,603 
respectively. The ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘) and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) are 0.20 and -0.13. The positive 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘) reflects the steepening of the NVWAP-Ask curve and negative ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) 
suggests that the curve is contracting. Also, the 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑 values at start and end of the third 
downtrend interval are 1.37 and 1.39 respectively. 𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑 at these two points are, respectively, 
3,254,123 and 4,065,445. The ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) are 0.05 and 0.15. The positive 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) reflects the flattening of the NVWAP-Bid curve while the positive 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) value suggests that the curve is expanding. 
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Figure 13: NVWAP curves for the stocks of AZN and Vodafone respectively at the start and end of the downtrend in the 
month of August 2007. The start and end timestamp for the each snapshot are noted above each curve. The top two 
panels are for AZN stock, while the bottom two panels are for Vodafone stock.  
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Figure 14: NVWAP curves for the stocks of AZN and Vodafone respectively at the start and end of the downtrend in the 
month of July 2007. The start and end timestamp for the each snapshot are noted above each curve. The top two panels 
are for AZN stock, while the bottom two panels are for Vodafone stock. 
Similarly, from the first downtrend interval 13:35 to 15:25 in Figure 14, the 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘 values 
at start and end of the interval are 1.42 and 1.95 respectively. 𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘 at these points are 173,286 
and 122,631. ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘) and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) are calculated to be 0.07 and -0.05 respectively. 
The NVWAP-Ask curve steepens due to the positive value of ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘). Besides, the 
negative value of ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) suggests that the curve is contracting. Further, the 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑 
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values at start and end of the third downtrend interval are 0.31 and 0.28 respectively. 𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑 at 
these two points are 670,549 and 763,407. ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) are 0.02 and 0.01. 
The positive ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) suggests that the NVWAP-Bid curve is flattening, while the 
positive ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) value reflects the expansion of the curve. 
 
Figure 15: NVWAP curves for the stocks of AZN and Vodafone respectively at the start and end of the uptrend in the month 
of August 2007. The start and end timestamp for the each snapshot are noted above each curve. The top two panels are 
for AZN stock on the 10th and the 28th respectively, while the bottom two panels are for Vodafone stock. 
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On the other hand, Figure 15 and Figure 16 depict a strongly similar patterns of steepening 
and contraction in NVWAP-Bid accompanied by flattening and expansion in NVWAP-Ask 
following an uptrend. These effects are observed at all eight downtrend intervals. The value of 
the 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑 at start and end of the last uptrend interval 09:50 to 10:05 in figure 6 are 0.81 and 
0.76 respectively, while the 𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑 at these points are 6,144,675 and 6,459,550. The 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) are reported at -0.09 and 0.01. The negativity in 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) suggests the flattening of the NVWAP-Bid curve and the positive ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) 
reflects the expansion of the curve. Likewise, the 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘 value at start and end of the last 
uptrend interval in Figure 15 are 1.10 and 0.96 respectively. As for 𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘 values at these points, 
they are 6,018,278 and 6,733,815. ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘) and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) are 0.04 and -0.007 
respectively. The previous numbers suggest that the positive ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘) reflects the 
NVWAP-Ask curve’s steepening. Moreover, the negative ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) suggests that the curve 
is contracting. 
This pattern is also clear in the statistics for the last interval in Figure 16. 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑 at start 
and end of the last uptrend interval 08:15 to 08:20 are 0.79 and 0.66 respectively. 𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑 at these 
two points are 6,976,201 and 6,343,944. ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) are at -0.18 and -
0.09. The negativity in ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) suggests the flattening of the NVWAP-Bid curve. 
However, the negative ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) doesn’t really reflect the expansion of the curve as 
expected. Likewise, the 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘 value at start and end of the last uptrend interval in Figure 16 
are 0.75 and 0.64. The 𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘 values at these two points are 8,808,778 and 10,288,709. Values 
of ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘) and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) respectively are -0.16 and 0.15. The negative 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘) doesn’t reflect the NVWAP-Ask curve’s steepening. Also, the positive 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) suggests that the curve is not contracting. 
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Figure 16: NVWAP curves for the stocks of AZN and Vodafone respectively at the start and end of the uptrend in the month 
of July 2007. The start and end timestamp for the each snapshot are noted above each curve. The top two panels are for 
AZN stock, while the bottom two panels are for Vodafone stock. 
A sample of uptrend and downtrend intervals for the Vodafone stock in July 2007 is shown 
in Table 9 below. All uptrend and downtrend intervals for the Vodafone stock in August 2007 
and for the AZN stock in July 2007 are shown in Table 16 and Table 17 in the appendix. For 
uptrend intervals, most ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) values are negative and most ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) are positive. 
Moreover, ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘) values are positive and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘)  are negative. On the other 
hand, for downtrend intervals, most ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) values are positive while most 
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∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) are negative. Further, ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘) values are negative, however, ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘)  
are positive.  
The analysis cover all uptrend and downtrend intervals which are identified by reversal 
points at a minimum change in return of ±25bp for all five stocks over a 2 month period, July 
and August 2007. Overall, the detailed results are consistent with the explanation of the 
behaviour of the four statistics for three out four uptrend and downtrend intervals analysed 
above. To sum up, Table 8 summarises the results (comparisons) from the identified intervals 
of the overall (results) is presented in below. The number of steepening/flattening (S/F) 
behaviour of the NVWAP curves is counted as the total number of observations where 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑)<∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘) in an uptrend, and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘)<∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) in a 
downtrend. On the other hand, the contraction and expansion (C/E) behaviour of NVWAP 
curves is defined as the total number of observations where ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑)>∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) in an 
uptrend, and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘)>∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) in a downtrend.  
As illustrated in Table 8 below, steepening/flattening (S/F) and contraction/expansion (C/E) 
of NVWAP curves’ behaviour has identified the price trend as expected in 86.61% of the total 
observations for all five stocks.  
Stock S/F C/E Total S/F (%) C/E (%) 
HSBA 269 274 282 95.39 97.16 
BP 361 366 385 93.77 95.06 
TSCO 258 263 290 88.97 90.69 
AZN 335 338 388 86.34 87.11 
VOD 255 264 277 92.06 95.31 
Total 1478 1505 1722 % 85.83 % 87.40 
Table 8: Summary of the results of steepening/flattening (S/F) and contraction/expansion (C/E) statistics used to measure 
the change in the shape of NVWAP curves for all five stocks over a period of 2 consecutive months, July and August 2007. 
Column S/F is the number of observations where steepening/flattening of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price 
trend. Column C/E is the number of observations where contraction/expansion of the NVWAP curve correctly identified 
the price trend. Column Total is the total number of uptrend and downtrend intervals with at least ±25 basis points price 
return change. Column S/F (%) is the S/F as percentage of total uptrends and downtrends. Column C/E (%) is the C/E as 
percentage of total observations. 
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Table 8 above shows that steepening/flattening behaviour has identified the price trend as 
expected and ranged from 86.34% for AZN to 95.39% for HSBA out of the total observations. 
In the same way, the contraction/expansion effect has captured the trend and ranged from 
87.11% for AZN to 97.16% for HSBA out of the total observations. These results are consistent 
with the findings of Malik and Markose (2012).  
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Uptrend – NVWAP – Bid  
Date_time(t) Date_time(t+1) Mid_Pricet Mid_Pricet+1 Dlog(Mid_Price) Slope_Bid(t) Slope_Bid(t+1) Dlog(Slope_Bid) Q_Bid(t) Q_Bid(t+1) Dlog(Q_bid) 
04/07/2007 10:05 04/07/2007 10:40 165.35 
164.9 -0.0027 0.1360 0.15808 0.1500 34996400 31757533 -0.0971 
27/07/2007 08:15 
27/07/2007 08:20 148.45 
147.85 -0.0040 0.7932 0.6593 -0.1848 6976201 6343944 -0.0950 
27/07/2007 08:30 27/07/2007 08:35 
148.65 
148.15 -0.0033 0.7061 0.7720 0.0892 6447547 5835569 -0.0997 
Uptrend – NVWAP – Ask  
Date_time(t) Date_time(t+1) Mid_Pricet Mid_Pricet+1 Dlog(Mid_Price) Slope_Ask(t) Slope_Ask(t+1) Dlog(Slope_Ask) Q_Ask(t) Q_Ask(t+1) Dlog(Q_Ask) 
04/07/2007 10:05 04/07/2007 10:40 165.35 
164.9 -0.0027 0.9725 0.4388 -0.7957 6045396 10309776 0.5337 
27/07/2007 08:15 
27/07/2007 08:20 148.45 
147.85 -0.0040 0.7470 0.6375 -0.1585 8808778 10288709 0.1552 
27/07/2007 08:30 27/07/2007 08:35 
148.65 
148.15 -0.0033 0.8192 0.6442 -0.2403 8711915 10907526 0.2247 
Downtrend – NVWAP – Bid 
Date_time(t) Date_time(t+1) Mid_Pricet Mid_Pricet+1 Dlog(Mid_Price) Slope_Bid(t) Slope_Bid(t+1) Dlog(Slope_Bid) Q_Bid(t) Q_Bid(t+1) Dlog(Q_bid) 
04/07/2007 08:30 04/07/2007 10:05 164.05 
165.35 0.00789318 0.2110 0.1360 -0.4389 25004913 34996400 0.3361 
27/07/2007 08:05 27/07/2007 08:15 147.55 
148.45 0.0060811 1.0629 0.7932 -0.2927 5840890 6976201 0.1776 
27/07/2007 08:35 27/07/2007 10:00 
148.15 
153.95 0.0384026 0.7720 0.5389 -0.3594 5835569 8772116 0.4076 
Downtrend – NVWAP - Ask 
Date_time(t) Date_time(t+1) Mid_Pricet Mid_Pricet+1 Dlog(Mid_Price) Slope_Ask(t) Slope_Ask(t+1) Dlog(Slope_Ask) Q_Ask(t) Q_Ask(t+1) Dlog(Q_Ask) 
04/07/2007 08:30 04/07/2007 10:05 164.05 
165.35 0.00789318 0.5219 0.9725 0.6222 11000721 6045396 -0.5986 
27/07/2007 08:05 27/07/2007 08:15 147.55 
148.45 0.0060811 0.6198 0.7470 0.1867 9115481 8808778 -0.0342 
27/07/2007 08:35 27/07/2007 10:00 
148.15 
153.95 0.0384026 0.6442 0.9296 0.3667 10907526 7449644 -0.3812 
Table 9: Steepening/ Flattening and Contraction/Expansion statistics for the VOD stock data July 2007.
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5.2 The out-of-sample analysis (robustness check) 
This analysis covers any arbitrary time interval with a fixed time duration with prediction 
taking place every 5, 10 and 15 minutes of the first time stamp. Results are reported for all 5 
stocks over a 2 month period, July and August 2007. The methodology requires at least two 
consecutive timestamps for the order book to predict the price trend at the next future 
timestamp. Consecutive timestamps used are taken following fixed time durations of 5, 10 and 
15 minutes time difference.  
For an interval of 5 minutes difference between the consecutive timestamps, Table 10 below 
presents the total number of uptrend and downtrend price movement predicted by the price 
trend indicator in the month of August 2007. Table 11 depicts the results for the month of July 
2007 for the same interval (5 minutes). The NVWAP curves’ behaviour has identified the price 
trend as expected in 61.42% of the total observations for all five stock holdings in the month 
of August 2007 compared to 69.61% of the total observations in the month of July 2007. The 
price trend indicator has interestingly identified the price trend as expected, according to Table 
10, in only 25.99% for AZN, which is a less liquid stock. Additionally, it ranged between 
65.31% for TSCO to 75.27% for VOD out of the total observations. In the same way, Table 11 
demonstrates that the price trend was correctly captured in 65.13% for TSCO compared to 
73.29% for VOD out of the total observations.  
Interestingly, using different time intervals, Table 10, Table 11, Table 12, Table 13, Table 14 
and Table 15 suggest that the predictive power of the change in the shape of NVWAP curves 
for predicting the price trend decreases as markets are more volatile. Furthermore, as the month 
of August is considered as a volatile month, the predictive power of the change in the shape of 
NVWAP curves for the least liquid stock (AZN) was a bit low at nearly 26% only compared 
to nearly 71% in the month of July (before the start of the Financial Crisis). The predictive 
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power of the change in the shape of NVWAP curves for all other stocks was fairly high in the 
two month. These results suggest the robustness and efficacy of the price trend indicator 
calculated using the NVWAP methodology. 
 Total observations 
Actual matches 
(correct predictions) 
for 5 min interval 
Total actual/correct 
matches 
Percentage of the actual matches from 
the total observations 
Stock  Uptrend Downtrend  % 
HSBA 2220 818 778 1596 71.89 
BP 2220 772 752 1524 68.65 
TSCO 2220 715 735 1450 65.31 
AZN 2220 293 462 755 25.99 
VOD 2220 845 826 1671 75.27 
Total 11100 2940 3878 6818 61.42 
Table 10: Summary of the results of predictive power of the change in the shape of NVWAP curves for predicting the price 
trend for 5 minutes interval for all five stocks over the month of August 2007. Column Actual matches is the number of 
observations where steepening/flattening and contraction/expansion of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price 
trend for an interval of 5 minutes. This column reports uptrend and downtrend price movements. Moreover, column Total 
actual matches is the sum of all correctly identified uptrend and downtrend price movements. Lastly, column Percentage 
of the actual matches represents the percentage of observations where steepening/flattening and contraction/expansion 
of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price trend. 
 
 Total observations 
Actual matches 
(correct predictions) 
for 5 min interval 
Total actual/correct 
matches 
Percentage of the actual matches from 
the total observations 
Stock  Uptrend Downtrend  % 
HSBA 2220 762 776 1538 69.28 
BP 2220 764 777 1541 69.41 
TSCO 2220 705 741 1446 65.13 
AZN 2220 773 802 1575 70.94 
VOD 2220 805 819 1627 73.29 
Total 11100 3809 3918 7727 69.61 
Table 11: Summary of the results of predictive power of the change in the shape of NVWAP curves for predicting the price 
trend for 5 minutes interval for all five stocks over the month of July 2007. Column Actual matches is the number of 
observations where steepening/flattening and contraction/expansion of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price 
trend for an interval of 5 minutes. This column reports uptrend and downtrend price movements. Moreover, column Total 
actual matches is the sum of all correctly identified uptrend and downtrend price movements. Lastly, column Percentage 
of the actual matches represents the percentage of observations where steepening/flattening and contraction/expansion 
of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price trend. 
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 Total observations 
Actual matches 
(correct predictions) 
for 10 min interval 
Total actual/correct 
matches 
Percentage of the actual matches from 
the total observations 
Stock  Uptrend Downtrend  % 
HSBA 1110 410 385 795 71.16 
BP 1110 376 397 773 69.64 
TSCO 1110 350 366 716 64.50 
AZN 1110 143 154 297 26.77 
VOD 1110 407 418 825 74.32 
Total 5550 1686 1720 3406 61.28 
Table 12: Summary of the results of predictive power of the change in the shape of NVWAP curves for predicting the price 
trend for 10 minutes interval for all five stocks over the month of August 2007. Column Actual matches is the number of 
observations where steepening/flattening and contraction/expansion of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price 
trend for an interval of 10 minutes. This column reports uptrend and downtrend price movements. Moreover, column 
Total actual matches is the sum of all correctly identified uptrend and downtrend price movements. Lastly, column 
Percentage of the actual matches represents the percentage of observations where steepening/flattening and 
contraction/expansion of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price trend. 
 
 Total observations 
Actual matches 
(correct predictions) 
for 10 min interval 
Total actual/correct 
matches 
Percentage of the actual matches from 
the total observations 
Stock  Uptrend Downtrend  % 
HSBA 1110 415 372 787 70.90 
BP 1110 389 385 774 69.73 
TSCO 1110 355 372 727 65.49 
AZN 1110 382 409 791 71.26 
VOD 1110 398 415 813 73.24 
Total 5550 1939 1953 3892 70.12 
Table 13: Summary of the results of predictive power of the change in the shape of NVWAP curves for predicting the price 
trend for 10 minutes interval for all five stocks over the month of July 2007. Column Actual matches is the number of 
observations where steepening/flattening and contraction/expansion of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price 
trend for an interval of 10 minutes. This column reports uptrend and downtrend price movements. Moreover, column 
Total actual matches is the sum of all correctly identified uptrend and downtrend price movements. Lastly, column 
Percentage of the actual matches represents the percentage of observations where steepening/flattening and 
contraction/expansion of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price trend. 
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 Total observations 
Actual matches 
(correct predictions) 
for 15 min interval 
Total actual/correct 
matches 
Percentage of the actual matches from 
the total observations 
Stock  Uptrend Downtrend  % 
HSBA 740 256 278 534 72.16 
BP 740 269 247 516 69.73 
TSCO 740 236 244 480 64.86 
AZN 740 96 108 204 27.57 
VOD 740 294 265 559 75.54 
Total 3700 1151 1142 2293 61.97 
Table 14: Summary of the results of predictive power of the change in the shape of NVWAP curves for predicting the price 
trend for 15 minutes interval for all five stocks over the month of August 2007. Column Actual matches is the number of 
observations where steepening/flattening and contraction/expansion of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price 
trend for an interval of 15 minutes. This column reports uptrend and downtrend price movements. Moreover, column 
Total actual matches is the sum of all correctly identified uptrend and downtrend price movements. Lastly, column 
Percentage of the actual matches represents the percentage of observations where steepening/flattening and 
contraction/expansion of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price trend. 
 
 Total observations 
Actual matches 
(correct predictions) 
for 5 min interval 
Total actual/correct 
matches 
Percentage of the actual matches from 
the total observations 
Stock  Uptrend Downtrend  % 
HSBA 740 261 260 521 70.40 
BP 740 254 268 522 70.54 
TSCO 740 237 261 498 67.30 
AZN 740 247 277 524 70.81 
VOD 740 266 279 545 73.65 
Total 3700 1265 1345 2610 70.54 
Table 15: Summary of the results of predictive power of the change in the shape of NVWAP curves for predicting the price 
trend for 15 minutes interval for all five stocks over the month of July 2007. Column Actual matches is the number of 
observations where steepening/flattening and contraction/expansion of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price 
trend for an interval of 15 minutes. This column reports uptrend and downtrend price movements. Moreover, column 
Total actual matches is the sum of all correctly identified uptrend and downtrend price movements. Lastly, column 
Percentage of the actual matches represents the percentage of observations where steepening/flattening and 
contraction/expansion of NVWAP curves correctly identified the price trend. 
Generally, the detailed results are consistent with the explanation of the behaviour of the 
four statistics which form the price trend indicator. On average, 65.82% of the price changes 
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for all stocks in the 2 months period were correctly predicted by the proposed indicator. This 
percentage is fairly high, which suggests the accuracy and the precision of this indicator as a 
tool to predict price movements in the stock market. This tool can be effectively utilised to 
form profitable trading strategies. 
6 Conclusion 
This study aims at analysing the intraday dynamics of liquidity in London SETS electronic 
limit order book for five different stock holdings over a period of two months, July and August 
2007, due to data limitation. This study applies the Malik and Markose (2012) definitions of 
NVWAP to model the shape of bid and ask side of the order book to predict the market trend 
under different time intervals. The prediction methodology consists of four statistics which are 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘), ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑), ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘).  
The empirical analysis confirms the that information from the NVWAP along with the 
resulted liquidity supply and demand curves in the limit order book reveal consistent 
observable market behaviour during both uptrend and downtrend intervals. In fact, examining 
the change in the shape of NVWAP curves for five different stocks over a period of two 
consecutive months, July and August 2007, suggests that the aforementioned four statistics 
have correctly identified prevailing market trend in 86.61% of the total observation on average. 
Thus, these four statistics indicator is revealed to be robust measure to identify the prevailing 
market trend without prior knowledge of the price. These results go in line with Malik and 
Markose (2012) findings. Within an algorithmic trading system, as market state changes, these 
four statistics can be used to switch between different trading strategies. 
This study can be extended by investigating the change in order submission sides along 
with cancellations in both sides in the limit order book. Understanding the order cancellation 
 
83 
 
on each side of the order book will help to reveal more information about price changes in the 
market.   
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7 Appendix 
 
Date_time Slope_Bid(t) Slope_Bid(t+1) Dlog(Slope_Bid) Q_Bid(t) Q_Bid(t+1) Dlog(Q_Bid) Slope_Ask(t) Slope_Ask(t+1) Dlog(Slope_Ask) Q_Ask(t) Q_Ask(t+1) Dlog(Q_Ask) 
10/08/2007 08:05 1.37 1.44 0.05 3254123 3770995 0.15 0.74 0.91 0.20 6170708 5439794 -0.13 
10/08/2007 08:20 1.39 1.41 0.02 4065445 3792570 -0.07 1.00 1.01 0.01 5688603 6114593 0.07 
10/08/2007 08:45 2.51 1.92 -0.27 2947751 3567969 0.19 0.63 0.71 0.11 8385237 7566272 -0.10 
10/08/2007 09:20 1.21 1.15 -0.05 4893506 4592816 -0.06 1.05 1.57 0.41 5326098 4724770 -0.12 
10/08/2007 09:45 1.74 1.40 -0.21 3661629 4228186 0.14 0.79 0.82 0.04 6677490 6160040 -0.08 
10/08/2007 10:10 0.87 0.82 -0.05 5178074 5266898 0.02 1.06 0.95 -0.12 5947307 5914503 -0.01 
10/08/2007 11:35 1.79 1.37 -0.27 2859632 3877915 0.30 0.53 0.75 0.34 7680536 6989393 -0.09 
10/08/2007 11:45 1.14 1.63 0.35 4489468 3316229 -0.30 0.83 0.62 -0.29 7033693 9157207 0.26 
10/08/2007 11:50 1.63 0.77 -0.75 3316229 5812013 0.56 0.62 0.62 -0.01 9157207 8149647 -0.12 
10/08/2007 12:00 0.60 0.74 0.20 8153153 6693109 -0.20 0.73 0.66 -0.11 7289708 8010201 0.09 
10/08/2007 12:10 0.78 0.65 -0.17 5694197 6143574 0.08 0.73 0.64 -0.12 7205918 7409633 0.03 
10/08/2007 12:35 0.60 0.67 0.11 7015777 6297316 -0.11 0.82 0.62 -0.29 7182225 7622034 0.06 
10/08/2007 13:00 0.81 0.82 0.01 6091717 5835121 -0.04 0.72 0.64 -0.12 7439944 7825786 0.05 
10/08/2007 14:00 0.59 0.62 0.05 7111153 6135572 -0.15 1.01 0.63 -0.47 6827081 7873537 0.14 
10/08/2007 14:05 0.62 0.64 0.03 6135572 6360365 0.04 0.63 0.78 0.21 7873537 7220321 -0.09 
10/08/2007 14:25 0.55 0.71 0.25 7509365 6274604 -0.18 1.30 0.82 -0.46 4914590 6790133 0.32 
10/08/2007 14:40 0.69 0.69 0.01 6014669 6220684 0.03 0.94 0.92 -0.03 6850647 5698444 -0.18 
10/08/2007 15:05 0.66 0.63 -0.04 7470163 6250194 -0.18 1.17 0.68 -0.55 4940238 7854195 0.46 
10/08/2007 15:10 0.63 0.58 -0.09 6250194 7225677 0.15 0.68 0.94 0.33 7854195 6180254 -0.24 
10/08/2007 15:15 0.58 0.66 0.14 7225677 6015799 -0.18 0.94 0.82 -0.14 6180254 7052619 0.13 
10/08/2007 15:25 0.59 0.64 0.08 5924151 6808219 0.14 0.60 0.77 0.25 7964908 6502650 -0.20 
10/08/2007 15:30 0.64 0.60 -0.08 6808219 6018456 -0.12 0.77 0.60 -0.24 6502650 7623769 0.16 
10/08/2007 15:55 0.79 0.64 -0.22 6045821 6264747 0.04 0.76 0.66 -0.13 7876556 8459956 0.07 
10/08/2007 16:15 0.79 0.65 -0.19 6675774 5700891 -0.16 0.92 0.77 -0.17 7722146 6541244 -0.17 
10/08/2007 16:25 0.78 1.03 0.28 6605043 3785076 -0.56 0.76 0.89 0.16 7364437 5661905 -0.26 
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Steepening/ Flattening and Contraction/Expansion statistics for the Vodafone stock data August 2007 (Cont.) 
Date_time Slope_Bid(t) Slope_Bid(t+1) Dlog(Slope_Bid) Q_Bid(t) Q_Bid(t+1) Dlog(Q_Bid) Slope_Ask(t) Slope_Ask(t+1) Dlog(Slope_Ask) Q_Ask(t) Q_Ask(t+1) Dlog(Q_Ask) 
28/08/2007 08:25 1.04 1.05 0.01 5381253 5422252 0.01 0.87 0.99 0.13 6465820 6346551 -0.02 
28/08/2007 09:50 0.82 0.74 -0.09 6144675 6212672 0.01 1.10 1.15 0.04 6018278 5974961 -0.01 
28/08/2007 10:05 0.76 0.75 -0.01 6459550 6865693 0.06 0.96 1.03 0.07 6733815 6208278 -0.08 
28/08/2007 11:15 0.70 0.71 0.01 6974814 6440052 -0.08 1.16 1.07 -0.08 5961906 6226548 0.04 
28/08/2007 12:00 0.86 0.68 -0.23 6411618 6192453 -0.03 0.85 0.95 0.12 7121114 7058960 -0.01 
28/08/2007 13:00 0.73 0.79 0.08 7364317 7080544 -0.04 0.98 0.96 -0.02 6308823 6544674 0.04 
Table 16: Steepening/ Flattening and Contraction/Expansion statistics for the Vodafone stock data August 2007. 
 
Date_time Slope_Bid(t) Slope_Bid(t+1) Dlog(Slope_Bid) Q_Bid(t) Q_Bid(t+1) Dlog(Q_Bid) Slope_Ask(t) Slope_Ask(t+1) Dlog(Slope_Ask) Q_Ask(t) Q_Ask(t+1) Dlog(Q_Ask) 
04/07/2007 08:45 0.26 0.29 0.10 677295 674167 -0.005 1.56 1.68 0.07 137745 143007 0.04 
04/07/2007 09:45 0.34 0.33 -0.03 658829 662526 0.01 1.24 1.36 0.10 191912 187641 -0.02 
04/07/2007 12:25 0.28 0.29 0.05 690575 687812 0.00 1.93 1.88 -0.03 138321 158272 0.13 
04/07/2007 13:35 0.31 0.31 0.02 670549 680380 0.01 1.42 1.53 0.07 173286 164789 -0.05 
04/07/2007 15:25 0.28 0.29 0.02 763407 758132 -0.01 1.95 2.12 0.08 122631 124879 0.02 
27/07/2007 08:05 1.68 1.31 -0.25 121048 128240 0.06 1.78 1.28 -0.33 146225 145142 -0.01 
27/07/2007 09:45 1.51 1.65 0.09 130288 120540 -0.08 2.39 2.21 -0.08 103416 122356 0.17 
27/07/2007 10:20 1.95 1.73 -0.12 99621 116319 0.15 1.48 2.00 0.30 142291 143460 0.01 
27/07/2007 10:25 1.73 2.09 0.19 116319 108343 -0.07 2.00 1.48 -0.30 143460 181082 0.23 
27/07/2007 11:20 3.06 1.96 -0.44 82663 102601 0.22 1.76 1.81 0.03 165404 140905 -0.16 
27/07/2007 11:50 1.56 1.77 0.12 113410 107362 -0.05 1.87 1.00 -0.63 129737 225106 0.55 
27/07/2007 12:35 2.84 2.32 -0.20 84421 89650 0.06 1.41 1.69 0.18 192301 163164 -0.16 
27/07/2007 14:20 1.84 1.85 0.01 131980 124222 -0.06 1.96 1.46 -0.30 147147 162250 0.10 
27/07/2007 14:40 1.46 0.80 -0.61 136847 186906 0.31 1.12 1.65 0.39 182374 168048 -0.08 
27/07/2007 15:05 0.82 1.79 0.78 181153 122065 -0.39 1.93 1.59 -0.19 135252 168555 0.22 
27/07/2007 15:55 2.10 2.07 -0.01 92969 91051 -0.02 1.52 1.42 -0.07 151457 151394 -0.0004 
27/07/2007 16:10 1.31 1.26 -0.03 127544 123763 -0.03 1.55 1.48 -0.05 148259 157227 0.06 
Table 17: Steepening/ Flattening and Contraction/Expansion statistics for the AZN stock data July 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Chapter Four 
  
 
87 
 
 
The Effect of Cancellations in The Electronic Order Book 
Study on London Stock Exchange Electronic Order Book (SETS) 
Abstract 
The electronic order book (E-LOB) has no designated market maker for the 
liquidity provision. Traders, therefore, in E-LOB markets are known to provide 
fleeting liquidity with sudden withdrawals of positions. Order submissions and 
order cancellations can be driven by price discovery strategies as well as those that 
can influence the shape of the order book to bring about price trends that increase 
the profitability of traders’ positions. Some of the latter can tip over to price 
manipulation, and these are known to include strategies like spoofing and layering, 
which have been alleged to cause flash and mini-crashes. This study tries to uncover 
some of the effects of the observable multitude of order cancellations using a 
sample of stocks from London Stock Exchange Electronic Trading System (SETS). 
Thus, it inspects whether cancellations contribute to the size of price drops to the 
extent that this phenomenon may lead to market volatility. In light of the Directional 
Change (DC) methodology, the sampling of the order book is done on the basis of 
a Peak-Trough methodology to avoid any potential loss of information that results 
from aggregating data containing all order events occurring within an interval. 
Further, a new measure of bid-ask spread is proposed based on the slopes of the 
Notional Volume Weighted Average Price (NVWAP) curves. All analysis is based 
on ultra-high-frequency data from the London SETS order book which investigates 
the periods where the market was experiencing a downtrend price move (peak to 
trough). The price impact of type of event, namely new buy, new sell, cancellation 
of buy or cancellation of sell, may not show any statistical significance outside of 
the Peak-Trough and Trough-Peak analysis. This study suggests that buy order 
submissions decrease and their cancellations increase during a downtrend price 
move. Their effects are highly significant determinants of the change in cumulative 
return when price is decreasing under both extreme and normal price conditions. 
Sell new orders are significant determinant of the change in cumulative return 
though. On the other hand, sell order submissions’ increase and their cancellations’ 
decrease are significant determinants of the change in cumulative return under 
normal price conditions.  However, the effect of the changes on both sides of the 
market has no significant impact on the proposed bid-ask spread measure under 
extreme and normal price conditions. These findings go in line with the expected 
sign or direction of change in cumulative return. Lastly, cancellations, generally, 
increase on both sides of the market as the trading day approaches its end regardless 
of the volatility.  
Keywords: Order Book Rebuild; High Frequency Trading; Volatility; Liquidity Dynamics; 
Price Trend; Order Book Cancellations; Bid-Ask Spread  
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1 Introduction 
The recent Flash Crash and the subsequent investigations have focussed on the relation 
between order flow and price changes (Eisler et al., 2012).  Orders submitted to the market are 
characterised as one of the following: firstly, fully or partially matched resulting in a trade, 
secondly, remain in the order book till they are matched (fully or partially) or expired or, 
thirdly, cancelled (deleted). Kirilenko et al. (2011) highlight that cancelation of orders was a 
large contributor to the Flash Crash. The fleeting nature of orders has raised many concerns, 
and therefore led to more research on the order submission process. The US Department of 
Justice report16 (2015, p. 22), in the case “United States of America v. Navinder Singh Sarao”, 
alleged that “Sarao's use of the dynamic layering technique was particularly intense in the hours 
leading up to the Flash Crash… Sarao began this cycle by placing … five sell orders nearly 
simultaneously… The orders were replaced or modified more than 19,000 times before Sarao 
cancelled them, without having executed any of them.” This indicates that order submissions 
and cancellations can be used to manipulate the market.   
Traditionally, Baruch and Glosten (2013) point out that limit order book cancellations have 
been treated as part of the order book imbalance measures. Moreover, the ability to revise a 
decision is a fundamental mechanism in the modern price discovery process. However, the fact 
that (see Table 22) almost 90% of all limit orders are cancelled before execution, most of them 
within a couple of seconds, sheds the light on the role which cancellations play in modern 
financial markets (see Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009; Huang and Hautsch, 2011; Scholtus and van 
Dijk, 2015). Therefore, regulators such as SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India17) 
                                                          
 
16 Available online at: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/04/21/sarao_criminal_complaint.pdf. 
17 That is in a “Discussion paper on 'Strengthening of the Regulatory framework for Algorithmic  
Trading & Co-location”; available online on: https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1470393485587.pdf. 
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has proposed the imposition of minimum resting time of 500 milliseconds (ms) for orders, 
whereby an order will not be allowed to be amended or cancelled. 
Interestingly, Farmer et al. (2004) and Finer et al. (2016) have argued that order cancellation 
has become as important as submission itself, mainly with regard to trading strategies, liquidity 
shortfalls and their effects on large price movements. Morck et al. (2000) make the point that 
trades affect the price in the direction of their transactions, whereby price fluctuates with excess 
demand and excess supply. Additionally, Paddrik et al. (2012) have made the point that 
according to data provided by the Commodity and Futures Trade Commission, high frequency 
traders (HFTs) place 60% of their orders 1 tick away or less from the last trade price. The 
analysis of this chapter shows that an average of 77% of the new submissions where placed 1 
tick away or less from the last trade price in July 2007 for instance.  
Treleaven et al. (2013) point out that, in the finance industry, the focus is on improving the 
profitability of trading algorithms as well as improving their ability to identify patterns in the 
market data besides, minimising transaction costs and limiting the amount and type of risk. 
Within an algorithmic trading system, as market state changes, the change in the shape of bid 
and ask sides of the order book can be used to switch between different trading strategies. 
Understanding the order cancellation on each side of the order book will help to reveal more 
information about price changes in the market. Moreover, at the time of the May 6th, 2010 Flash 
Crash, Paddrik et al. (2012) describe that algorithmic trading in the U.S. was thought to be 
accountable for more than 70% of trading volume.  
Studying high frequency trading (HFT) is, therefore, crucial to comprehend modern market 
behaviour and order cancellations. The definition of HFT is not really coherent in the literature. 
It ranges from a very general, covering almost 95% of trading activities, to extremely specific 
definition, including only a small fraction of market actors. HFTs’ strategies are characterised 
by holding usually extremely short term positions and making money by a high volume of 
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many tiny returns rather than on the basis of high returns with single trades. To achieve these 
small profits, they need to rapidly submit orders to the order book and then cancel (delete) them 
(Aldridge, 2013; Baruch and Glosten, 2013; Gomber et al., 2011; Lhabitant and Gregoriou, 
2015; Security and Exchange Commission, 2010).  
Montgomery (2016) argue that HFTs act to move quotes by submitting and quickly 
cancelling limit orders to rapidly profit from trading the induced transitory mispricing. 
Interestingly, at the best price, a cancellation of the last limit order widens the spread by either 
increasing the best ask or decreasing the best bid. He highlights that there are different 
strategies/techniques18 to manipulate the market price. One strategy is called Fictitious Orders, 
which is entering orders without an intention to execute them. Another strategy is spoofing 
which is very similar to the former strategy while the third is called Layering, which is the most 
complex one. Nevertheless, not all orders’ submissions and cancellations are aimed at 
manipulating the market. Aquilina et al (2017) make the point that order flow is informative in 
itself. In light of cancellations, they emphasise that traders may submit additional buy and sell 
orders to the order book while trying to discover the efficient price in a gradual learning 
process. 
Furthermore, Lhabitant and Gregorius (2015) underline that to understand the reasons 
behind the high order cancellation rate, one has to realise the behaviour intentions of market 
participants and the circumstances behind them. This behaviour is noted as trading strategy, 
however, not everything is covered by specific trading strategies. Generally speaking, there are 
two driving forces which drive cancellations. These factors differ between making money and 
preventing losses. Therefore, all reasons for order cancellation are classified into active 
execution for offence reasons (making money) or active execution for defence reasons 
                                                          
 
18 These strategies are described in the SEC indictment for market manipulation by Sarao in the run inspired by 
the 2010 Flash Crash. See https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf 
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(preventing losses). For a limit order book market, Obizhaeva and Wang (2005) have pointed 
out that when trading times are chosen optimally, the dynamics of the supply/demand play a 
key role in determining the optimal execution strategy.  
The main innovation to the literature is to use the methodology from the previous chapter 
where it was found that that order book had characteristic changes in its shape depending on 
periods of price rises and price falls. Periods when cumulative returns exceed a certain 
threshold (in basis points) in the up- or downward directions, respectively, have been called 
directional changes (DC), i.e. trough to peak and peak to trough (see Tsang, 2017 for more 
about DC). Peak-Trough methodology has been introduced and applied to avoid any potential 
loss of information results when aggregating data containing all order events occurring within 
an interval. Further, to study the role of order submissions and cancellations in the order book 
under peak to trough and trough to peak, I use the tool developed in the previous chapter to 
indicate the prevailing market trends. This tool uses the information conveyed by the Notional 
Volume Weighted Average Price (NVWAP) curves. NVWAP curves provide a method to 
model the shape of the entire order book on the basis of the average price at cumulative volumes 
at given time stamps. These curves, in turn, depict the expectations of market participants 
regarding current and future price movements.  
Put differently, the information conveyed by the NVWAP order book curves (in the bid and 
ask sides) suggests that the market activity on each side of the limit order book directly affects 
the shape of liquidity supply and demand curves. Consequently, the change in the slope of the 
NVWAP curve (𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑 and 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘) captures both the volume available and any additional 
cost (benefit) results from buying (selling) in the rising (falling) market. These changes in 
slopes of NVWAP curves cause steepening/flattening effects. On the other hand, the 
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contraction/expansion effects of the NVWAP curves are measured by calculating the changes 
in the total volume available on both sides of the limit order book (𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑 and 𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘). 
In a downtrend, change in slope of the bid curve is greater than the change in the slope of 
the ask curve, i.e.  ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑) > ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘). The slope coefficient (𝛽1) is estimated 
at each peak and trough accounting for both uptrends (from trough to peak) and downtrends 
(from peak to trough) intervals. Each of these uptrend and downtrend intervals has a return of 
at least ±25bp. Then, I calculate the following four statistics ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑), ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘), 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑)and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘) at the start and the end of each uptrend and downtrend interval. 
Hence, the change in the slope of the NVWAP curves, and the change in the total volume on 
each side of the limit order book can be used within an algorithmic trading strategy to exploit 
trading opportunities. It is expected that when the market price falls (downtrend), the bid side 
gradually decreases. The bid side NVWAP curve slowly contracts and becomes steeper. The 
NVWAP curve on ask (liquidity supply) side curve then slowly expands and becomes flatter.  
The present study investigates the cancellations that occurred on both sides of the limit 
order book, buy and sell, using a sample of stocks from London Stock Exchange examining 
the aforementioned change (NVWAP slopes). The categories of order events investigated, 
under conditions of price falls, include new sells, new buys, cancellation buys and cancellation 
sells. So, it is hypothesised that for large price falls, new buys decrease while new sells 
increase; also, cancellations of buy increase but cancellations of sells decrease for large price 
falls. These categories of order submissions and cancellations are studied in the context of the 
peak and trough analysis applied in the previous chapter. These lead to precise hypotheses 
where the differential behaviours of cancellations are investigated when price is falling 
(downtrend). To establish the stylised facts, the peak to trough data is differentiated into: (1) 
small change when the change in cumulative return is more than 25 basis points but less than 
50, (2) medium change in cumulative return when the change is more than 50 basis points but 
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less than 100 and (3) large change in cumulative return when it changes by more than 100 basis 
points.   
I also introduce a new measure of volatility based on volume weighted concept of bid-ask 
spread19. This is estimated as the change in the logarithm of slope of the NVWAP curves (bid 
and ask) from peak to trough. Furthermore, this study extends Mayston et al. (2008) work. One 
extension is by dividing the trading day into four periods instead of a time dummy which 
accounts only for the end of the trading day. The new time dummy20 will account for the time 
of the day in which the order has been submitted to the order book or cancelled to identify 
whether cancellations trend varies with trading hours. Another extension is redefining the 
resiliency variable to be the duration involved in cumulative return from peak to trough.  Flash 
Crashes, for instance, involve large price drops in very short time periods, i.e. duration. This 
variable (duration) is used to normalise/adjust the volumes of cancellations and submissions 
on both sides of the market from peak to trough. 
Thus, this study follows the literature by investigating the variables which contribute to the 
explanation of the market impact and volatility. These variables are, namely, volume, change 
in return, change in price and time/duration. By rebuilding the E-Order Book for 5 stocks from 
London SETS in July and August 2007, this study reconstructs the demand and supply curves 
to analyse the price impact and fluctuations with special focus on cancellations. More 
specifically, this paper’s aim is to investigate how cancellations on both sides of the order book 
contribute to the market impact measured as the duration adjusted cumulative return of peak-
trough directional changes. It, also, aims at investigating the cancellations behaviour on both 
                                                          
 
19 The bid-spread at the best is very competitive at 0.5 basis points on average.  
20 This variable clarifies the times where more orders have been submitted to the order book by traders from 
outside the UK, namely from the US or any other country. As these traders join the trading session, they may 
affect the number of submissions of new orders as well as orders cancellations. 
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sides of the order book and their effect on market volatility based on the changes of the 
NVWAP slopes between bid and ask sides.  
To recap, this study investigates the effect of cancellations on the market to the extent that 
this phenomenon may lead to market crashes. It is expected that during a downtrend price 
move, cancellations on the buy side increase while cancellations on the sell side decrease. The 
cancellations behaviour affect both the size of the price drop as well as volatility by broadening 
them which might cause a flash crash to the market. Particularly, this study inspects whether: 
1. Cancellations contribute to the size of price drops (have large market impact).  
2. Cancellations increase the market volatility.  
To this end, different model specifications are defined and tested comparing scenarios 
where variables are/aren’t adjusted to duration of the peak to trough price trend. Duration 
adjusted models are expected to perform better than non-adjusted ones in explaining the 
cancellations effect on the market. All analysis is based on ultra-high-frequency data from the 
order book which investigates the periods where the market was experiencing downtrend price 
moves (from peak to trough). Robust regressions21, which control for efficiency under more 
realistic conditions, are run to check the validity of the regression results obtained.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a background and a 
literature survey. The methodology and the research hypotheses are discussed in section 3 
while a description of the data used is given in section 4. Section 5 presents the data analysis 
and the empirical results of the study along with discussing the implications of the study. The 
conclusion and some suggestions for future research are given in the last section.   
                                                          
 
21 See Andrews (1974).  
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Background on Price Impact, Order Submissions and Cancellations 
In recent years, the wide evolution in electronic trading in both Europe and the U.S. has led 
to introduce new trading platforms (e.g. Chi-X and EdgeX) in stock exchanges (Colliard and 
Foucault, 2012). These platforms allow traders to utilize technology to swiftly buy and sell 
their shares in the market. Briefly, in line with the notion of fast automated execution and high 
technology, market participants complete their transactions fully electronically with identified 
counterparties who want to transact/trade in a matter of seconds. This ultimately sets the tone 
for emerging a new style of trading known as high frequency trading, where automated systems 
electronically buy and sell. HFT strategies update their orders very quickly (a few seconds or 
less) and have no over-night positions. To realize small profits per trade, rapid submission of 
cancellations and deletions is necessary (Gomber et al., 2011).  
It is traditionally argued that there are, in fact, two types of traders coexisting in the financial 
markets: (i) “informed” traders and (ii) uninformed (or less informed) market makers. 
“Informed” traders place market orders for immediate execution where their cost is at half the 
bid-ask spread level. On the other hand, uninformed22 (or less informed) market makers provide 
liquidity in a shape of placing limit orders on both sides of the order book in a hope of earning 
part of the bid-ask spread. In the current electronic markets, there exists a conceptual problem 
such that it is difficult to distinguish between an informed trader and a market maker. This is 
due to the fact that each participant in the market can place both limit and market orders 
depending on the current state of the order book or their own strategies (Eisler et al., 2012; 
Kyle, 1985).  
                                                          
 
22 An asymmetry in information between a buyer and the corresponding seller is present. 
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Electronic trading platforms and automated trading have led to less execution costs23 as 
well as higher execution efficiency24. Nevertheless, this automated trading follows different 
strategies compared to non-automated trading. The trading strategy decisions have to be made 
much faster as the speed of trading has significantly increased. A recent and growing body of 
literature suggests that not only trades are informative but also other order book events. The 
existing literature focuses more on the decision of whether to place a market order or a limit 
order. Yet, decisions after an investor places a limit order, i.e. orders cancellations, are not 
widely considered by this literature. Put differently, there is growing literature tends to classify 
all activities of electronic traders as being strategic (see Fong and Liu, 2008; Lhabitant and 
Gregorius, 2015; Weber and Rosenow, 2005). 
On the other hand, Höschler (2011) suggests that the main risk of a limit order arises from 
the execution time or time-to-fill. Its execution price is fixed by the price tick when the limit 
order is placed though. Thus the execution price (traded VWAP) depends on its size and the 
liquidity available in the order book. Traders may choose to place limit orders to decrease 
execution costs. Limit orders also have an impact on price in that submitting a buy limit order 
sets an extra upwards pressure on price, while cancelling a buy limit order decreases this 
pressure. Furthermore, in the context of optimal order execution, understanding the price 
impact of orders from a theoretical perspective is important. Huberman and Stanzl (2004) 
suggested that arbitrage opportunities exist if the effect of trades on prices is permanent and 
that effect is non-linear. Gatheral (2010) also studied the effect of trades on prices and added 
that if the price impact function is non-linear, arbitrage could be excluded if the trades impact 
decays in a particular way.  
                                                          
 
23 That is due to lower transaction costs and less need for human intervention. 
24 That is due to quicker reaction to incoming orders and market changes. 
 
97 
 
Bouchaud et al. (2004) carried out a detailed study of the statistics of price changes at the 
trade by trade level, and analysed the interplay between the impact of each trade on price and 
volatility. They associated limit orders with the decay of price impact of trades. They argued 
that there is a “delicate interplay” between two opposite tendencies: first, strongly correlated 
market orders which lead to super-diffusion (or persistence), and second, mean reverting limit 
orders which lead to sub-diffusion (or anti-persistence). Their insight implies that focusing 
solely on trades without considering the effect of limit orders volumes leads to ignoring an 
important part of the price formation mechanism. 
Furthermore, the main focus of the empirical literature on price impact has been primarily 
on trades. Different models for price impact have been recommended in the literature; however, 
little agreement on how to model that impact is in place. Price impact has been described by 
various authors in the empirical literature as non-linear, linear, square root, mechanical, virtual, 
permanent, instantaneous, temporary or transient (see Cont et al., 2014; Bouchaud, 2010). The 
intuitive notion that prices move due to the imbalance between demand and supply seems to 
be the only consensus.  
Eisler et al. (2012) review the dynamics of prices and state and suggest three processes. 
These processes are “instantaneous jumps due to events, events inducing further events and 
thereby affecting the future jump probabilities (described by the correlation between events), 
and events exerting pressure on the gaps behind the best price and thereby affecting the future 
jump sizes”. Moreover, large orders have an impact on the subsequent behaviour of the order 
book; market (buy) orders drive up prices and widen the spread (i.e. the gap between best limit 
buy and sell order). Large orders, which are visible to all market participants, change the supply 
and demand balance of the asset and therefore also have an impact on the price, even without 
being executed (Höschler, 2011).  
 
98 
 
Traditionally, cancellations have been treated as part of order book imbalance measures. 
Cancellations are part of traders’ trading strategies. For a limit order book market, Obizhaeva 
and Wang (2005) have constructed a simple dynamic model to capture the intertemporal nature 
of supply/demand in the market and solved for the optimal execution strategy. They have 
pointed out that when trading times are chosen optimally, the dynamics of the supply/demand 
play a key role in determining the optimal execution strategy.  
Additionally, Machain and Dufour (2013) have questioned the price impact of limit order 
cancellations. They have explicitly modelled cancellations as a separate event using a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) specification. They have found limit order cancellations are negatively 
correlated with the cumulative quote changes. Typically, a cancellation on the buy (sell) side 
permanently decreases (increases) stock prices. Nevertheless, Machain and Dufour (2013) have 
suggested that HFTs are feasibly acting to move quotes by submitting and quickly cancelling 
limit orders to rapidly profit from trading the induced transitory mispricing. They have, also, 
made the point that non-HFTs’ limit order cancellations convey some information while HFTs’ 
cancellation activity is not informative.  
Interestingly, at the best price, a cancellation of the last limit order widens the spread by 
either increasing the best ask or decreasing the best bid. Eisler et al. (2012) suggested that the 
impact of market orders was the main focus of previous studies which found that this impact 
decays in a way that offsets the correlation of the sign of the trades. They described the 
underlying mechanism as that, on one side of the book, market orders attract compensating 
limit orders. They added that “these limit orders do not necessarily change the best limits, but 
are such that the conditional impact of a buy trade following other buy trades is smaller than 
the conditional impact of a sell trade following buy trades.” In addition, Farmer et al. (2004) 
studied changes in the mid-price (returns) at the level of individual events. They concluded that 
the returns triggered by market orders, limit orders, and cancellations are very similar and are 
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statistically indistinguishable from those caused by market orders. They emphasised that their 
results are quite consistent across the cancellation of buy and sell limit orders. They added that 
any removal of volume (cancellation) at the best price is equivalent to removal by a market 
order. Both cases create a price change equivalent to the first gap. However, the effect25 on best 
prices for a limit order remains unexplained.  
Eisler et al. (2012) suggested that there is a long-range relationship between events 
happening on the same side of the book. However, the signed correlation function26 is short 
ranged. This demonstrates the compensating effect such that on one side of the book, market 
orders attract compensating limit orders. They emphasised that market orders, all limit orders 
and cancellations at the bid/ask lead to a constant jump size that matches the average price 
change they cause. This simple picture works very well for large tick stocks, but not for small 
tick stocks. Also, as a generalization of the theory of the market order price impact in the 
associated literature, Eisler et al. (2012) pointed out that an event can induce further events27 
that amplify or dampen its own effect.  
2.2 The Market Price Manipulation through Order Cancellations 
Montgomery (2016) emphasises that while there exists an imbalance in the market between 
the buy side and the sell side, logically, participants (“unsuspecting investors”) would act upon 
which direction they expect the price to change into. To manipulate the market price, 
perpetrators (or manipulators) send a huge order on one side of the order book, which creates 
imbalance in the market and thus misleading interpretations. These interpretations, very likely, 
are creating a "chain effect" where many participants actually do not wait till the large orders 
                                                          
 
25 A limit order that falls inside the spread decreases the spread, and causes a price change in the opposite 
direction from market orders and cancellations. 
26 It is the function which assigns an opposite sign to the limit order and market order on the same side of the 
book. 
27 E.g. the arrival of excess buy market orders is shortly followed by additional sell limit orders. 
 
100 
 
are executed. Rather, they enter the market for themselves. This increasing activity by those 
participants (“unsuspecting investors”) sets pressure on the price in one direction. This creates 
an opportunity (improved prices) to the perpetrators (owners of those large orders) which they 
use to enter the market on the opposite direction and cancel their original large orders. They, 
then, leave the stage with nearly risk free profits.  
 
Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) demonstrate that “’t’he term “illegal price manipulation” is 
difficult to define. Current US law does not explicitly define it. The finance and economics 
literature uses the term manipulation in an imprecise manner.” They suggest that if a trader 
intends to hit the economic efficiency by pursuing an order which makes prices less accurate 
as signals for efficient resource allocation and makes markets less liquid for risk transfer, then 
this trading strategy is classified as “illegal price manipulation”. They consider “price 
manipulation” and “market manipulation” as synonyms as price effects are market wide. 
•submit huge order on one side of 
the order book (with no intention 
of executing
•the order has to be visible to all 
traders
•this creates imbalance in the 
market and improve prices (chain 
effect)
Perpetrators
• enter the market on the same 
direction to profit from the 
improved price
Participants
(unsuspected investors) •enter the market on the opposite
direction
• cancel their original large orders or 
modify them
• leave the market with nearly risk 
free profits
Perpetrators
Figure 17: How manipulators could use cancellations to manipulate the market 
 
101 
 
There are different strategies/techniques to manipulate the market price. One strategy is 
called Fictitious Orders, which is entering orders without an intention to execute them; this 
strategy is one of the simplest. Another strategy is Spoofing which is very similar to the former 
strategy. The third strategy is called Layering, which is the most complex one (see 
Montgomery, 2016).  
Fictitious Large Orders: This scenario requires several assumptions to work:  
1. The stock28 should be followed by number of participants and the order book 
should be available to all of them.  
2. Initial Large Order should be large enough29 as compared to the average daily 
volume on the market of the security.  
3. If short selling restrictions apply like in some countries within EU, then this 
account should have a position to be able to unwind. 
This strategy follows three major steps: Build-Up, Un-Winding and Cancellation. During 
Build-Up stage of Fictitious Orders Scenario, a perpetrator30 sends a very large limit buy order 
at a price below the best bid (below spread). Then, the top level of the book is instantly updated 
with the new order. Many participants who see this misbalance may misinterpret this 
misbalance (increase in demand) as probably a hedge fund having some upgrade or earnings 
news on this stock, so they buy in. This sets pressure on price as more existing liquidity will 
be consumed. Therefore, price will eventually move up (chain effect). The manipulator, then, 
will sell31 this stock or in other words "un-wind" the original direction. Lastly, he either cancels 
                                                          
 
28 Logically, manipulators with large trading accounts would aim at thinly traded securities and low caps. 
Theoretically, such an account has all means to manipulate this kind of relatively illiquid markets. 
29 At least 25% of this average daily volume should be enough to have some effect (at least short term intra-
day) on the market price. Obviously, the higher the original order, the higher the odds.  
30 A perpetrator or manipulator is a trader who has a relatively large trading power. 
31 The manipulator’s strategy is either selling because he had a position previously or he sells short. 
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the initial large order completely or modifies32 it so that it is insignificant or not relevant, see 
Figure 17 above.  
Spoofing: This scenario is very similar to the scenario described above with one difference in 
speed. However, the effect of the spoofing is smaller in terms of basis points and more short term 
oriented than the Fictitious Large Orders. Hence why, the activity of spoofing means sending and 
cancelling/modifying the large orders more frequently than in the Fictitious Large Orders scenario. 
Typically, this scenario is done by a "fast" trader (an ALGO or some other automated trading 
system). This trader sends a very large order within the spread and, then, takes it down before 
spread manages to adjust itself so that the large order is executed. Yet, this scenario can entice not 
only other ALGOs but also other carefully monitoring traders of order book.  
 
Figure 18: Illustration of Spoofing scenario. Source: Silicon Investor website33. 
                                                          
 
32 He either modifies the quantity or the price. He sets the price far below that level which market may reach. 
33 See: https://www.siliconinvestor.com/readmsgs.aspx?subjectid=23993&msgnum=120006&batchsize=10&batchtype=Next. 
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Layering: Similar to spoofing but smarter, layering is more likely to be executed by "fast" 
traders. In this case, the manipulator decides to mask his activity by splitting the large order 
into smaller sized but still significant layers34 of multiple orders. After these layered lots, the 
order book would, obviously, look busier with built up demand. Other participants interpret the 
change in the order book as positive, so they act on it, which in turn leads price to increase. 
Lastly, the originator of the Layered Orders cancels all or some of the layers and sells the 
security for improved prices. 
 
Figure 19: Market price manipulation through layering 
“If the proprietary firm is layering the book with multiple bids and offers at different prices 
and sizes, this strategy can generate an enormous volume of orders and high cancellation rates 
of 90% or more”, Security and Exchange Commission (2010). 
                                                          
 
34 The manipulator would split an order of 1000 shares limit buy into 10 layers of 100 lots. He, then, sends the 
first 100 lot at a level above the best bid and then gradually drops (i.e. first lot is sent at 145.50 when the best 
bid is at 145.46 then the next at 145.49, etc.. till the tenth layer at 145.40). 
Manipulator
•submits a large buy order but spliting that order into smaller sized orders
•then he sends the lot priced at a level above the best bid for the first order in the lot, i.e. best bid is at 
145.50 → he prices the first order in the lot at 145.55
•then he sets the price of the remaining orders in the lot to gradually drops, i.e. 145.54, 145.53 ... till 
the last layer
Other market 
participants
•order book looks busier with build up demand
•startto demand more of this security
•price increases
Manipulator
•cancels all or some of the layers
•sells the security for improved prices
 
104 
 
2.3 Flash Crashes, High Frequency Trading and Order Book Cancellations  
2.3.1 Overview 
Several studies, in financial markets literature, have suggested that the rising importance of 
HFT has amplified the frequency and severity of flash crashes besides the high volatility of 
prices. Nevertheless, the debate about the benefits and costs of HFT has not been settled in the 
literature yet. Many empirical and theoretical studies have questioned the threatening effects 
of HFT which, possibly, may lead to the emergence of flash crashes (Kirilenko et al., 2011; 
Sornette and Von der Becke, 2011).  
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) (2010), demonstrates that “HFTs are 
proprietary trading firms that use high speed systems to monitor market data and submit large 
numbers of orders to the markets. HFTs utilize quantitative and algorithmic methodologies to 
maximize the speed of their market access and trading strategies.” As proprietary firms are 
engaged in HFT, the SEC (2010) report also notes the other characteristics often attributed to 
those firms to be: “(1) the use of high-speed and sophisticated computer programs for 
generating, routing, and executing orders; (2) use of co-location services and individual data 
feeds offered by exchanges and others to minimize network and other types of latencies; (3) 
very short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions; (4) the submission of 
numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission; and (5) ending the trading day in 
as close to a flat position as possible (that is, not carrying significant, unhedged positions 
overnight).” 
Moreover, Leal et al. (2016) have associated the high price volatility and the observation 
of flash crashes to the presence of HFTs in the market. They pointed out two salient 
characteristics of HFT which explain the emergence of flash crashes; namely the ability of 
HFTs (i) to raise bid-ask spreads in the limit order book (LOB) by grasping market liquidity, 
and (ii) to synchronize on the sell-side of the LOB. However, they reported that sharp drops in 
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prices were observed with the contemporaneous concentration of Low Frequency Traders’ 
(LFTs) orders on the buy-side of the book.  
Generally, contrary to LFTs who base their trading strategies on chronological time, HFTs 
apply event-based strategies. SEC (2010) describes HFTs behaviour/strategies in the market as 
they “now take advantage of low-latency systems and liquidity rebates by submitting large 
numbers of non-marketable orders35 (often cancelling a very high percentage of them), which 
provide liquidity to the market electronically.” Nevertheless, Leal et al. (2016) developed an 
agent-based model of a limit order book market in which heterogeneous HFTs interact with 
LFTs. They studied two different scenarios to assess the contribution of HFTs; only LFTs 
interact with each other in the first scenario, whereas both HFTs and LFTs interact with each 
other in the second scenario. They concluded that order cancellations by HFTs have an 
uncertain effect on price dynamics and fluctuations. They reported that on one occasion, high 
rates of order cancellation lead to higher volatility and more frequent flash crashes. However, 
on another occasion, they suggested that order cancellations also imply faster price-recoveries, 
which lessen the duration of flash crashes.   
Furthermore, SEC (2010, 48) emphasis that “except for securities in the lowest 20% of 
typical buy-side depth, increasingly more severe drops in price is associated with ever-larger 
drops in liquidity”. Yet, the report adds that the “securities that had both the worst decline in 
that depth and the greatest intraday average of buy-side depth had the most severe average 
price drop”. 
2.3.2 6th of May 2010, HFTs and Cancellations 
In 2010, all it took was a matter of minutes and nearly $1 trillion in market value was wiped 
off US share values in Wall Street's infamous Flash Crash. The SEC (2010) report points out 
                                                          
 
35 The submission of numerous orders is followed by cancellation shortly after submission, SEC (2010) Report. 
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that there was no uniformity in response to market conditions on May 6 amongst HFTs. Some 
of those traders have stopped their trading activity36, others have reduced it while the remaining 
HFTs have continued to trade actively. Different motivations were behind the decision of HFTs 
to continue trading according to the SEC (2010). Some of them thought that algorithms under 
the extreme market conditions observed that afternoon would still be able to operate 
successfully (profitably). Later on, their aggregate trading activity picked up and increased 
significantly during the period in which the broad indices were rapidly declining.  
After almost five years, the US regulators believe that a British high-frequency trader was 
largely to blame. A spotlight on trading practices after the arrest of a futures trader operating 
out of a suburban house in London in connection with the US equity market “Flash Crash” in 
2010. Navinder Singh Sarao, named The Hound of Hounslow, has been accused of 
manipulating the market. He is also charged with wire and commodities fraud. In a criminal 
complaint, the Department of Justice in the US alleges that Navinder Singh Sarao manipulated 
the market for S&P 500 futures contracts, known as E-minis37, using an automated trading 
program. It is alleged that he used this automated program to generate large sell orders. He then 
cancelled the trades after the price had fallen giving himself a chance38 to buy new contracts 
before a rebound. Designed to mimic the market and push prices sharply in one direction, it is 
said that Mr Sarao used a variety of trading techniques. These techniques include spoofing and 
layering.  
On the day of the Flash Crash itself, The United States Department of Justice stated that the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by approximately 600 points in a five-minute span, 
                                                          
 
36 This is for reasons such as the triggering of their internal risk parameters due to rapid price moves and 
subsequent data-integrity concerns. 
37 E-minis contracts are traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the largest US futures market. 
38 He has profited from other investors following the pattern or exiting the market. 
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following a drop in the price of E-Minis39. US authorities claim that he made over $40 million 
in total (≈£27 million) from his trades where they assume that the manipulations continued for 
five years right up until he was caught. Navinder Singh Sarao was arrested at his parents’ home 
in Hounslow west London where the suburban surroundings bolide a scale of the accusations 
against him (see DOJ criminal complaint named “United States of America v. Navinder Singh 
Sarao”, 201540; Financial Times41). 
Interestingly, the focus here is on equations that are written into computer code and acting 
with a bunch of a very expensive infrastructure autonomously from the intervention of a 
human. Besides, lawyers have argued that Sarao's conduct, as it is described in US court filings, 
does not amount to a criminal offense in the UK. Furthermore, Davis et al. (2013, p. 9) point 
out that “(c)onceptually, spoofing is easily understood, but it is far harder to enforce regulations 
against it”. This suggests that there should be a serious review for the laws and regulations that 
control trading activities in the market. There have been many cases in the history of blaming 
individuals of a market crash but Sarao is the most recent one. He was applying the 
aforementioned strategy of HFTs which is explained in SEC (2010) report.  
3  Motivation and Methodology  
3.1 Motivation 
Machain and Dufour (2013) suggested that HFTs are feasibly acting to move quotes by 
submitting and quickly cancelling limit orders to rapidly profit from trading the induced 
transitory mispricing. They, also, made the point that non-HFTs’ limit order cancellations 
convey information while HFTs’ cancellation activity is not informative. Furthermore, at the 
                                                          
 
39 See The United States Department of Justice’s report at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/futures-trader-
charged-illegally-manipulating-stock-market-contributing-may-2010-market-flash. 
40 Available online at: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/04/21/sarao_criminal_complaint.pdf. 
41 Available online at: https://www.ft.com/content/a1114d60-e8d0-11e4-87fe-00144feab7de. 
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best price, a cancellation of the last limit order widens the spread by either increasing the best 
ask or decreasing the best bid. Additionally, Farmer et al. (2004) have suggested that liquidity 
fluctuations drive the large price fluctuations in any market. On the other hand, Leal et al. 
(2016) suggested that order cancellations by HFTs have an uncertain effect on price dynamics 
and fluctuations. They, also, reported that on one occasion, high rates of order cancellation lead 
to higher volatility and more frequent flash crashes.  
In light of HFT and flash crashes, the previous chapter has investigated the shape of bid 
and ask sides of the order book using the NVWAP concept. It suggested that within an 
algorithmic trading system, as market state changes, the change in the shape of bid and ask 
sides of the order book can be used to switch between different trading strategies. Thus, 
understanding the order submissions and cancellations on each side of the order book will help 
to reveal more information about price changes in the market.  
The information conveyed by the NVWAP curves is greatly useful as an indicator of 
prevailing market trends. Further, the information delivered by the NVWAP curves suggests 
that the market activity on each side of the limit order book directly affects the shape of 
liquidity supply and demand curves. These curves, in turn, depict the expectations of market 
participants regarding current and future price movements. Hence, the cumulative impact of 
market events is expected to have observable changes on these curves. More specifically, the 
change in the slope of the NVWAP curves, and the change in the total volume on each side of 
the limit order book can be used within an algorithmic trading strategy to exploit trading 
opportunities.  
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Closely linked to the aforementioned trading strategies, market participants42 act upon 
which direction they expect the price to change into. For instance, when they observe that buy 
orders exceed43 sell orders for a stock, those market participants think that the price should go 
up, thus, they would very likely buy this stock not waiting till large orders actually get 
executed. Rather, they enter the market for themselves. This increasing activity sets pressure 
on the price in one direction. This creates an opportunity (improved prices) to the manipulators 
which they use to enter the market on the opposite direction and cancel their initial large orders. 
As the price starts rising, investors will compete to consume liquidity quickly to take advantage 
of the potential higher returns. This competition will attract higher volume to the demand side. 
At the same time, volume on the supply side will decrease as fewer traders become willing to 
sell.  
Leal et al. (2016) concluded that order cancellations by HFTs have an uncertain effect on 
price dynamics and fluctuations. They reported that on one occasion, high rates of order 
cancellation lead to higher volatility and more frequent flash crashes. However, on another 
occasion, they suggested that order cancellations also imply faster price-recoveries, which 
lessen the duration of flash crashes. Therefore, on one hand, this study hypothesises that 
cancellations have an impact on the market (price dynamics measured by the market impact) 
to the extent that this phenomenon may lead to market crashes. Particularly, this study inspects 
whether cancellations affect the size of price drops. Generally, it is expected that when the 
market price falls (downtrend), the bid side gradually decreases. The bid side NVWAP curve 
slowly contracts and becomes steeper. The NVWAP curve on ask (liquidity supply) side curve 
                                                          
 
42 These participants are referred to as unsuspecting investors (Montgomery, 2016). 
43 A manipulator sends a huge order on one side of the order book, which creates imbalance in the market and 
thus misleading interpretations. 
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then slowly expands and becomes flatter. This effect can be seen in Figure 20 in the shape of 
the NVWAP curves on the bid side where the curves slowly contract and become steeper. 
Panel 1:       Start of Downtrend at 08:15am                                               End of Downtrend at 08:20am on 27th July 
 
Panel 2:       Start of Downtrend at 08:35am                                               End of Downtrend at 10:00am on 27th July 
 
Figure 20: The NVWAP curves show the start (8:15 AM) and end (8:20 AM) of downtrend for panel 1 and the start (8:35 
AM) and end (10:00 AM) of downtrend for panel 2 on 27th of July 2007 for Vodafone stock. The ask side NVWAP curve 
gradually expands and becomes flatter; the bid side NVWAP curve contracts and steepens. The curves in Panel 2, however, 
experienced larger price change. 
In other words, it is expected in the downtrend price movements that new orders submitted 
to the buy side of the order book as well as cancellations from the sell side of the order book 
would decrease. It is, also, expected that new orders submitted to the sell side of the order book 
and cancellations from the buy side of the order book under the same price trend would 
increase. On the other hand, this study, also, hypothesises that cancellations have an effect on 
the market volatility, explicitly the bid-ask spread. It is noteworthy that realized volatility could 
alternatively be used instead of market volatility to examine the effect of cancellations on the 
market. 
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As cancellations behaviour affects both the size of the price drop and volatility by 
broadening them, this might cause a flash crash to the market. Therefore, this study inspects 
whether: 
1. Cancellations contribute to the size of price drops (have large market impact).  
2. Cancellations increase the market volatility.  
The data used in this study allows comparing between two market states, volatile and quiet, 
as July 2007 was the month before the Financial Crisis in 2007 (quiet) while August 2007 
covers its starting (volatile). Though, due to limitations in the dataset used in this study, it is 
not possible to identify cancellations causes, namely manipulation or price discovery. In other 
words, the dataset doesn’t allow testing different trading strategies.  
By rebuilding the E-LOB for London SETS in July and August in 2007, this study 
reconstructs the demand and supply curves to analyse price impact and fluctuations with special 
focus on orders’ cancellations. The aim is to investigate how cancellations on both sides of the 
order book contribute to the size of the price drop (price dynamics) explanation. It, also, aims 
at investigating the cancellations behaviour on both sides of the order book and their effect on 
market volatility (denoted by the newly introduced bid-ask spread measure).  
To this end, different model specifications are defined and tested comparing scenarios 
where variables are/aren’t adjusted to duration from the peak to trough price trend. Duration 
adjusted models are expected to perform better than non-adjusted ones in explaining the 
cancellations effect on the market. All analysis is based on ultra-high-frequency data from 
London SETS which investigates the periods where the market was experiencing a downtrend 
price move (from peak to trough). Uptrend price move’s effects are supposed to be similar to 
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the downtrend price movements but opposite in signs. Robust regressions44, which control for 
efficiency under more realistic conditions, are run to check the validity of the regression results 
obtained.  
3.2 Methodology 
This study aims at investigating the effect of cancellations on the market (price dynamics 
measured by the market impact), to the extent that this phenomenon may lead to market 
crashes. Particularly, this study inspects whether cancellations affect the size of price drops. It, 
also, examines whether cancellations have an effect on the market volatility, explicitly bid-ask 
spread measure. This section presents the econometric methodology used to examine the 
dynamics of cancellations in the limit order book of London SETS platform.  
Various models to study the price impact have been proposed in the literature; however, 
little agreement on how to model that impact is in place (see Bouchaud, 2010; Cont et al., 
2014). The intuitive notion that prices move due to the imbalance between demand and supply 
seems to be the only consensus. Traditionally, cancellations have been treated as part of order 
book imbalance measures. For a limit order book market, Obizhaeva and Wang (2005) have 
pointed out that when trading times are chosen optimally, the dynamics of the supply/demand 
play a key role in determining the optimal execution strategy. Moreover, Lo and Hall (2015) 
have suggested that studies based on calendar time suffer from many shortcomings. Thus, 
choosing an interval length for time aggregation becomes necessity when using calendar time. 
Choosing the appropriate interval length depends on the level of limit order activity and would 
likely vary among stocks in the sample. On the other hand, a potential loss of information 
results when aggregating data containing all order events occurring within an interval.  
                                                          
 
44 See Andrews (1974).  
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Therefore, the methodological choice of sampling frequency in this paper will deviate from 
the typical choice in the related literature where event time or calendar time is used. This study 
will base the sampling frequency for the data set of order events on the directional changes 
(DC) approach45 where peaks and troughs in cumulative return are identified. This 
methodology is followed in a previous work where time duration from peak to trough is defined 
as the time that the market takes to change its state46. Peaks and troughs in cumulative return 
are located by setting a minimum cumulative return change threshold of 25 basis points (bp) to 
identify local peaks and troughs. Peak to Trough represents the period where the market return 
is experiencing a downward price movement, see Table 18.  
Stock 
Month 
Number of Peaks and Troughs Identified during the month 
HSBA BP TSCO AZN VOD 
July 206 135 175 171 184 
August 352 250 215 217 259 
Table 18: This table shows how many peaks and troughs were identified when the cumulative return changed by at least 
25 basis points 
Furthermore, this study differs from the definition of resiliency variable in Mayston et al. 
(2008) and Tóth et al. (2011) who have studied the resiliency of the order book market 
following a liquidity shock. Mayston et al. (2008) define resiliency as “the speed with which 
the temporary order-flow related changes induced in depth and in spreads by an order-flow 
shock are corrected or neutralized by the flow of new orders into the market through the 
competitive actions of value traders, liquidity suppliers and others.” Relatively, the resiliency 
                                                          
 
45 See Tsang (2017). 
46 Peaks and troughs methodology is explained in the previous chapter. 
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variable is redefined in this study to be the time taken (duration) for the change in cumulative 
return from peak to trough.  
With that in mind, this study follows the literature by investigating the volume, change in 
price and resiliency (time/duration) variables as well as the volatility and the change in 
cumulative return (price impact) (see Gabaix, 2003; Obizhaeva and Wang, 2005; Lo and Sapp, 
2008;  Mayston et al., 2008; Tóth et al., 2011; Eisler et al., 2012; Farmer et al., 2013; Lo and 
Hall, 2015). Therefore, this paper investigates how order cancellations, the change in spread, 
the change in cumulative returns, the duration from peak to trough and whether an extreme 
price change impact the market. All analysis is based on ultra-high-frequency data for 5 stocks 
from the E-LOB of London SETS which covers the periods where the market was experiencing 
a downtrend price change (from peak to trough).  
To establish some stylised facts about the data this study considers, a new dummy variable, 
which is the TimeOfTheDayi variable. This variable will account for the time of the day in 
which the order has been submitted to the order book or cancelled to identify whether 
cancellations trend varies with trading hours. It is expected that more traders join the trading 
session from the US (around Mid-day UK time when the trading day in the US starts). In other 
words, we split the day into 4 periods as follows: 
 
 
 
Dividing the trading day into four periods extends Mayston et al. (2008) work. They have 
used a time dummy which accounts only for the end of the trading day in their study. The 
reason behind defining this variable is to account for the new traders who trade stocks listed in 
the London SETS from outside the UK, namely from the US or any other country. As these 
08:05 10:05 12:05 14:05 16:25 
4 3 2 1 
Figure 21: Time line to show the definition of the Time of The Day variable. 
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traders join the trading session, they may affect the number of submissions of new orders as 
well as orders cancellations. TheTimeofTheDayi variable takes the values from 1 to 4. Each 
value covers a period of at least two consecutive hours starting from 08:05 and ending at 16:25. 
This study hypothesizes that order cancellations affect the market or the price dynamics 
(measured by the market impact) to the extent that this phenomenon may lead to market 
crashes. Particularly, this study inspects whether cancellations affect the size of price drops 
during downtrend price movements. Market impact is defined as the change in the stock 
cumulative return from peak to trough (∆ReturnFromPeakToTroughi). The stock cumulative 
return, r, is calculated following the formula: 
𝑟 = log(𝑃𝑚,𝑡+1) − log (𝑃𝑚,𝑡)  (3.2.1) 
where Pm is the mid price, and is given as Pm =
Pbid+Pask
2
. Then the change in return is the first 
difference between the cumulative return at the peak corrected for the first minute and at the 
trough corrected for the last minute, such that: 
∆ReturnPeakToTroughi = 𝑟𝑃+1 − 𝑟𝑇−1  (3.2.2) 
where 𝑟𝑃+1 is the cumulative return at the peak time plus one minute, and 𝑟𝑇−1 is the cumulative 
return at the trough time minus one minute. Adding and deducting one minute aims at 
discarding changes in cumulative returns at the turning points. 
This study, also, theorises that order cancellations have an effect on the market volatility, 
explicitly the new measure of bid-ask spread. Farmer et al. (2004) have suggested that the 
granularity of fluctuations in supply and demand remains the key factor underlying extreme 
price fluctuations. Therefore, we will account for liquidity fluctuations using the 
∆NVWAP Slope
i
 (discussed in the previous chapter) as a proxy for the Bid-Ask spread. 
Therefore, to test the second hypothesis, the Bid-Ask spread is defined as the Bid-Ask 
difference between the changes in the logarithms of the slopes of the NVWAP curves on the 
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buy and sell sides from peak to trough (∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTrough
i
). The slope of the 
NVWAP curve (𝛽1) in each side of the E-LOB is estimated by the regression: 
log(Yi) = logβ0 + β1Xi  (3.2.3) 
where Yi is the market impact and Xi is the cumulative volume normalized to the i-th order at 
which market side that a trader wants to trade. Xi is calculated as follows: 
Xi =
∑ Volj
i
j=1
ADV
× 100  (3.2.4) 
The exponential transformation Y = β0𝑒
𝛽1𝑋 is performed to ensure that the supply curve is 
strictly increasing for β0, β1 > 0, as assumed by definition. The market impact Yi or the 
premium a trader pays for executing a volume larger than the amount available at best price is 
defined as: 
Yi = (
NVWAPi−Pm
Pb
) × 10000   (3.2.5) 
where Pm and Pb are mid- and best-price respectively. The NVWAP is the average expected 
transaction price for a trade size equal to the cumulative volume at the i-th level, and is 
calculated as:  
NVWAPi =
∑ Pj×Volj
i
j=1
∑ Volj
i
j=1
  (3.2.6) 
where Pj is the price and Volj is the volume at order j in the book.  
All regressions run are non-linear and are linearized using logs. Also, differences’ variables 
are used to minimise the estimation bias and may be omitting it. Following a downtrend move 
in the price, it is expected that cancellations on the buy (sell) side of the market will increase 
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(decrease)47. Hence, as shown in Table 19, the buy (sell) cancellations coefficient will be 
positive (negative). On the other hand, it is expected that submission of new orders on the buy 
(sell) side of the market will decrease (increase). This means that the coefficient of new orders 
on the buy (sell) side is negative (positive), see Table 19 below.  
Side 
Event 
Buy Sell 
Cancellations + - 
New Orders - + 
Table 19: This table emphasises the expected signs of cancellations and new orders' coefficients in each side of the 
market, namely buy and sell, following a downtrend move in the price. 
All regressions performed account for two levels of cumulative return change in basis 
points as dependant variable, normal and extreme. The stock cumulative return change is 
considered to be normal if it does not exceed 100bp while it is considered as extreme change 
when it exceeds the 100bp level as demonstrated in (3.2.7) below, unless stated otherwise.  
∆ReturnPeakToTrough ≝ {
 Normal ∀ ∆ReturnPeakToTrough < 100bp.
Extreme ∀ ∆ReturnPeakToTrough≥100bp.
 (3.2.7) 
 The dependant variable is then adjusted to duration to define other model specifications 
to analyse the minutely market impact, i.e. the minutely change in cumulative return from peak 
to trough in basis points (∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei). To adjust the 
∆ReturnPeakToTrough defined in 3.2.7, the stock cumulative return, r, is calculated following 
equations 3.2.1 to 3.2.6. Then the change in return is calculated by taking first difference 
                                                          
 
47 See Höschler (2011). 
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between the cumulative return at the peak and at the trough. Lastly, this change in return is 
normalised to duration as follows: 
∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei = (
∆ReturnPeakToTroguhi
Durationi
) × 10000  (3.2.8) 
where Durationi is the time duration in minutes from peak to trough, i.e. the difference between 
the start time and end time of a downtrend price move. 
Durationi = 𝑡𝑒 − 𝑡𝑠 (3.2.9) 
𝑡𝑒 and 𝑡𝑠 are the end time and start time of the i
th downtrend price move, respectively. 
After that, ∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei is defined as normal and extreme as well. 
To set a threshold after which change in cumulative return from peak to trough per minute 
(higher market impact) is recognised as extreme, the ∆ReturnPeakToTroughi reporting 
criterion demonstrated in equation (3.2.7) is restructured following more strict criteria. To 
decide the cut-off point on which the reporting of ∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei is 
based, the descriptive statistics for the new variable48 are stated in Table 34. As Table 34 below 
best illustrates, the mean value of the |∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei| is 1.64 in July 
compared to 2.26 in August. Using August’s statistics is more convenient due to the fact that 
the financial crisis has already kicked off in that month. Moreover, the top 10% values of the 
distribution are beyond or equal to |3.64|. This value, consequently, will be used to restructure 
the minutely changes in cumulative return from peak to trough 
(∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei).  
                                                          
 
48 See equation (3.2.8). 
 
119 
 
Thus, the minutely changes in cumulative return from peak to trough 
(∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei) is split into two categories
49 to shed the light on the 
market impact of large price drops which happen in a shorter time span, i.e. have larger impact, 
such that: 
∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei ≝ {
 Normal ∀ ∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei < |3.64|.
Extreme ∀ ∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei≥|3.64|.
              (3.2.10) 
Moreover, Chordia et al. (2008) make the point that over the recent years, algorithmic 
trading was behind the increase in trading volume as well as the drop in the average trade size. 
Thus, the increase in trading volume may explain the concerns about the impact of algorithmic 
trading on price discovery process and volatility. With that in mind, different independent 
variables are defined and used to build different model specifications. These variables are 
defined as follows: 
1- TotalBuyCancellationToADVi (equation 3.2.11) and TotalSellCancellationToADVi 
(equation 3.2.12) are the total volume of all cancellations occurred on the buy and sell 
sides, respectively, during the span from peak to trough, then normalising (dividing) 
that volume to the average daily volume. 
TotalBuyCancellationToADVi = ∑ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 𝐴𝐷𝑉⁄  (3.2.11) 
TotalSellCancellationToADVi = ∑ 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 𝐴𝐷𝑉⁄  (3.2.12) 
                                                          
 
49 Generally, for any change in cumulative return to be classified as extreme, it should be no less than 100 basis 
points and happen in a time span shorter or equal 30 minutes. Although 50 basis points change is not 
considered as extreme change in cumulative return, it is believed to be high enough to hit the market. 
Additionally, the reason why 30 minutes is considered here is that at the time of the Flash Crash in 2010, the 
market took 20 minutes to crash. 
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2- TotalBuyNewToADVi (equation 3.2.13) and TotalSellNewToADVi (equation 
3.2.14) are the total volume of all new orders submitted to the buy and sell sides, 
respectively, during the span from peak to trough, then normalising (dividing) that 
volume to the average daily volume. 
TotalBuyNewToADVi = ∑ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖 𝐴𝐷𝑉⁄  (3.2.13) 
TotalSellNewToADVi = ∑ 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖 𝐴𝐷𝑉⁄  (3.2.14) 
3- ln TotalBuyCancellationi and ln TotalSellCancellationi are the logarithm of the total 
volume of all cancellations occurred on the buy and sell sides, respectively, during the 
span from peak to trough. 
ln TotalBuyCancellationi = ln(∑ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖) (3.2.15) 
ln TotalSellCancellationi = ln(∑ 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖) (3.2.16) 
4- ln TotalBuyNewi and ln TotalSellNewi are the logarithm of the total volume of all 
new orders submitted to the buy and sell sides, respectively, during the span from peak 
to trough. 
ln TotalBuyNewi = ln(∑ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖 𝐴𝐷𝑉⁄ ) (3.2.17) 
ln TotalSellNewi = ln(∑ 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖 𝐴𝐷𝑉⁄ ) (3.2.18) 
5- ln AverageBuyCancellationi (equation 3.2.19) and ln AverageSellCancellationi 
(equation 3.2.20) are the logarithm of the average buy and sell cancellations, i.e. the 
total volume of all cancellations occurred on the buy and sell sides, respectively, 
during the span from peak to trough divided by the number of cancellation 
events/orders during the same time span. 
ln 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐵𝑢𝑦𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  = ln(∑ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 #𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠⁄ ) (3.2.19) 
ln 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  = ln(∑ 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 #𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠⁄ ) (3.2.20) 
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6- ln AverageBuyNewi (equation 3.2.21) and ln AverageSellNewi (equation 3.2.22) 
are the logarithm of the average new buy and sell orders, i.e. total volume of all new 
orders submitted to the buy and sell sides, respectively, during the span from peak to 
trough divided by the number of new submission events/orders during the same time 
span. 
ln 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖  = ln(∑ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖 #𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠⁄ ) (3.2.21) 
ln 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖  = ln(∑ 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖 #𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠⁄ ) (3.2.22) 
Additionally, to answer the second research question of this study, i.e. how cancellations 
affect the market volatility (the bid-ask spread), the change in bid-ask spread from peak to 
trough (i.e. when the market experiences a downtrend price move) is used as a proxy to measure 
the market volatility, and is set as the dependent variable. The ordinary bid-ask spread 
definition is not informative in the dataset used because it changes either by 0.5 or 1. Therefore, 
the dependant variable in this set of models (the bid-ask spread) is defined as the Bid-Ask 
difference between the change in the logarithm of slope of the NVWAP curves from peak to 
trough ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTrough
i
.  
To calculate this variable, first, the slope of the NVWAP curve in each side of the E-LOB is 
estimated by equations (3.2.3) to (3.2.6). Then, ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTrough
i
 is calculated 
by estimating the difference between the logarithms of slopes of the NVWAP curves in the bid 
and ask sides of the E-LOB as follows:  
∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTrough
i
= ∆NVWAPBuyPeakToTrough
i
− ∆NVWAPSellPeakToTrough
i
                      (3.2.23) 
where:  
- ∆NVWAPBuyPeakToTrough
i
 is the change in the logarithm of slope of the NVWAP 
curves in the bid side of the E-LOB from peak to trough, which is calculated as: 
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∆NVWAPBuyPeakToTrough
i
= SlopeNVWAPBuyPeak
i
− SlopeNVWAPBuyTrough
i
 
            (3.2.24) 
- ∆NVWAPSellPeakToTrough
i
 is the change in the logarithm of slope of the NVWAP 
curves on the sell side of the E-LOB from peak to trough, which is calculated as: 
∆NVWAPSellPeakToTrough
i
= SlopeNVWAPSellPeak
i
− SlopeNVWAPSellTrough
i
 
           (3.2.25) 
Finally, to check the validity of the previous regressions, robust regressions will be used to 
down-weight the effect of any outliers or standard errors in the estimations, and to generalise 
the findings. Therefore, robust regressions control for efficiency under more realistic 
conditions. Different sets of robust regressions are run; namely, standard errors and clustered 
robustness checks are used. Below are the models defined to test this paper’s hypotheses. 
3.2.1 MARKET IMPACT ANALYSIS (The Effect of Orders Cancellations on the Size of 
Cumulative Return Drops from Peak to Trough) 
To answer the first research question of this study, i.e. how cancellations affect the market 
(market impact or price dynamics), different model specifications of cancellations are defined 
and run. In particular, the effect of cancellations on the size of price drops is studied under 
various provisions. The size of drop in cumulative return from peak to trough (when the market 
experiences a downtrend price move) is used as a proxy to denote the market impact, and is 
used as the dependent variable. Below are the models’ specifications used to study how 
cancellations impact the market. 
MODEL SPEC (1): The Effect of Total Volume of Cancelled and New Orders Normalised 
by the Average Daily Volume (ADV) on the Size of Drop in Cumulative Return from Peak 
to Trough Measured in Basis points 
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In this model specification, using the total volumes of cancellations and submissions (new 
orders) on both sides of the E-LOB after normalising them to the average daily volume, the 
effect of cancellations on the size of price drop is investigated. This normalisation is performed 
to comply with the fairly small number of the change in cumulative return from peak to trough. 
The size of the price drop is used as a proxy of market impact, and is defined as the change in 
cumulative return from peak to trough in basis points. This model is as follows: 
∆ReturnPeakToTroughi=β0+β1TotalBuyCancellationToADVi+β2TotalBuyNewToADVi 
+β3TotalSellCancellationTOADVi+β4TotalSellNewToADVi+ei (3.2.1.1) 
where: 
- ∆ReturnPeakToTroughi is the change in the stock cumulative return from peak to 
trough defined earlier in equations (3.2.1 to 3.2.6).  
- TotalBuyCancellationToADVi (equation 3.2.11) and TotalSellCancellationToADVi 
(equation 3.2.12) are the total volume of all cancellations occurred on the buy and sell 
sides, respectively, during the span from peak to trough, then normalising (dividing) 
that volume to the average daily volume. 
- TotalBuyNewToADVi (equation 3.2.13) and TotalSellNewToADVi (equation 3.2.14) 
are the total volume of all new orders submitted to the buy and sell sides, respectively, 
during the span from peak to trough, then normalising (dividing) that volume to the 
average daily volume. 
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MODEL SPEC (2): The Effect of Logged Total Volume of Cancelled and New Orders on 
the Size of Drop in Cumulative Return from Peak to Trough Measured in Real Points 
(Basis Points×104)50 
This model specification uses the logarithms of total volumes of cancellations and 
submissions on both sides of the E-LOB to study the effect of cancellations on the size of price 
drop. The right hand side of the equation (3.2.1.2) is logged to conform the left hand side 
variable which is reported in basis points and is a difference of logged values. The size of the 
price drop is defined as the change in cumulative return from peak to trough which describes 
the market impact. This model is of the shape: 
∆RPReturnPeakToTroughi=β0+β1 ln TotalBuyCancellationi +β2 ln TotalSellCancellationi 
+β3 ln TotalBuyNewi +β4 ln TotalSellNewi +ei (3.2.1.2) 
where: 
- ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughi is the change in the stock cumulative return from peak to 
trough in real points. This change in return is calculated following the formula: 
∆RPReturnPeakToTroughi = ∆ReturnPeakToTroughi × 10000 (3.2.1.3) 
where ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughi is the change in the stock cumulative return from 
peak to trough defined earlier in equations (3.2.1 to 3.2.6). 
- ln TotalBuyCancellationi and ln TotalSellCancellationi are the logarithm of the total 
volume of all cancellations occurred on the buy and sell sides, respectively, during the 
span from peak to trough. 
                                                          
 
50 Explain why this case  
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- ln TotalBuyNewi and ln TotalSellNewi are the logarithm of the total volume of all 
new orders submitted to the buy and sell sides, respectively, during the span from peak 
to trough. 
MODEL SPEC (3): The Effect of Logged Average Volume of Cancelled and New Orders 
on the Size of Drop in Cumulative Return from Peak to Trough Measured in Real Points 
(Basis Points×104) 
To study the effect of cancellations on the size of price drop, this model specification uses 
the logarithms of the average volumes of cancellations and submissions on both sides of the E-
LOB. The size of the price drop (the market impact) is defined as the change in cumulative 
return from peak to trough. Using the average values may mitigate the effect of any extreme 
values in the number of shares traded in each order. Therefore, this model is form as: 
∆RPReturnPeakToTroughi=β0+β1 ln AverageBuyCancellationi +β2 ln AverageSellCancellationi 
+β3 ln AverageBuyNewi +β4 ln AverageSellNewi +ei (3.2.1.4) 
where: 
- ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughi is the change in the stock cumulative return from peak to 
trough. This change in return is calculated as real points following formula (3.2.1.3) 
and (3.2.1 to 3.2.6) explained above. 
- ln AverageBuyCancellationi (equation 3.2.19) and ln AverageSellCancellationi 
(equation 3.2.20) are the logarithm of the average buy and sell cancellations, i.e. the 
total volume of all cancellations occurred on the buy and sell sides, respectively, 
during the span from peak to trough divided by the number of cancellation 
events/orders during the same time span. 
- ln AverageBuyNewi (equation 3.2.21) and ln AverageSellNewi (equation 3.2.22) are 
the logarithm of the average new buy and sell orders, i.e. total volume of all new orders 
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submitted to the buy and sell sides, respectively, during the span from peak to trough 
divided by the number of new submission events/orders during the same time span. 
3.2.2 MINUTELY MARKET IMPACT ANALYSIS (The Effect of Orders Cancellations 
on the Size of Cumulative Return Drops per Minute from Peak to Trough) 
To appropriately analyse the minutely market impact, the minutely change in cumulative 
return from peak to trough (∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei) is defined in 3.2.8, calculated 
and analysed. Models’ specifications 4 (equation 3.2.2.1), 5 (equation 3.2.2.2) and 6 (equation 
3.2.2.3) are run where the new structure in (3.2.10) is applied.  
MODEL SPEC (4): The Effect of Total Volume of Cancelled and New Orders Normalised 
by the Average Daily Volume (ADV) on the Size of Cumulative Return Drop from Peak 
to Trough Measured in Real Points (Basis points×104) and Normalised to Duration 
(Minutely Change in Cumulative Return) 
The total volumes of cancellations and submissions on both sides of the E-LOB after 
normalising them to the average daily volume are used in this specification to assess the effect 
of cancellations on the size of price drop from peak to trough. The size of the price drop is 
defined as the change in cumulative return from peak to trough in real points after normalising 
to the resiliency (duration from peak to trough). The model applied here is of the formula: 
∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei=β0+β1TotalBuyCancellationToADVi+β2TotalBuyNewToADVi 
+β3TotalSellCancellationTOADVi+β4TotalSellNewToADVi+ei (3.2.2.1) 
where: 
- ∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei is the resiliency variable. In other words, it is the 
change in the stock cumulative return from peak to trough normalised to the duration 
of the ith downtrend price movement (equation 3.2.8).  
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- TotalBuyCancellationToADVi (equation 3.2.11) and TotalSellCancellationToADVi 
(equation 3.2.12) are the total volume of all cancellations occurred on the buy and sell 
sides, respectively, during the span from peak to trough, then normalising (dividing) 
that volume to the average daily volume. 
- TotalBuyNewToADVi (equation 3.2.13) and TotalSellNewToADVi (equation 3.2.14) 
are the total volume of all new orders submitted to the buy and sell sides, respectively, 
during the span from peak to trough, then normalising (dividing) that volume to the 
average daily volume. 
MODEL SPEC (5): The Effect of the Logged Total Volume of Cancelled and New Orders 
on The Size of Cumulative Return Drop from Peak to Trough Measured in Real Points 
(Basis points×104) and Normalised to Duration (Minutely Change in Cumulative Return) 
In this model specification, the total volumes of cancellations and submissions on both 
sides of the E-LOB are logged (normalised) to examine the effect of cancellations on the size 
of price drop from peak to trough. The size of the price drop is defined as the change in 
cumulative return from peak to trough in real points after normalising to the resiliency. The 
model formula applied here is: 
∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei=β0+β1 ln TotalBuyCancellationi +β2 ln TotalSellCancellationi 
+β3 ln TotalBuyNewi +β4 ln TotalSellNewi +ei (3.2.2.2) 
where: 
- ∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei is the change in the stock cumulative return from 
peak to trough normalised to the duration of the ith downtrend price movement as 
previously mentioned (equations 3.2.1 to 3.2.6 and 3.2.8).  
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- ln TotalBuyCancellationi and ln TotalSellCancellationi are the logarithm of the total 
volume of all cancellations occurred on the buy and sell sides, respectively, during the 
span from peak to trough (equations 3.2.15 and 3.2.16). 
- ln TotalBuyNewi and ln TotalSellNewi are the logarithm of the total volume of all 
new orders submitted to the buy and sell sides, respectively, during the span from peak 
to trough (equations 3.2.17 and 3.2.18). 
MODEL SPEC (6): The Effect of the Logged Average Volume of Cancelled and New 
Orders on the Size of Cumulative Return Drop from Peak to Trough Measured in Real 
Points (Basis Points×104) 
The effect of cancellations on the size of price drop is investigated in this model 
specification where the logarithms of the average volumes of cancellations and submissions on 
both sides of the E-LOB are used. The size of the price drop is defined as the change in 
cumulative return from peak to trough after normalising to the duration (minutely change in 
cumulative return). This model is of the shape: 
∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei=β0+β1 ln AverageBuyCancellationi 
+β2 ln AverageSellCancellationi +β3 ln AverageBuyNewi +β4 ln AverageSellNewi +ei (3.2.2.3) 
where: 
- ∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei is the change in the stock cumulative return from 
peak to trough normalised to the duration of the ith downtrend price movement as 
previously mentioned (equations 3.2.1 to 3.2.6 and 3.2.8).  
- ln AverageBuyCancellationi (equation 3.2.19) and ln AverageSellCancellationi 
(equation 3.2.20) are the logarithm of the average buy and sell cancellations, i.e. the 
total volume of all cancellations occurred on the buy and sell sides, respectively, during 
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the span from peak to trough divided by the quantity of cancellation events/orders 
during the same time span. 
- ln AverageBuyNewi (equation 3.2.21) and ln AverageSellNewi (equation 3.2.22) are 
the logarithm of the average new buy and sell orders, i.e. total volume of all new orders 
submitted to the buy and sell sides, respectively, during the span from peak to trough 
divided by the quantity of new submission events/orders during the same time span. 
3.2.3 MARKET VOLATILITY ANALYSIS (The Effect of Order Cancellations on the 
Spread) 
To answer the second research question of this study, i.e. how cancellations affect the 
market volatility (the bid-ask spread), different model specifications of market events are 
defined. In particular, the effect of cancellations on the market volatility is analysed under 
various settings. The change in bid-ask spread from peak to trough (i.e. when the market 
experiences a downtrend price move) is used as a proxy to measure the market volatility, and 
is set as the dependent variable. Thus, model specifications to study how cancellations impact 
market volatility are described below. 
The ordinary bid-ask spread definition is not informative in the dataset used because it 
changes either by 0.5 or 1. Therefore, the dependant variable in this set of models (the bid-ask 
spread) is defined as the Bid-Ask difference between the change in the logarithm of slope of 
the NVWAP curves from peak to trough ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTrough
i
. This variableis 
calculated is estimated following equations 3.2.3 to 3.2.6 and 3.2.23 to 3.2.25. 
On the other hand, the right hand side of the models are either normalised to the ADV or 
logged to maintain consistency measures. Below are the models proposed to investigate the 
second research question. 
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MODEL SPEC (1): The Effect of Logged Total Volume of Cancelled and New Orders on 
The ∆NVWAPi from Peak to Trough  
This model specification uses the logarithms of total volumes of market events, namely 
cancellations and submissions, on both sides of the E-LOB to study the effect of cancellations 
on the spread. The right hand side of the equation (3.2.3.1) below is logged to conform the left 
hand side variable, which is a difference of logged values. This model studied here is the 
following: 
∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi=β0+β1Durationi+β2 ln TotalBuyCancellationi 
+β3 ln TotalSellCancellationi +β4 ln TotalBuyNewi +β5 ln TotalSellNewi +ei (3.2.3.1) 
where: 
-  ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi is the Bid-Ask difference between the change in 
the logarithm of slope of the NVWAP curves from peak to trough (equation 3.2.23).  
- Durationi is the time duration in minutes from peak to trough, i.e. the difference 
between the start time and end time of a downtrend price move (equation 3.2.9). 
- ln TotalBuyCancellationi and ln TotalSellCancellationi are the logarithm of the total 
volume of all cancellations occurred on the buy and sell sides, respectively, during the 
span from peak to trough (equations 3.2.15 and 3.2.16). 
- ln TotalBuyNewi and ln TotalSellNewi are the logarithm of the total volume of all 
new orders submitted to the buy and sell sides, respectively, during the span from peak 
to trough (equations 3.2.17 and 3.2.18). 
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MODEL SPEC (2): The Effect of Logged Average Volume of Cancelled and New Orders 
on The ∆NVWAPi from Peak to Trough  
To study the effect of cancellations on market volatility (the spread), this model 
specification uses the logarithms of the average volumes of cancellations and submissions on 
both sides of the E-LOB. The reason behind using the average values is that they may mitigate 
the effect of any extreme values in the number of shares traded in each order. Therefore, this 
model takes the form: 
∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi=β0+β1Durationi+β2 ln AverageBuyCancellationi 
+β3 ln AverageSellCancellationi +β4 ln AverageBuyNewi +β5 ln AverageSellNewi +ei (3.2.3.2) 
where: 
-  ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi is the Bid-Ask difference between the change in 
the logarithm of slope of the NVWAP curves from peak to trough (equation 3.2.23).  
- Durationi is the time duration in minutes from peak to trough, i.e. the difference 
between the start time and end time of a downtrend price move (equation 3.2.9). 
- ln AverageBuyCancellationi (equation 3.2.19) and ln AverageSellCancellationi 
(equation 3.2.20) are the logarithm of the average buy and sell cancellations, i.e. the 
total volume of all cancellations occurred on the buy and sell sides, respectively, 
during the span from peak to trough divided by the quantity of cancellation 
events/orders during the same time span. 
- ln AverageBuyNewi (equation 3.2.21) and ln AverageSellNewi (equation 3.2.22) are 
the logarithm of the average new buy and sell orders, i.e. total volume of all new orders 
submitted to the buy and sell sides, respectively, during the span from peak to trough 
divided by the quantity of new submission events/orders during the same time span. 
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MODEL SPEC (3): The Effect of Total Volume of Cancelled and New Orders Normalised 
by the Average Daily Volume (ADV) on The ∆NVWAPi from Peak to Trough  
The total volumes of cancellations and submissions on both sides of the E-LOB after 
normalising them to the average daily volume are used in this specification to evaluate the 
effect of cancellations on the market volatility. The formula for the model applied here is: 
∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi=β0+β1Durationi+β2TotalBuyCancellationToADVi+ 
β3TotalBuyNewToADVi+β4TotalSellCancellationTOADVi+β5TotalSellNewToADVi+ei 
            (3.2.3.3) 
where: 
- ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi is the Bid-Ask difference between the change in 
the logarithm of slope of the NVWAP curves from peak to trough (equation 3.2.23).  
- Durationi is the time duration in minutes from peak to trough, i.e. the difference 
between the start time and end time of a downtrend price move (equation 3.2.9). 
- TotalBuyCancellationToADVi (equation 3.2.11) and TotalSellCancellationToADVi 
(equation 3.2.12) are the total volume of all cancellations occurred on the buy and sell 
sides, respectively, during the span from peak to trough, then normalising (dividing) 
that volume to the average daily volume. 
- TotalBuyNewToADVi (equation 3.2.13) and TotalSellNewToADVi (equation 3.2.14) 
are the total volume of all new orders submitted to the buy and sell sides, respectively, 
during the span from peak to trough, then normalising (dividing) that volume to the 
average daily volume. 
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Type of Variable Variable Name 
Model Specification 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dependent ∆ReturnPeakToTroughi  ×         
Dependent ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughi   × ×       
Dependent ∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinute     × × ×    
Dependent ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi        × × × 
Independent 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝐴𝐷𝑉 ×   ×     × 
Independent 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤/𝐴𝐷𝑉  ×   ×     × 
Independent 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝐴𝐷𝑉  ×   ×     × 
Independent 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤/𝐴𝐷𝑉  ×   ×     × 
Independent 𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛   ×   ×  ×   
Independent 𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤   ×   ×  ×   
Independent 𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛   ×   ×  ×   
Independent 𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤   ×   ×  ×   
Independent 𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛    ×   ×  ×  
Independent 𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤    ×   ×  ×  
Independent 𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛    ×   ×  ×  
Independent 𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤    ×   ×  ×  
Table 20: This table describes what variables are used in each model specification to test both hypotheses of this study
4  The Data 
In this study, we analyse data on five carefully selected stocks to represent different market 
sectors. These stocks are traded at LSE where data is derived from London SETS. The data 
covers the period of two consecutive months, July and August, in 2007; a total of 44 trading 
days is used. I reconstruct the historic limit order book of London SETS platform over the 
period of study. I based the analysis on these two months because the month of July was a quiet 
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month where the market was not volatile. However, the market in the month of August was 
volatile due to the Financial Crisis which started August 2007-9. Eigner and Umlauft (2015: 
pp. 5) suggest that “The Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 was the most severe economic 
crisis since the Second World War. Only the Great Depression was similar in severity and 
length.”  
The following table (Table 21) provides a basic description of the stocks presented and 
analysed in this study. The impact of daily opening and closing auctions is excluded as we only 
evaluate return and market events between 8:01 AM and 4:29 PM. This approach filters out 
both auctions and overnight trading effect on one hand, and removes the impact of corporate 
actions (e.g. dividends, stock splits, etc.) on the other hand.  
Stock Ticker Industry Sector 
HSBC Holdings HSBA Banks 
British Petroleum Plc BP Petroleum  
Tesco Plc TSCO Retail 
Astra Zeneca Plc AZN Pharmaceutical Products 
Vodafone Group Plc VOD Telecommunications 
Table 21: List of stocks used in this study 
5 Analysis and Results 
This study inspects whether cancellations affect the size of price drops. It, also, studies 
whether cancellations have an effect on the market volatility, namely the bid-ask spread 
measure. To this end, this section demonstrates the analyses carried out to answer the 
hypotheses of this study. 
5.1 Preliminary Analysis and Descriptive Statistics 
This section describes the statistical properties of the new orders, cancelled orders, spread, 
change in price and change in stock return for HSBC stock data. These statistics are based on 
ultra-high-frequency basis covering 2 consecutive months (July and August 2007) before and 
after the financial crisis.  
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Month 
Stock 
percentage of cancellations 
to new orders for JULY% 
percentage of cancellations 
to new orders for 
AUGUST% 
Buy Sell Buy Sell 
HSBA 69.43 70.09 71.64 92.94 
BP 71.96 71.55 75.61 75.58 
TSCO 75.07 75.47 72.42 72.96 
AZN 87.44 89.42 88.18 88.90 
VOD 72.86 72.85 79.79 82.69 
Average 75.35 75.91 77.39 78.22 
Table 22:   This table presents the percentage of order cancellations to new order submissions for all peak to trough 
trends for both July and August 2007 and for all five stocks studied 
The statistics (Table 22 above) on the percentages of cancellations to new orders for all five 
stocks in July and August suggest that around 77% of the new orders submitted to the market 
are being cancelled. For TSCO stock, the cancellations percentages were as high as 75% of the 
new orders on both sides of the market in July and August. In July, the cancellations on the sell 
side of the market were more than their likes on the buy side for AZN51 (AstraZeneca plc) and 
HSBA. However, it is the opposite scenario where cancellations were more on the buy side of 
the market for BP in July. Moreover, cancellations in August indicate that they occurred more 
on the sell side of the LOB for VOD compared to TSCO, BP, HSBA and AZN where 
cancellations were almost at the same level for both sides of the order book in that month. 
Generally, contrary to the large difference in cancellations’ percentages between buy and sell 
sides of the LOB in July, the percentages of cancellations on both sides of the market in August 
were not significantly different from each other. Cancellations on both sides in August for 
VOD were 7-10% higher from their counters in July. This might have been due to more volatile 
market in the month of August 2007. 
                                                          
 
51 AstraZeneca plc is an Anglo–Swedish multinational pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical company. 
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Month 
Stock 
New Buy to New Sell Ratio  
Cancelled Buy to Cancelled 
Sell Ratio  
July 2007 August 2007 July 2007 August 2007 
HSBA 0.8582 0.8725 0.8501 0.8798 
BP 0.8922 0.8103 0.8973 0.8105 
TSCO 0.8460 0.9080 0.8415 0.9013 
AZN 0.8422 1.0035 0.8235 0.9954 
VOD 0.8980 0.6789 0.8981 0.6550 
Average 0.8668 0.8896 0.8611 0.8819 
Table 23: For August and July 2007 and for all five stocks studied, this table presents the Peak-Trough ratios of: (1) new 
orders submitted to the buy side of the LOB to the new orders submitted to the sell side of the LOB and (2) cancelled 
orders from the buy side of the LOB to the cancelled orders from the sell side of the LOB. 
Moreover, Table 23 above highlights which side of the market (buy or sell) new and 
cancelled orders have occurred most for the five stocks analysed in this study (see Figure  
below). It suggests that, in August, NEW orders submitted to the BUY side of the market were 
higher from their counterparts on the sell side for HSBA and AZN. Nonetheless, in July, the 
pressure were more on the SELL side where NEW orders submitted to the SELL side of the 
market were higher for all stocks. Furthermore, cancelled orders from the BUY side of the 
market were higher from their matches on the sell side for HSBA only in August. Interestingly, 
new orders (submissions) and cancellations (deletions) density were noticeably larger on the 
sell side of the market in both months.  
The descriptive statistics (Table 24 below) on cancellations and new orders for the HSBC 
stock suggest that the time of the day (in trading hours) where most cancellations occur was 
between 09:10-13:25 on both sides of the market in August and between 09:30-13:45 in July, 
when return changes by less than 50bp52. However, these cancellations have occurred between 
09:40-13:55, when return changes by at least 50bp but less than 100bp, in August while they 
                                                          
 
52 This is noted as low change in Table 24 and measured by basis points. 
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occurred between 09:40-15:15 in July. When return changes by more than 100bp, these 
cancellations have occurred between 11:20-15:40 in August compared to between 08:50-13:50 
in July. These times indicate that cancellation are most likely to occur almost an hour after 
trading starts and an hour before trading ends in both months.  
In August, the percentage of total cancellations to the new orders on the buy side was almost 
84% compared to 73% in July. This percentage was at nearly 70% and 68% on the sell side in 
August and July respectively. Also, the average volumes of cancelled orders on the buy side in 
both months noticeably increase with price fluctuations53. The same attitude (increase) is 
observed on the sell side of the market in both months, but is less noticeable when the change 
in return is less than 100bp. Interestingly, the percentage of cancellations, in August, has 
dropped from 83% to 72% when return changes by more than 50bp on the buy side. Rather, 
this percentage has slightly increased on the sell side when return changes by more than 50bp 
in August. Similarly, the same attitude can be observed in July on both sides in the market. 
Likewise, when return changes by less than 50bp, the average volume of new orders 
submitted to the buy side of the market in August increase as price fluctuates, but this increase 
was more severe in July, where the increase was almost 3000 shares on average. On the other 
hand, the average volume of new orders, in July, submitted to the buy side of the market when 
price change was between 50 and 100bp decreased more in comparison with August. 
Conversely, this volume has increased more in July than in August when price change exceeded 
100bp. Generally, cancellations are higher on the sell side than their counter on the buy side in 
both months. Yet, cancellations’ volume in July was higher on average than their likes in 
August. Lastly, the spread was consistent in both months regardless of the price change. 
 
                                                          
 
53 Returns have increased by more than 50 basis points. 
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Month Variable 
Change in Cumulative Return in basis 
points for HSBC on the Buy side  
Change in Cumulative Return in basis 
points for HSBC on the sell side 
Low 
(<50bp) 
Medium 
(<100 and 
>50bp) 
High 
(>100bp) 
Low 
(<50bp) 
Medium 
(<100 and 
>50bp) 
High 
(>100bp) 
A
u
g
u
st
 
Time of The Day 
2.216216 
(1.108932) 
2.71875 
(1.113969) 
3.384615 
(1.192928) 
2.216216 
(1.113969) 
2.71875 
(1.113969) 
3.384615 
(1.192928) 
Average 
Cancellations per 
order  
7723.272 
(1845.368) 
8277.699 
(2000.066) 
9244.942 
(2274.748) 
8243.519 
(2222.337) 
8226.206 
(1731.032) 
9553.733 
(1008.321) 
Average New 
submissions per 
order 
7586.675 
(1592.617) 
8391.374 
(1976.896) 
9284.978 
(1992.878) 
9027.287 
(2176.723) 
8833.018 
(1915.816) 
9877.508 
(1159.892) 
Total 
Cancellations 
3061501 
(4732361) 
6445218 
(4732361) 
1.03e+07 
(7060071) 
3652428 
(3599949) 
6940305 
(4452188) 
1.21e+07 
(7765693) 
Total New 
Orders 
4256603 
(4652654) 
8938266 
(6306044) 
1.45e+07 
(9970520) 
5256980 
(5396799) 
9760131 
(6181134) 
1.68e+07 
(1.07e+07) 
Spread 
0.5135135 
(0.0821995) 
0.578125 
(0.184451) 
0.5384615 
(0.138675) 
0.5135135 
(0.0821995) 
0.578125 
(0.184451) 
0.5384615 
(0.138675) 
Ju
ly
 
Time of The Day 
2.52 
(1.159023) 
2.85 
(1.308877) 
2.25 
(1.488048) 
2.52 
(1.159023) 
2.85 
(1.308877) 
2.25 
(1.488048) 
Average 
Cancellations per 
order  
8765.742 
(2320.515) 
9630.541 
(2982.46) 
10582.74 
(3401.486) 
9152.537 
(2264.373) 
9244.174 
(3183.682) 
9139.266 
(3192.953) 
Average New 
submissions per 
order 
8383.002 
(1697.482) 
9454.428 
(2188.659) 
12171.41 
(4335.696) 
9872.725 
(2299.963) 
9644.853 
(3123.662) 
10852.56 
(6094.291) 
Total 
Cancellations 
4830310 
(5136356) 
6823367 
(5760829) 
1.31e+07 
(8334784) 
5613898 
(5329542) 
8033376 
(6125016) 
1.55e+07 
(1.06e+07) 
Total New 
Orders 
6765385 
(6943768) 
9836540 
(8189457) 
1.99e+07 
(1.26e+07) 
8432472 
(7565189) 
1.13e+07 
(8263501) 
2.17e+07 
(1.39e+07) 
Spread 
0.56 
(0.1658312) 
0.55 
(0.1538968) 
0.5 
(0) 
0.56 
(0.1658312) 
0.55 
(0.1538968) 
0.5 
(0) 
Table 24: Peak – Trough descriptive statistics for the cancelled and new orders for the HSBC stock in August and July 
2007 under different return changes (from normal to extreme changes) for both sides of the market where price 
experiences a downtrend movement is presented in this table. Numbers in brackets are the standard deviations. 
On the other hand, Table 25 below illustrates the percentage of cancelled orders to new 
orders submitted to the market on both sides of the LOB. It is expected, in general, that market 
price is noticeably affected by large orders’ new submission, cancellations or executions. 
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Remarkably, this table classifies the cancelled to new orders’ percentages according to the 
order’s size to three categories: firstly, orders below one hundred thousand shares (small), 
secondly, orders which are between 100 and 300 thousand shares (medium), and lastly, orders 
which are above or equal 300 thousand shares (large). Notably, in July and August, the share 
of orders which are 100 thousand or more from the total orders is relatively small, i.e. around 
1.5% of the total orders for BP and less than 0.5% for the remaining stocks other than VOD 
for both buy and sell sides of the LOB. For VOD, the ratios were 14.88% and 17.64% for the 
buy and sell sides in July respectively. However, these ratio were 19.83% and 31.54% for the 
buy and sell sides in August respectively. 
For instance, the share of medium orders (between 100k-300k) for VOD stock was about 
19.24% and 13.53% of the total orders on the buy side and 30.93% and 16.16% on the sell side, 
for August and July respectively. Yet, the share of large orders (300k or more) for the same stock 
was 0.59% in August in comparison to 1.35% in July on the buy side while they were 0.61% and 
1.48% on the sell side in August and July respectively. This suggests that VOD stock was heavily 
traded in larger volumes in comparison to the other stocks sampled in this study. 
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Figure 22: This figure depicts the cancellation pressure in each side of the E-LOB for the stock of HSBC. The left hand side panel shows cancellations on the 13th of August 2007 on both sides, namely buy and sell. Yet, 
the right hand side panel presents the cancellation pressure on the buy and sell sides on the 27th of July 2007. 
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Ratio 
 
 
Stock 
Ratio of cancellations 
to new for orders 
below 100k shares 
(Small) 
Ratio of cancellations 
to new for orders 
between 100k-300k 
shares (Medium) 
Ratio of cancellations 
to new for orders 
above or equal 300k 
shares (Large) 
Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell 
HSBA 
July 0.7018 0.7216 0.4972 0.5332 0.9113 0.1199 
August 0.7171 0.7102 0.5507 0.5721 0.3363 0.4319 
BP 
July 0.7349 0.7492 0.6041 0.6365 0.9067 0.7261 
August 0.7608 0.7703 0.7198 0.6793 0.7868 0.7480 
TSCO 
July 0.7205 0.7462 0.8598 0.8483 1.0000 1.0000 
August 0.7189 0.7342 0.8729 0.6392 0.7261 0.6757 
AZN 
July 0.8740 0.8949 0.6470 0.4854 1.0000 0.2556 
August 0.8816 0.8927 0.9348 0.7212 N/A N/A 
VOD 
July 0.6901 0.7193 0.7454 0.7740 0.7731 0.6399 
August 0.7185 0.7409 0.8804 0.9073 0.6783 0.5193 
Table 25: For July and August 2007 and for all five stocks studied, this table presents the percentages of: (1) cancellations 
to new for orders below 100k shares (small size orders), (2) cancellations to new for orders between 100k-300k shares 
(medium size orders), and (3) cancellations to new for orders above or equal 300k shares (large size orders) for all peak 
to trough periods. 
Table 25 above, also, indicates that, in July, cancellation rates were higher for the orders 
below 100 thousand shares and 300 thousand shares or more than the ones between 100 and 
300 thousand shares in general for all stocks but TSCO and AZN. Nevertheless, cancellations’ 
ratios were significantly higher on the buy side than their likes on the sell side for HSBA, 
TSCO, BP and AZN in July 2007. This goes in line with what is expected as per Table 19. This 
continues to be the case with cancellations ratios on the buy side in August 2007 for BP, TSCO 
and VOD. For HSBA stock, cancellations’ ratio on the sell side was higher than the buy side, 
which contradicts Table 19 expectations. 
In August, the highest cancellation rates were for orders of 300 thousand shares or more 
on the buy side for BP, TSCO, AZN and HSBA where cancellations were at 90%+. The least 
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cancellation rates were on the sell side in August for orders of the size 300 thousand shares or 
more for HSBA.  
Moreover, cancellation rates on both sides in August were higher than their counterparts in 
July for the medium size orders for all stocks. The case is the opposite for the large size orders 
where cancellations’ rates in July were higher than their counterparts in August for all stocks 
but HSBA. Interestingly, for medium size orders in August, more than 93% of submitted orders 
were cancelled on the buy side compared to almost 72% on the sell side of the market in August 
for AZN. This percentage was more than 88% for VOD on both sides of the market. For all 
stocks, the cancellation pressure was higher on the buy side for orders of the large size in July. 
Relatively, this pressure was higher in July on the sell side for the medium size orders for 
HSBA, BP and VOD while it was higher on the buy side for BP, TSCO and AZN in August. 
Month 
Time of 
The Day 
Change in Return on the buy side in basis points Change in Return on the sell side in basis points 
Low 
(<50bps) 
Medium 
(<100 and 
>50bps) 
High 
(>100bps) 
Low 
(<50bps) 
Medium 
(<100 and 
>50bps) 
High 
(>100bps) 
A
u
g
u
st
 
1 4917255.6 6800468 16176581 6161962.76 8746708.62 19394737 
2 3263167.8 4569219 12077889 4323374.59 6048706.5 17494975 
3 4412686.4 6927079 N/A 4727427.83 6593423 N/A 
4 8268608.8 9328584 8919486 8732176.04 10109245.7 10151483 
Ju
ly
 
1 9909460 13790122 17690667.25 11208338.56 15617902 20918604 
2 5170844 5466144 6906405 6959112.54 9275965.5 9575949 
3 4903452 4039595 N/A 6246726.43 5413290 N/A 
4 5961927 6727081 9123497.33 6721606 7370233.4 10128902 
Table 26: These descriptive statistics describe cancellations for the HSBC stock in August and July 2007 at different times 
of the trading day and under different return changes (normal and extreme) for both sides of the market where price 
experiences a downtrend movement. The change in return is deemed to be low when the change is by less than 50 bp, 
while it is classified as medium when the change in return is between 50bp and 100 bp. The change in return is classified 
as high when the change is by 100 bp or more. 
The descriptive statistics (Table 26 above) on cancellations for the HSBC stock suggest that 
under low change in return, most of the cancellations occur at the beginning (between 08:05 
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and 10:05) and the end of the day (between 14:05 and 16:25) on both sides of the market in 
August. Yet, the least cancellations on both sides of the market occur between 10:05 and 12:05 
in August, when return changes by less than 50bp. The same scenario applies on cancellations 
on both sides of the market in August under the medium change in return, where the changes 
at least by 50bp but less than 100bp. However, cancellations on both sides of the market have 
occurred during the first two quarters of the trading day, i.e. between 08:05-14:05, when return 
changes by at least 100bp, in August. Interestingly, between 12:05 and 14:05, the return change 
remained under 100bp on both sides of the market in August and July. This may suggest that 
the market is a little bit less vulnerable at that time of the trading day.  
In July, under the low change in return condition, most cancellations on the buy and sell 
sides occur at the first two hours of the trading day. The rest of cancellations in the market after 
the first two hours of the trading day till the end of it add up almost to similar volumes. 
Likewise, most cancellations on the buy and sell sides occur at the first two hours of the trading 
day when returns change by more than 50bp but less than 100bp. However, cancellation 
pressure was significant on the second two hours of the trading day on the sell side compared 
to the rest of the day under the same price change condition. Cancellation pressure was higher 
in the last quarter of the trading day than the third quarter though on both sides of the market 
(buy and sell).  
Notably, cancellation volumes increase as the change in return gets larger (more volatile 
market). This is true for both sides of the market in July and August. This, also, goes in line 
with the higher volume of orders submitted to both sides of the market as shown in Table 24 
below. The highest cancellation volumes on both sides of the market in July occurred under 
the extreme change in return where return changes by at least 100bp. This may clearly suggest 
that traders try to actively discover the market price. Moreover, cancellations were substantial 
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in the last two hours of the trading day on the buy side in July, and in the second and last 
quarters of the trading day on the sell side.  
Variable 
Time of The Day (Buy side) Time of The Day (Sell side) 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Average 
Cancellations 
7862.346 
(2431.876) 
6946.275 
(1336.248) 
7853.118 
(1742.298) 
9472.292 
(1544.927) 
8811.936 
(2713.465) 
7255.155 
(1232.025) 
8181.823 
(1522.501) 
9107.161 
(1434.019) 
Average New 
Orders 
7695.201 
(2137.899) 
7389.775 
(1628.992) 
8134.083 
(1692.164) 
9088.337 
(1683.569) 
9344.162 
(2313.849) 
8174.438 
(1999.725) 
8966.786 
(1630.036) 
9556.877 
(1709.286) 
Total 
Cancellations 
4917256 
(5596488) 
3263168 
(2738831) 
4412686 
(3546827) 
8268609 
(6115154) 
6161963 
(6551147) 
4323375 
(3911165) 
4727428 
(2477927) 
8732176 
(6473587) 
Total New 
Orders 
7223897 
(8122179) 
4729437 
(4215753) 
6064551 
(4678651) 
1.12e+07 
(8491953) 
8846098 
(9134337) 
6058409 
(5612751) 
6737343 
(3733176) 
1.21e+07 
(8987815) 
Spread 
0.547619 
(0.150396) 
0.5 
(0) 
0.5277778 
(0.117851) 
0.5769231 
(0.183973) 
0.547619 
(0.150396) 
0.5 
(0) 
0.5277778 
(0.117851) 
0.5769231 
(0.183973) 
Table 27: Some descriptive statistics are presented here to describe the cancelled and new orders for the HSBC stock in 
August, defined by the time of the day they occurred. Time 1 is between 08:05 and 10:05. Time 2 is between 10:05 and 
12:05. Time 3 is between 12:05 and 14:05. Time 4 is between 14:05 and 16:25. Numbers in brackets are the standard 
deviations. 
Variable 
Time of The Day (Buy side) Time of The Day (Sell side) 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Average 
Cancellations 
10091.51 
(3500.017) 
8931.52 
(3256.226) 
7897.177 
(836.389) 
9511.613 
(2074.806) 
9269.495 
(3000.796) 
9983.552 
(3753.345) 
8256.354 
(1317.641) 
9119.695 
(2211.195) 
Average New 
Orders 
10080.23 
(3841.429) 
8850.96 
(2531.757) 
8431.577 
(1183.057) 
9337.631 
(1944.334) 
10276.55 
(4481.851) 
10557.43 
(3569.954) 
8662.25 
(1130.917) 
9760.809 
(2632.168) 
Total 
Cancellations 
9909460 
(8812000) 
5170844 
(6568360) 
4903452 
(2830110) 
5961927 
(3974786) 
1.12e+07 
(1.03e+07) 
6959113 
(6868360) 
6246726 
(3106856) 
6721606 
(4767113) 
Total New 
Orders 
1.44e+07 
(1.30e+07) 
7570098 
(9214153) 
6776737 
(3552947) 
8544537 
(6094496) 
1.61e+07 
(1.35e+07) 
1.03e+07 
(9853541) 
8461879 
(4096968) 
9504210 
(6661926) 
Spread 
0.5625 
(0.170782) 
0.5909091 
(0.20226) 
0.5 
(0) 
0.525 
(0.111803) 
0.5625 
(0.170782) 
0.5909091 
(0.20226) 
0.5 
(0) 
0.525 
(0.111803) 
Table 28: Some descriptive statistics are presented here to describe the cancelled and new orders for the HSBC stock in 
July, defined by the time of the day they occurred. Numbers in brackets are the standard deviations. 
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Overall, Table 27 and Table 28 show that on both sides of the market, the percentage of total 
volume of the cancelled orders to the total volume of new orders, in August, increases with the 
time of the day. The increase is more rapid on the sell side though. This suggests that traders 
are considering their positions in the market before the end of the trading day. Remarkably, 
cancellations on both sides in the market are at most between 12:05 and 14:05, in July, while 
they are at their minimum between 10:05 and 12:05. Also, cancellations on the sell side of the 
market were slightly higher than their rivals on the buy side. 
Variable 
HSBC August HSBC July 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Duration in 
minutes 
51.09756 47.89407 0 340 92.77778 103.3115 5 470 
Avg. (Buy) 
Cancellations 
8180.874 2022.902 5121.78 13476.94 9355.989 2753.351 4272.62 17812.48 
Tot. (Buy) 
Cancellation 
5526200 5220897 392739 2.37e+07 6833210 6395019 529123 2.87e+07 
Avg. (Sell) 
Cancellations 
8444.479 1930.592 5347.53 17893.05 9228.137 2721.033 4901.42 16555.51 
Tot. (Sell) 
Cancellation 
6280840 5578040 735969 2.66e+07 8037831 7227596 456667 3.37e+07 
Avg. (Buy) 
New Orders 
8169.947 1893.593 4849.38 13935.7 9341.072 2687.662 4889.46 21995.24 
Tot.Vol (Buy) 
New Orders 
7713305 7286301 811715 3.25e+07 9842162 9355846 357692 4.17e+07 
Tot. Vol (Sell) 
New Orders 
8840440 7792441 1245813 3.45e+07 1.15e+07 9855012 811245 4.45e+07 
Avg. (Sell) 
New Orders 
9086.266 1958.891 5575.16 15701.34 9933.489 3325.534 5789.79 25545.82 
Spread at best 0.5426829 0.1405725 .5 1 0.5462963 0.1462912 .5 1 
Δ price -1.021341 8.78544 -25.75 32 -5.796296 3.160813 -15.25 -2.5 
Δ return -0.007076 0.005384 -0.028745 -0.002732 -.006432 0.003565 -0.017075 -0.002741 
Table 29: The descriptive statistics for all downtrend intervals for the HSBC stock during the months of July and August 
2007 for all orders in the order book for both buy and sell sides. 
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The descriptive statistics on HSBC stock (Table 29) shows that the average duration from 
peak to trough (downtrend interval) is 51 minutes in August compared to nearly 93 minutes in 
July. A downtrend interval in August can be as small as one minute or may last up till 340 
minutes, which accounts for almost one trading day. In comparison, this interval ranged 
between 5 to 470 minutes in July. These numbers indicate how volatile the market was in 
August compared to July 2007, where the price trend changes more frequently in August. Also, 
the average volumes of cancelled orders on the buy side and sell side were 8181 in August and 
9356 in July, respectively, with a higher standard deviation in July. The same attitude can be 
observed on the sell side as well with 8444 in August compared to 9228 in July. Moreover, the 
average volume of new orders submitted to the buy side of the market in August was 8170 
where it was 9086 on the sell side. On the other hand, the average volume of new orders, in 
July, submitted to the buy side of the market was 9341 in comparison with 9933 on the sell 
side.  
Table 30 below presents the Peak-Trough descriptive statistics for all variables used to build 
the model specifications which are used to test the hypotheses of stated earlier. These statistics 
are reported for both July and August 2007 for HSBC stock. 
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Descriptive Stats 
Variable 
July August July August 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
∆ReturnPeakToTroughi  -0.0064 0.0035 -0.1707 -0.0027 -0.0070 0.0053 -0.0287 -0.0027 
∆RPReturnPeakToTroughi  -64.3231 35.6501 -170.7529 -27.4123 -70.7622 53.8457 -287.4483 -27.3224 
∆ReturnPeakToTroughPerMinute  -1.6370 2.0093 -9.9559 -0.1222 -2.2638 2.7967 -19.7585 -0.0816 
∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi  0.5389 0.3918 -0.0531 1.7189 0.5407 0.3667 -0.1563 2.0407 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝐴𝐷𝑉 0.1613 0.1509 0.0124 0.6785 0.1304 0.1232 0.0092 0.5587 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤/𝐴𝐷𝑉  0.2323 0.2208 0.0084 0.9834 0.1820 0.1719 0.0191 0.7669 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝐴𝐷𝑉  0.1897 0.1401 0.0107 0.7951 0.1482 0.1316 0.0173 0.6289 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤/𝐴𝐷𝑉  0.2706 0.2326 0.0191 1.0514 0.2086 0.1839 0.0294 0.8136 
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  15.3583 0.9199 13.1789 17.1740 15.1289 0.9080 12.8809 16.9796 
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤  15.7051 0.9616 12.7874 17.5450 15.4696 0.8923 13.6069 17.2964 
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  15.5337 0.9163 13.0317 17.3325 15.3112 0.8407 13.5089 17.0981 
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤  15.9225 0.8606 13.6063 17.6119 15.6736 0.7963 14.0353 17.3555 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  9.1016 0.2952 8.8359 9.7876 8.9798 0.2448 8.5412 9.5087 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤  9.1075 0.2601 8.4948 9.9985 8.9818 0.2321 8.4866 9.5422 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  9.0901 0.2821 8.4972 9.7144 9.0175 0.2170 8.5843 9.7921 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤  9.1616 0.2780 8.6638 10.1482 9.0929 0.2069 8.6260 9.6615 
Table 30: Descriptive statistics for all variables used to define the model specifications to test the hypotheses of this 
study are reported in this table. All observations are for Peak-Trough trends for HSBC stock in July and August 2007. 
Overall, the average volume of the cancelled orders in August on the sell side was larger 
than its like on the buy side. The case was different in July though where the average volume 
of the cancelled orders on the buy side was larger than its counterpart on the sell side. 
Furthermore, the average volume of new orders on the sell side of the market was larger than 
the one on the buy side in both months. However, the difference between the average volume 
of new orders between the two sides in August was larger than the difference in July. This 
suggests that traders try to minimise the price change effect and maximise returns. Besides, 
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Table 29 suggests that changes in stock price and the stock return in August were more volatile 
than the ones in July as suggested by the higher standard deviations.  
5.2 The effect of Changes in the size of Cumulative Return on Orders’ Cancellations 
Analysis 
This section reports the results from running the regressions in model specifications defined 
in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 to answer the first research question/hypothesis of this study. This 
study hypothesises that cancellations have an effect on the market, i.e. price dynamics 
measured by the market impact, to the extent that this phenomenon may lead to market crashes. 
Mainly, cancellations’ effect on the size of price drops is investigated.  
In July, Table 31 below shows that under normal cumulative return changes, model 
specification (2)54 has performed best in terms of explaining those changes. Nevertheless, the 
best model which has explained these changes in August has been model specification (3)55 
with R2 equals to 55%. This study’s focus is on the explanations of the extreme56 changes in 
cumulative return, as a proxy for market impact, i.e. potential market crash. Hence, 
cancellations on the buy side as well as the new orders on the buy side are highly significant 
determinants of the change in cumulative return. The signs of this effect are consistent with the 
expectations emphasised in Table 19. This suggests that in a downward price move, higher 
cancellations associated with lower orders’ submissions on the buy side would lead to higher 
market impact. This recommendation, additionally, goes in line with Machain and Dufour 
(2013) findings. Notably, cancellations effect on the buy side in models (1)57 and (2) is 
significant in determining the change in cumulative return under extreme price conditions. 
                                                          
 
54 This model is represented in equation (3.2.1.2). 
55 This model is represented in equation (3.2.1.4). 
56 Extreme price conditions definition in (3.2.7) is used unless stated otherwise. 
57 This model is represented in equation (3.2.1.1). 
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Neither cancellations nor submissions on the sell side significantly affect the change in 
cumulative return under extreme change in returns in both months, July and August.  
Further, cancellations as well as orders’ submissions under normal conditions in August are 
significant determinants of the change in return on the sell side for all three models. The effects 
on the change in returns match the expected effect in signs. On the other hand, that effect is not 
significant in July under normal return change under all models but model (3) where orders’ 
submissions effect, only, was significant. These effects’ directions, also, match the 
expectations in demonstrated in Table 19. These findings conform to Eisler et al. (2012) and 
Mayston et al. (2008) suggestions.  
Further, models (5)58 and (6)59 suggest that cancellations effect on the sell side on the change 
in cumulative return under normal price conditions is highly significant in July (p-value<1%) 
and less significant (p-value<20%) in August. The sign of this effect is opposite to what is 
expected in Table 19 though. Besides, under model (5), cancellations effect was significant in 
August on the change in cumulative return on the buy side under normal return change. This 
effect’s direction is as expected in Table 19.  
To sum up, it can be concluded that when the market is volatile and the change in 
cumulative return is not extreme, cancellations on the buy side play significant role in 
determining the change in cumulative return. Yet, cancellations on the sell side of the market 
are responsible for the change in cumulative return when the market is not volatile and the 
change in cumulative return is not extreme. On the other hand, when the market is volatile and 
the change in cumulative return from peak to trough is extreme, the change in the cumulative 
return is significantly affected by the cancellations occur on the buy side of the market. 
                                                          
 
58 This model is represented in equation (3.2.2.2) under (3.2.10) definition. 
59 This model is represented in equation (3.2.2.3) under (3.2.10) definition. 
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Cancellations, however, on both sides of the market have no clear effect on the change in 
cumulative return. It can be argued that, generally, the effect of cancellations on the sell side 
of the market has a larger effect on the cumulative return than cancellations on the buy side of 
the market when the change in cumulative return is extreme and the market is not volatile. This 
effect is not significant though. Therefore, if manipulations are to occur in the market, they are 
more likely to be on the sell side when the market is not volatile and on the buy side when the 
market is volatile. 
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Table 31: This table reports the analysis results of the model specifications which are used to analyse the effect of orders’ cancellations on the size of price drops from peak to trough for HSBC stock in 
August and July 2007 for both buy and sell sides. *** means that the coefficient is significant at 1% while ** means that it is significant at 5%. * means that the coefficient is significant at 10%. These 
models are:  
(1) ∆Return from peak to troughi=β0+β1TotalBuyCancellationToADVi+β2TotalBuyNewToADVi+β3TotalSellCancellationTOADVi+β4TotalSellNewToADVi+ei
,  
(2) ∆RPReturn from peak to troughi=β0+β1 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyCancellationi +β2 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyNewi +β4 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellNewi +ei
 and  
(3) ∆RPReturn from peak to troughi=β0+β1 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyCancellationi +β2 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyNewi +β4 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellNewi +ei
. 
Dependant variable is ∆ReturnPeakToTroughi 
Model Spec 
 
Variable 
Model Spec(1) Model Spec(2) 60 Model Spec(3)61 
July August July August July August 
Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme 
Constant -0.005*** -0.013 -0.004*** -0.016*** 54.429 -123.250 99.334 67.084 110.396 -572.930 -162.928” 1021.814 
𝒍𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏     5.851 -85.335 10.951 259.054”     
𝒍𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑵𝒆𝒘      -21.243 145.058 -21.077 -198.602     
𝒍𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏     -11.580 33.758 -27.487* 15.923     
𝒍𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑵𝒆𝒘      19.829 -95.119 27.428” -85.032     
𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏         17.742 -57.404 29.419” 304.901** 
𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑵𝒆𝒘          -41.733* 153.579 -35.037* -396.77** 
𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏         -34.333 71.510 -33.459” -385.159 
𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑵𝒆𝒘          40.068 -121.470 51.094** 344.745 
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏/𝑨𝑫𝑽  0.021 -0.035 0.015 0.126”         
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑵𝒆𝒘/𝑨𝑫𝑽 -0.015 0.038 -0.021 -0.091         
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏/𝑨𝑫𝑽  -0.014 -0.016 -0.024” -0.043         
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑵𝒆𝒘/𝑨𝑫𝑽 0.007 -0.003 0.022” 0.029         
𝑹𝟐 0.1071 0.3333 0.1657 0.4858 0.1959 0.2270 0.2614 0.4304 0.1457 0.4019 0.1085 0.5471 
                                                          
 
60 The dependant variable in this model specification is multiplied by 10000 to get the change in basis points as an integer number, i.e. ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughi. 
61 The dependant variable in this model specification is multiplied by 10000 to get the change in basis points as an integer number, i.e. ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughi. 
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Table 32: This table reports the analysis results of the model specifications which are used to analyse the effect of orders’ cancellations on the size of price drops per minute from peak to trough for HSBC 
stock in August and July 2007 for both buy and sell sides. *** means that the coefficient is significant at 1% while ** means that it is significant at 5%. * means that the coefficient is significant at 10%. 
These models are:  
(4) ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei=β0+β1TotalBuyCancellationToADVi+β2TotalBuyNewToADVi+β3TotalSellCancellationTOADVi+β4TotalSellNewToADVi+ei
,  
(5) ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei=β0+β1 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyCancellationi +β2 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyNewi +β4 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellNewi +ei
 and  
(6) ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei=β0+β1 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyCancellationi +β2 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyNewi +β4 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellNewi +ei
. 
Dependant variable is ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei 
Model Spec 
 
Variable 
Model Spec(4) Model Spec(5) Model Spec(6) 
July August July August July August 
Normal High Normal High Normal High Normal High Normal High Normal High 
Constant -2.695*** - -3.167*** -2.211** -16.181*** - -20.006** -17.603* 18.244* - 38.398** 7.224 
𝒍𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏     -1.107 - 3.824” -3.796     
𝒍𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑵𝒆𝒘      -1.062 - -3.710 3.641     
𝒍𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏     5.647*** - -3.875” -4.070     
𝒍𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑵𝒆𝒘      -2.485 - 4.881” 5.089     
𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏         -0.437 - -0.708 -3.509 
𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑵𝒆𝒘          -0.726 - -2.198 2.730 
𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏         8.747*** - -2.295 -6.211 
𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑵𝒆𝒘          -9.688*** - 0.665 5.932 
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏/𝑨𝑫𝑽  5.148 - 27.183 -46.889         
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑵𝒆𝒘/𝑨𝑫𝑽 -18.128” - -21.818 50.951         
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏/𝑨𝑫𝑽  24.410” - -14.546 -20.025         
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑵𝒆𝒘/𝑨𝑫𝑽 -0.986 - 16.267 3.079         
𝑹𝟐 0.2297 - 0.0536 0.1935 0.4009 - 0.1086 0.4653 0.3072 - 0.0858 0.2476 
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5.3 The Effect of Order Cancellations on the Spread Analysis  
In this section, the results from running the regressions in model specifications defined in 
section 3.2.3 are presented. These model specifications try to answer the second research 
question/hypothesis of this study where we examine the effect of cancellations on the market 
volatility, i.e. the bid-ask spread., to the extent that this phenomenon may lead to market 
crashes. In specific, the analysis on how cancellations affect the bid-ask spread is reported in 
this section.  
As Table 33 below best illustrates, model specification (2) has the best performance in 
explaining the change in the spread from peak to trough. It performed best under both price 
change conditions, normal and extreme. Furthermore, it can be noticed under model (2) that 
there is remarkable evidence on a significant relationship between the change in spread from 
peak to trough and both cancellations and newly submitted orders on the sell side of the market 
in July under the extreme change in cumulative return. Interestingly, under model specification 
(1), cancellations and new orders on the sell side were, also, significant determinants of the 
change in spread at 20% significance level in August where the change in cumulative return 
was normal (below 100bp); model specification (1) had the worst goodness of fit at almost 
70% amongst the three models though. On the other hand, cancellations’ effect on the buy side 
was significant on the change in spread under normal cumulative return change.  
Nevertheless, change in spread is not significantly affected by any of the factors included 
in models (1), (2) and (3) in August under the extreme change in cumulative return. These 
findings partially conform to the findings of Mayston et al. (2008). The duration of the 
downtrend price move was a significant determinant of the change in spread in July but not 
August under both settings of cumulative return change for model (2). Yet, this effect’s 
direction was positive under normal change in cumulative return and negative under the 
extreme change in cumulative return. The significant relationship between time duration from 
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peak to trough and the spread on the sell side of the market goes in line with Mayston et al. 
(2008) and Obizhaeva and Wang (2005) findings. However, Table 33 suggests that the spread 
is positively affected by cancellations on the buy side, which matches the expected sign in Table 
19 and supports what Eisler et al. (2012) suggested. 
In a nutshell, the analysis suggests that when the market is volatile but the change in 
cumulative return is not extreme, cancellations on the sell side significantly affect the spread. 
The effect direction confirms the expectation stated in Table 19. Cancellations, nevertheless, on 
the buy side of the market justifies the change in spread when the market is not volatile and the 
change in cumulative return is not extreme. On the other hand, it is not clear how cancellations 
on both sides of the market affect the spread under the extreme change in cumulative return 
from peak to trough and the market is volatile. It can be concluded, additionally, that the effect 
of cancellations on the sell side of the market strongly affect the spread when the change in 
cumulative price is extreme but the market is not volatile. This effect is of opposite direction 
of what is expected though.   
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Table 33: This table reports the analysis results of the model specifications which are used to analyse the effect of orders’ cancellations on the size of price drops from peak to trough for HSBC stock in 
August and July 2007 for both buy and sell sides. *** means that the coefficient is significant at 1% while ** means that it is significant at 5%. * means that the coefficient is significant at 10%. These 
models are:  
(1) ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi=β0+β1Durationi
+β2 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellCancellationi +β4 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyNewi +β5 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellNewi +ei
,  
(2) ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi=β0+β1Durationi
+β2 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellCancellationi +β4 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyNewi +β5 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellNewi +ei
 and  
(3) ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi=β0+β1Durationi+β2TotalBuyCancellationToADVi+β3TotalBuyNewToADVi+β4TotalBuyCancellationTOADVi+β5TotalSellNewToADVi+ei
. 
Dependant variable is ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi 
Model Spec 
 
Variable 
Model Spec(1) Model Spec(2) Model Spec(3) 
July August July August July August 
Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme 
Constant -0.175 1.925 -1.770” -2.166 -0.886 -16.378* -5.402** 0.453 0.431*** 1.137” 0.535*** 0.697** 
Duration 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 0.001” -0.002” 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
𝒍𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 0.399 -2.849 -0.001 -1.525         
𝒍𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑵𝒆𝒘  -0.705* 4.942 -0.020 2.381         
𝒍𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 -0.333 1.828 -0.573”62 1.058         
𝒍𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑵𝒆𝒘  0.675 -4.002 0.733” -1.727         
𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏     0.681” -1.134 0.109 -0.858     
𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑵𝒆𝒘      -0.380 4.036” 0.071 1.148     
𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏     -0.240 3.840* -0.217 0.479     
𝒍𝒏 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑵𝒆𝒘      0.083 -4.866* 0.689” -0.738     
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏/𝑨𝑫𝑽          1.606 -12.015” -1.861 -2.308 
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒖𝒚 𝑵𝒆𝒘/𝑨𝑫𝑽         -2.188 14.647” 1.796 3.997 
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏/𝑨𝑫𝑽          0.673 3.446 -1.513 -1.694 
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑵𝒆𝒘/𝑨𝑫𝑽         0.658 -10.122 1.029 -1.293 
𝑹𝟐 0.1170 0.6978 0.0674 0.2745 0.1147 0.8982 0.1008 0.0889 0.0408 0.7989 0.0434 0.1024 
                                                          
 
62 This Coefficient is nearly significant at 10% (P-value is 0.109). 
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5.4 Robust Regressions 
This section aims at validating the results obtained in sections 5.2 and 5.3 above. 
Consequently, robust regressions for model specifications discussed earlier are reported in this 
section. Robust regressions are used to account for any measurement errors in the estimations 
to allow generalisation of results.   
Overall, examining Table 37, Table 38 and Table 39, it can be noted that the outcome of the 
robust regressions confirm what have been previously reported in section 5.2. Remarkably, the 
results suggest that the change in cumulative return can be attributed to cancellations on both 
sides of the market when the market is not volatile regardless of the change size of cumulative 
return from peak to trough. The effect of cancellations on the sell side on the change in 
cumulative return is higher though. In addition, in the extreme price conditions, new orders on 
the sell side also turned to be significant determinant of the size of price drop. 
On the other hand, analysing Table 40, also, strengthens the results reported in section 5.3. 
The aforementioned table adds that under the extreme change in cumulative return, 
cancellations on the buy side of the market have significant effect on the spread when the 
market is volatile. This suggests that traders, as profit maximizers, may be able to alter their 
transaction costs using cancellations on the buy side of the market during price fall periods.  
6 Conclusion 
The present study aims at investigating and analysing how cancellations on both sides of 
the order book of London SETS contribute to the market impact (price dynamics) explanation. 
It, also, aims at investigating the cancellations behaviour in on both sides of the order book and 
their effect on market volatility (measured by the bid-ask spread). To this end, this paper 
rebuilds the E-Order Book for London SETS for July and August in 2007, and reconstructs the 
demand and supply curves to analyse price impact and fluctuations with special focus on 
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cancellations. All analysis is based on ultra-high-frequency data (in micro seconds) for five 
different stocks from different market sectors in London SETS. This study concentrates on the 
periods where the market was experiencing a downtrend price movements only (from peak to 
trough) as microstructure effects are supposed to be similar in the uptrend price movements 
but in different signs. Peak to trough analysis was introduced and explained in the previous 
chapter and utilises the DC methodology.  
Closely linked to the rise of electronic market microstructure, high frequency finance and 
algorithmic trading, this study attempts to uncover some of the effects for the observable 
multitude of order cancellations in E-LOB. Thus, it follows the literature by investigating the 
variables that contribute to the explanations of the market impact and volatility. However, this 
work deviates from the literature which uses event-time or calendar-time for sampling to using 
a new methodology which is Peak-Trough sampling methodology. This research, also, 
introduces new definitions to the spread as a measure to market volatility. Therefore, it defines 
and tests different model specifications to tackle the research questions.  
This work emphasises that when the market is volatile and the change in cumulative return 
is not extreme, cancellations on the buy side is a significant determinant of the change in 
cumulative return. Also, cancellations on the sell side of the market are deemed to be 
responsible for the change in cumulative return when the market is not volatile and the change 
in cumulative return is not extreme. On the other hand, when the market is volatile and the 
change in cumulative return from peak to trough is extreme, the change in the cumulative return 
is significantly affected by cancellations occurred on the buy side of the market. Yet, when the 
change in cumulative return is extreme and the market is not volatile, cancellations on both 
sides of the market have no clear effect on the change in cumulative return. Particularly, the 
effect of cancellations on the sell side of the market has a greater effect on the cumulative return 
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than cancellations on the buy side of the market when the change in cumulative return is 
extreme and the market is not volatile. This effect is not significant though.  
The analysis, also, proposes that when the market is volatile but the change in cumulative 
return is not extreme, cancellations on the sell side play a significant role in affecting the spread. 
Cancellations, nonetheless, on the buy side of the market significantly affect the spread when 
the market is not volatile and the change in cumulative return is not extreme. Yet, it is still not 
clear how cancellations on both sides of the market affect the spread under the extreme change 
in cumulative return from peak to trough and the market is volatile. Furthermore, the effect of 
cancellations on the sell side of the market strongly affect the spread when the change in 
cumulative price is extreme but the market is not volatile. This effect is of opposite direction 
of what is expected though. Generally, the findings go in line with the expected/proposed sign 
or direction of change in cumulative return. Lastly, cancellations are found to increase on both 
sides of the market as the trading day approaches its end regardless of the volatility. 
Given the limitations of this work, the methods proposed are rather simple and general. The 
data available doesn’t provide traders’ IDs, so strategies followed by different traders, 
including spoofing and layering, cannot be traced or checked. Also, cancellations have been 
discussed in many studies in the literature as an order book event, but the effect of cancellations 
is yet not quantified. A future work to extend this study’s analysis could be using comparative 
approaches, e.g. GARCH and error correction models, to analysis cancellations effect on the 
market. Another extension could be building an agent-based model to enhance the inferences 
and test different trading scenarios and behaviours.  
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7 Appendix 
Change in Cumulative e Return 
in real points by duration 
July August 
Percentage Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest 
1% -9.955937 -9.955937 -19.75854 -19.75854 
5% -6.9407 -8.847126 -5.586596 -14.52134 
10% -2.636648 -6.9407 -3.641602 -7.470693 
25% -1.660771 -5.48246 -2.613166 -6.372242 
50% -1.122029 Largest -1.492679 Largest 
75% -0.4363247 -0.1801158 -0.874963 -0.4343376 
90% -0.3287552 -0.150734 -0.694445 -0.3977094 
95% -0.150734 -0.1308936 -0.5088683 -0.2152334 
99% -0.1222918 -0.1222918 -0.0816994 -0.0816994 
Mean -1.637076 -2.263851 
Std. Dev. 2.009392 2.796788 
Skewness -2.711168 -4.252297 
Kurtosis 10.34847 24.36465 
Table 34: The descriptive statistics for the change in cumulative return from peak to trough per minute measured in real 
points (basis points x 10000) 
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Duration in Minutes 
From Peak to Trough 
July August 
Percentage Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest 
1% 5 5 0 0 
5% 15 5 10 5 
10% 20 15 10 5 
25% 30 15 20 10 
50% 55 Largest 40 Largest 
75% 100 320 70 130 
90% 240 375 110 140 
95% 375 385 125 155 
99% 470 470 340 340 
Mean 92.7778 51.0976 
Std. Dev. 103.3115 47.8941 
Skewness 2.0879 3.0040 
Kurtosis 6.6991 17.4453 
Table 35: The descriptive statistics for the duration in minutes for a downtrend price move from peak to trough  
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Change in Return Per 
minute Is More Than |3.65| 
July August 
Percentage Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest 
1% 0 0 0 0 
5% 0 0 0 0 
10% 0 0 0 0 
25% 0 0 0 0 
50% 0 Largest 0 Largest 
75% 0 1 0 1 
90% 0 1 1 1 
95% 1 1 1 1 
99% 1 1 1 1 
Mean 0.09259 0.1097 
Std. Dev. 0.2926 0.3145 
Skewness 2.8110 2.4969 
Kurtosis 8.9020 7.2344 
Table 36: The descriptive statistics for the change in cumulative return from peak to trough per minute measured in real 
points as a dummy variable used to identify extreme changes in returns. 
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Table 37: This table reports the robust regression results of the model specifications which are used to analyse the effect of orders’ cancellations on the size of price drops from peak to trough for HSBC 
stock in August and July 2007 for both buy and sell sides. *** means that the coefficient is significant at 1% while ** means that it is significant at 5%. * means that the coefficient is significant at 10%. 
These models are:  
(1) ∆Return from peak to troughi=β0+β1TotalBuyCancellationToADVi+β2TotalBuyNewToADVi+β3TotalSellCancellationTOADVi+β4TotalSellNewToADVi+ei
,  
(2) ∆Return from peak to troughi=β0+β1 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyCancellationi +β2 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyNewi +β4 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellNewi +ei
 and  
(3) ∆RPReturn from peak to troughi=β0+β1 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyCancellationi +β2 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyNewi +β4 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellNewi +ei
. 
Dependant variable is ∆ReturnPeakToTroughi 
Model Spec 
 
Variable 
Model Spec(1) Model Spec(2) 63 Model Spec(3)64 
July August July August July August 
Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme 
Constant -0.005*** -0.013** -0.004*** -0.016*** 54.429 -123.250 99.334* 67.084 110.396 -572.930 -162.928 1021.814 
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛     5.851 -85.335 10.951 259.054**     
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤      -21.243”65 145.058 -21.077” -198.602”     
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛     -11.580 33.758 -27.487*66 15.923     
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤      19.829 -95.119 27.428” -85.032     
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛         17.742 -57.404 29.419”67 304.901** 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤          -41.733** 153.579 -35.037* -396.770** 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛         -34.333” 71.510 -33.459* -385.159 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤          40.068” -121.470 51.094** 344.745 
Total Buy Cancellation/ADV 0.021” -0.035 0.015 0.126*         
Total Buy New/ADV -0.015” 0.038 -0.021 -0.091”         
Total Sell Cancellation/ADV -0.014 -0.016 -0.024* -0.043         
Total Sell New/ADV 0.007 -0.003 0.022”68 0.029         
𝑅2 0.1071 0.3333 0.1657 0.4858 0.1959 0.2270 0.2614 0.4304 0.1457 0.4019 0.1085 0.5471 
 
                                                          
 
63 The dependant variable in this model specification is multiplied by 10000 to get the change in basis points as an integer number. 
64 The dependant variable in this model specification is multiplied by 10000 to get the change in basis points as an integer number. 
65 This coefficient is almost significant at 10% significance level (p-value is 0.114). 
66 This coefficient is almost significant at 5% significance level (p-value is 0.057). 
67 This coefficient is almost significant at 10% significance level (p-value is 0.103). 
68 This coefficient is almost significant at 10% significance level (p-value is 0.104). 
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Table 38: This table reports the robust regression results of the model specifications which are used to analyse the effect of orders’ cancellations on the size of price drops per minute from peak to trough 
for HSBC stock in August and July 2007 for both buy and sell sides. *** means that the coefficient is significant at 1% while ** means that it is significant at 5%. * means that the coefficient is significant 
at 10%.These models are:  
(4) ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei=β0+β1TotalBuyCancellationToADVi+β2TotalBuyNewToADVi+β3TotalSellCancellationTOADVi+β4TotalSellNewToADVi+ei
,  
(5) ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei=β0+β1 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyCancellationi +β2 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyNewi +β4 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellNewi +ei
 and   
(6) ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei=β0+β1 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyCancellationi +β2 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyNewi +β4 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellNewi +ei
. 
Dependant variable is ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughToDurationi 
Model Spec 
 
Variable 
Model Spec(4) Model Spec(5) Model Spec(6) 
July August July August July August 
Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme 
Constant -2.258*** -7.286 -2.354*** -13.152*** -14.502*** -59.541** -15.236*** -108.077*** 5.315 2.777 19.669*** 80.170 
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛     -1.200*69 4.240 2.459** 13.812     
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤      0.817 -8.818 -2.208” -10.136     
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛     4.135*70 6.491” -1.154 -18.329     
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤      -2.851” 1.715 1.801” 20.880     
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛         -2.624* 6.243 -0.179 -8.179 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤          1.470 5.546 -1.710 8.762 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛         7.740* 0.773 0.026 -20.661 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤          -7.273” -13.288” -0.521 10.692 
Total Buy Cancellation/ADV 2.737 2.066 10.965 80.256         
Total Buy New/ADV -9.087” -7.330 -9.231 -84.512         
Total Sell Cancellation/ADV 11.475” 1.139 -1.119 -58.299         
Total Sell New/ADV 1.734 13.179 5.443 85.732         
𝑅2 0.2060 0.6364 0.1421 0.5860 0.5115 0.9206 0.2968 0.8303 0.3106 0.6073 0.1224 0.8022 
 
                                                          
 
69 This coefficient is almost significant at 5% significance level (p-value is 0.056). 
70 This coefficient is almost significant at 5% significance level (p-value is 0.063). 
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Table 39: This table reports the robust regression results of the model specifications which are used to analyse the effect of orders’ cancellations on the size of price drops per minute from peak to trough 
for HSBC stock in August and July 2007 for both buy and sell sides. *** means that the coefficient is significant at 1% while ** means that it is significant at 5%. * means that the coefficient is significant 
at 10%. These models are:  
(7) ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei=β0+β1TotalBuyCancellationToADVi+β2TotalBuyNewToADVi+β3TotalSellCancellationTOADVi+β4TotalSellNewToADVi+ei
,  
(8) ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei=β0+β1 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyCancellationi +β2 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyNewi +β4 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellNewi +ei
 and  
(9) ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughPerMinutei=β0+β1 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyCancellationi +β2 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyNewi +β4 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellNewi +ei
. 
Dependant variable is ∆RPReturnPeakToTroughToDurationi 
Model Spec 
 
Variable 
Model Spec(7) Model Spec(8) Model Spec(9) 
July August July August July August 
Normal High Normal High Normal High Normal High Normal High Normal High 
Constant -2.695*** - -3.167*** -2.211** -16.181** - -20.006** -17.603** 18.244* - 38.398** 7.224 
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛     -1.107 - 3.824 -3.796     
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤      -1.062 - -3.710 3.641     
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛     5.647** - -3.875” -4.070     
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤      -2.485 - 4.881” 5.089     
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛         -0.437 - -0.708 -3.509 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤          -0.726 - -2.198 2.730 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛         8.747*** - -2.295 -6.211 
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤          -9.688*** - 0.665 5.932 
Total Buy Cancellation/ADV 5.148 - 27.183” -46.889         
Total Buy New/ADV 
-
18.128*** 
- -21.818 50.951         
Total Sell Cancellation/ADV 24.410* - -14.546 -20.025         
Total Sell New/ADV -0.986 - 16.267 3.079         
𝑅2 0.2297 - 0.0536 0.1935 0.4009 - 0.1086 0.4653 0.3072 - 0.0858 0.2476 
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Table 40: This table reports the robust regression results of the model specifications which are used to analyse the effect of orders’ cancellations on the size of price drops from peak to trough for HSBC 
stock in August and July 2007 for both buy and sell sides. *** means that the coefficient is significant at 1% while ** means that it is significant at 5%. * means that the coefficient is significant at 10%. 
These models are:  
(1) ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi=β0+β1Durationi
+β2 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellCancellationi +β4 𝐥𝐧 TotalBuyNewi +β5 𝐥𝐧 TotalSellNewi +ei
,  
(2) ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi=β0+β1Durationi
+β2 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyCancellationi +β3 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellCancellationi +β4 𝐥𝐧 AverageBuyNewi +β5 𝐥𝐧 AverageSellNewi +ei
 and  
(3) ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi=β0+β1Durationi+β2TotalBuyCancellationToADVi+β3TotalBuyNewToADVi+β4TotalBuyCancellationTOADVi+β5TotalSellNewToADVi+ei
. 
Dependant variable is ∆NVWAPBuySellPeakToTroughi 
Model Spec 
 
Variable 
Model Spec(1) Model Spec(2) Model Spec(3) 
July August July August July August 
Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme Normal Extreme 
Constant -0.175 1.925 -1.770” -2.166 -0.886 -16.378* -5.402** 0.453 0.431*** 1.137” 0.535*** 0.697** 
Duration 0.001 -0.001 -0.001” -0.006” 0.001** -0.002* 0.00171 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 0.399” -2.849* -0.001 -1.525”         
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤  -0.705** 4.942* -0.020 2.381”         
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 -0.333 1.828* -0.573” 1.058         
𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤  0.675 -4.002* 0.733* -1.727         
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛     0.681*72 -1.134 0.109 -0.858     
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤      -0.380 4.036” 0.071 1.148     
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛     -0.240 3.840”73 -0.217 0.479     
𝑙𝑛 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤      0.083 -4.866*74 0.689* -0.738     
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝐴𝐷𝑉          1.606 -12.015” -1.861 -2.308 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤/𝐴𝐷𝑉         -2.188 14.647” 1.796 3.997 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝐴𝐷𝑉          0.673 3.446 -1.513 -1.694 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑤/𝐴𝐷𝑉         0.658 -10.122” 1.029 -1.293 
𝑅2 0.1170 0.6978 0.2989 0.2745 0.1147 0.8982 0.1008 0.0889 0.0408 0.7989 0.0434 0.1024 
                                                          
 
71 This coefficient is almost significant at 20% significance level (p-value is 0.203). 
72 This coefficient is almost significant at 5% significance level (p-value is 0.057). 
73 This coefficient is almost significant at 10% significance level (p-value is 0.103). 
74 This coefficient is almost significant at 5% significance level (p-value is 0.061). 
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5 Chapter Five 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
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The increase in trading volume has raised many concerns about the impact of algorithmic 
trading, which links to HFT, on the market, i.e. price discovery process and volatility. There 
has been considerable effort on questioning market quality and HFT in both theoretical and 
empirical literature. Initially, HFTs and other intermediaries played a positive role in stabilizing 
prices by providing liquidity. However, intermediaries step aside in many historical cases at 
times of extreme volatility. It, consequently, does not appear to be a problem with HFT but 
rather a general feature of equity markets. Most of the research which has investigated HFT 
has concentrated on the market impact of HFT on market quality measures. Besides, another 
bulk of studies has inspected the suitability of the current market regulations in light of HFT.  
However, there is still a gap between the results of academic literature and the beliefs 
predominant or sustained in media, public and even regulatory discussions on HFT impact on 
markets. Additionally, it is important to highlight that evaluating the strategies used by HFTs 
is of overriding significance. Yet, more attention should be paid to investigating automated 
trading strategies. Introducing the European Commission FTT has raised many concerns about 
examining the impact of this tax on traders (HFTs in particular) and financial markets. The first 
chapter of this thesis has attempted to empirically examine the impact of levying FTT on the 
stock market by simulating an electronic limit order market (order-driven market) with a 
heterogeneous set of players/traders. This set of players includes traders who are liquidity 
takers and providers where they buy and sell a single asset in the market. This artificial market 
is populated exclusively with zero-intelligence agents who randomly place orders. Yet, the 
specifications of the limit order book in this artificial market has led to generate a non-random 
price. The novelty of the first chapter lies in the use of simulated order flow data to assess the 
impact of the FTT on the market quality as well as on the market participants. I found support 
to the regulatory policy of the European Commission regarding introducing a FTT of 0.1% on 
all stock transactions. In particular, traders are found to tend to submit orders and start to trade 
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more aggressively by increasing the volume traded in order to remain in a profitable position 
after the tax. The market, nevertheless, ended up with higher trading volume, lower bid-ask 
spread and almost same price volatility. This may suggest that the proposed tax does not affect 
HFTs in a negative way. On the contrary, it induced them to perform more trading volume.  
The second and third chapters rebuild the London Stock Exchange Electronic Order Book 
(SETS) in real-time for 5 different stocks for two consecutive months, July and August 2007 
and utilise the Directional Changes (DC) methodology to track price trends. DC tracks peak to 
trough (P-T) and trough to peak (T-P) trends that have cumulative returns in excess of 25 basis 
points thresholds.  
The second chapter of this thesis aims at analysing the intraday dynamics of liquidity in 
London SETS electronic limit order book. Utilising the concept of the NVWAP, the shape of 
bid and ask sides of the order book is modelled to predict the market trend under different time 
intervals. The prediction methodology consists of four statistics which are ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘), 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑), ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑏𝑖𝑑) and ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝑎𝑠𝑘). These statistics represent the 
steepening/flattening and the expansion/contraction in the NVWAP curves. The empirical 
analysis confirms the that information from the NVWAP along with the resulted liquidity 
supply and demand curves in the limit order book reveal consistent observable market 
behaviour during both uptrend and downtrend intervals. In fact, examining the change in the 
shape of NVWAP curves for five different stocks over a period of two consecutive months, 
July and August 2007, suggests that the aforementioned four statistics have correctly identified 
prevailing market trend in 86.61% of the total cases on average. Thus, these four statistics are 
revealed to be robust measures to identify the prevailing market trend without prior knowledge 
of the price. These results go in line with Malik and Markose (2012) findings for different set 
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of stocks. Within an algorithmic trading system, as market state changes, these four statistics 
can be used to switch between different trading strategies or build new strategies. 
The third chapter of this thesis investigates how cancellations on both sides of the order 
book of London SETS contribute to the market impact (price dynamics) explanation. It, also, 
analyses the cancellations behaviour on both sides of the order book and their effect on market 
volatility (denoted by the bid-ask spread). To this end, I rebuild the E-Order Book for London 
SETS for July and August in 2007, and reconstruct the demand and supply curves to analyse 
price impact and fluctuations with special focus on cancellations. The main focus of the third 
chapter will be on the periods where the market was experiencing a downtrend price 
movements only (from peak to trough) as microstructure effects are supposed to be similar in 
the uptrend price movements but in different signs. This chapter tries to uncover some of the 
effects for the observable multitude of order cancellations on the market quality. It follows the 
literature by investigating the variables that contribute to the explanations of the market impact 
and volatility. However, this study deviates from the literature which uses event-time or 
calendar-time for sampling to using a new methodology which is Peak-Trough sampling 
methodology inspired by DC approach. This study, also, introduces new definitions to the 
spread as a measure of market volatility. Therefore, this paper defines and tests different model 
specifications to tackle the research questions.  
Third chapter suggests that when the market is volatile and the change in cumulative return 
is not extreme, cancellations on the buy side is a significant determinant of the change in 
cumulative return. Also, cancellations on the sell side of the market are deemed to be 
responsible for the change in cumulative return when the market is not volatile and the change 
in cumulative return is not extreme. On the other hand, when the market is volatile and the 
change in cumulative price return from peak to trough is extreme, the change in the cumulative 
return is significantly affected by cancellations occurred on the buy side of  the market. Put 
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differently, this study, also, proposes that when the market is volatile but the change in 
cumulative return is not extreme, cancellations on the sell side play a significant role in 
affecting the spread. Cancellations, nonetheless, on the buy side of the market significantly 
affect the spread when the market is not volatile and the change in cumulative return is not 
extreme. Moreover, it is still not clear how cancellations on both sides of the market affect the 
spread under the extreme change in cumulative price return from peak to trough and the market 
is volatile. This study, also, suggests that the effect of cancellations on the sell side of the 
market strongly affect the spread when the change in cumulative price is extreme but the market 
is not volatile. This effect is of opposite direction of what is expected though.  
Given the limitations of this work, the methods proposed are rather simple and general. The 
data available doesn’t provide traders’ IDs, so strategies followed by different traders, 
including spoofing and layering, cannot be checked. Also, cancellations have been discussed 
in many studies in the literature as order book events, but the effect of cancellations is yet not 
quantified. A future work to extend this study’s analysis could be using comparative 
approaches to analysis cancellations effect on the market. Another possible extension is to build 
an agent-based model to enhance the inferences and test different trading strategies/scenarios 
and behaviours.  
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